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In 1928 Max Scheler wrote in Man's place in Nature._------,
Man is more a problem to himself at the
present time than ever before in all
recorded history ••• we have a scientific,
a philosophical, a theological anthro-
pology in complete separation from each
other. We do not have a unified idea of
man. The increasing multiplicity of the
special sciences valuable as they are, -
tend to hide man's nature more than
reveal it.l
This confused, fragmented and piecemeal picture of man
is the legacy left to him by the promises of the Enlighten-
ment when men had once believed in the happiness to be
a-ttained by the progress of reason. lYl-en in the twentieth
century, contrary to the predictions of the Enlighten-
men-t, have lived through two world wars and are facing the
danger of an immanent third; an atomic holocaust.
They are ghostly spectres, passionless, goalless, without
soul or integrity. How has such a sorry state of affairs
come about and how is the integral image of man to be
restored to him? These are some of the questions that
plague twentieth century thinkers who sit amongst the ruins
of over tW0 thousand years of western culture.
This is how the twentieth century confronted Nicolas
Alexandrovich Berdyaev. The first and second world wars
in the West and the ascendancy of Communism in the East
heralded for him the end of a historical epoch. As far
as Berdyaev is concerned,modern man is undergoing a
crisis of consciousness and is desperately in need of
2.
direction and hope.
Existentialism2 and Marxism, two modern schools of thought;
were consciop.s reactions to the history of ideas in the
East and West. The shock of the wars forced many thinkers
to challenge the assumptions inherent in the understanding
of man by the thinkers in these two 'worlds.' The result
was, in the case of the Westpan admission that the
glorification of reason had Qbseu~ed the irrational and
passionate aspects of man's creatureliness and had
presented a distorted and onesided picture of him.
saw llimself as a being whose rational powers were the
dependable means for the advancement of his happiness and
the resolution of conflict. But events in the twentieth
century showed up the hollowness of this claim and in so
doing precipitated an unprecedented attack on the entire
philosophical tradition of the West. The overriding
influence of'reason was traced back to its sources in
Greece and Rome for it was here that reason first gained
ascendancy in the formal logic of the Romans and in the
phi10sophy of the Greeks and had remained differentiated
and supreme throughout the history of philosophy in the
West.
Despite several attempts made during the course of
Wes·tern philosophy by, for example, the Stoics, St.
Bernard 'I St. Augustine, the mystics like commas , Eckhard, Tauler,
Suso and Bohme, Pascal, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche 3 to
point to the limits of reason, reason held sway until
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the cataclysmic world wars of 1914 and 1939. It is for
this reason that Existerrtialism was a necessary reaction
to the distorted self-understanding of western man.
The Existentialists contended that it was faith in
reason which predicted the glorious progress of man from
the Enlightenment onwards; r2ason which has given us the
abstract technological world we live in and reason which
makes the extinction of man through atomic war possible.
Now with the shattering of the idea of the dependability
of reason to advance the cause of man, the traditional
view of man which was built on reason and which goes back
to the culture of Greece and Rome stands in need of
evaluation. This means that if man was understood in
terms of reason, to question the ability of reason to
solve man's c~isis is to question the traditional under-
standing of man himself. This is what the Existentialists
in effect did. By pointing to the neglected aspects of
man, they altered the picture of man in the West and
produced an 'adjustment crisis'.
In the case of the East the crisis may be best described
in Berdyaev's words, 'How could h01y Russia be turned
. t 1 f . 1 . h' ,4ln 0 an arsena 0 ml ltant ut elsm? It is an irony
that Russian thought which is fundamentally religious
and which has prided itself on its holistic view of man
should in the end spawn a social theory that would destroy
and crush this very holism. The Russian holistic view
of man is intimately linked with her religious culture
for all the themes and controversies among the Russian
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intelligentsia of the nineteenth century which were
attempts to cope wit.h the sufferings and unhappiness
of man were rooted in religious questions. The phenomenon
of serfdom and the absolutist monarchy of Russia gave to
this quest a particular poignancy. The serfs were the
subject of concern in the writings of Radischev and
Chernishevsky, Herzen and Belinsky to name but a few.
The quest for righteousness and justice, the problem of
evil, God's responsibility for the condition of man,
the pitiful state of unfreedom and the orthodox doctrine
of the di'inity of man were all deeply religious themes
with a par~icular social concern.
The advent of Communism in Russia is the beginning of the
ascendancy of the social over the religious. The socio-
political problems of Russia, the gulf between the rulers
and the ruled and the events that brought this conflict
to a head all contributed to changing the religious quest
of the Russians for a solution to man's problem,to the
possibility of a social Utopia here on earth. This
subtle change produced a split among the intelligentsia.
Many among the~, Berdyaev included, stubbornly maintained
that the problems of Russia and man could only be resolved
in an eschatological culmination of the world in the
kingdom of God. Others who secularized this eschatology
completely preached the message that the kingdom of
righteousness on earth was both desirable and possible
and that Russia would be the country to realize it first.
Communism then, although it was the brainchild of a Jew
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in the West, responded to urgent social and religious
preoccupations of the Russians and was seen by many to
be the answer to Russia's problems.
History has shown, however, that atheistic socialism
was a bitter parody of the essential God-consciousness
of the Russian people. Experts on Russian thought
maintain that on the one hand the Russian mentality is
predisposed towards Communism because the Russians have
always had a holistic and integrated ,approach to life.
On the other hand they point out that the Orthodox Church
gave to the Russians an inner freedom and dignity by
insisting on the divine aspect of man who has been cast
Xin God's image. These contradictions found their apparent
resolution in the social promise of Communism which,
however, soon proved to its supporters to be a perversion
of the essential religious disposition of the Russians.
Like the West, Russia too operated with a particular view
of man which made possible the rise of Communism. Now
the horrors of Communist dictatorship have forced many
to question and re-examine the understanding of man in
the East. The crisis oC man's self understanding in the
West and East is discussed in much greater detail in
Chapter I for Berdyaev's philosophy is a conscious
attempt to cope with the dilemma of his age and many of
the themes and motifs of his views can be traced to the
early beginnings of philosophy in both the West and
Russia.
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The crisis of modern man then,is his alienation from
his own self-understanding and/as a consequence,his
inability to understand 'the other: This has produced
an unbridgable ~ulf of contending ideologies in the
twentieth century which appear to be the only overt
symbols of security and cohesion to the peoples of the
west and Ea.st. It seems tha-t unless an attempt is made
to reaffirm the integrity of man, man will be unable to
free himself from the kind of ideological collectives
from which he derives his security and well being. He
will be therefore under the constaDt threat of ideolo-
gical warfare for ideology is uncritical and fosters fanaticism
It seems further, that in the absence of inner strength
man will derive it from externals and the more frenzied
the attachment the greater seems to be the absence of
inner peace and integrity.S Furthermore, the conflicting
ideologies of technocracy and communism have been given
a frightening dimension by the service of science.
Science has, if anything, given the ideological war the
power to completely destroy man and has removed all
traces of inner security from the minds and hearts of
men. Even modern social sciences, as Schlerer has pointed
out, have increased rather than alleviated these t~nsions.
More than ever before man has become the subject of his
own investigations, and although the information ,concerning
man has far surpassed any previous age , he is nowhere
nearer apprehending himself in his wholeness than before.
Ironically the plethora of information has presented a
fragmented and disjointed picture of man with the anthro-
I •
pologists of the separate disciplines all claiming a
unique understanding of ~im. Hence for the sociologist,
man is first and foremost a social animal who discovers
himself in relations with llis fellow man and his environ-
ment. For the psychologist he is a creature of neuroses
and for the biologist a specimen in the laboratory no
greater than any other subject of study. Although all
these disciplines have advanced important information
concerning man they have not improved his overall lot
in the world nor contributed to the advancement of his
inner peace.
In the face of these problems - of the lack of under-
standing, lack of freedom, dehumanization and rootlessness -
many attempts have been made to call man to an awareness of
his unfree condition and dehumanized aspect but few have
faced the reality of the crisis of consciousness of
Western man and the need fer a new source of inspiration
that would provide new direction. One such person has
been Nicholas Alexandrovich Berdyaev whose unique
philosophy of freedom is an attempt to call man to a
recognition of his humanity and provide forthe men of
East and West an incisive understanding of the purpose
and vocation of his humanity.
As a onetime member of the Russian intelligentsia and of
the early Marxist circle he is a true representative of
the Russian world~view for all the themes of the intelli-
gentsia in the nineteenth century recur in his mature
8 •
philosophy. Yet on the other hand he openly declares his
sympathy with Existentialism, agreeing and supporting many
of their main themes especially their reaction to
absolute knowledge and their emphasis on subjective
experience.
The circumstances of Berdyaev's birth and the
exigencies of his life go a long way in explaining this
apparent contradiction.
Berdyaev was born in Kiev in 1874 during the reign of
Alexander 11 the Emancipator (1855-1881) at a time when
Russia was afire with revolutionary activity. His life
mirrors the political turmoil of Russia for in 1898 he
was arrested and exiled to Volgoda for his part as a
leader in the student Marxist circle. However, he soon
became disenchanted with the Marxist's alternative for
he saw that 'it was bound to lead to despotism and the
betrayal of freedom'. When Berdyaev was exiled to the
West in 1922, this time for antagonizing the Soviet
authorities by publishing in the magazine Russian
Freedom his disagreereents with the Marxist
doctrine, he realized that the bourgeois civilization
of the West was no haven for those seeking freedom
. h 6. .elt er. HlS sympathetlc disposition towards Marxism
and Existentialism was his appreciation of the fact
that these philosophies appeared to be man-centred.
Only later he realized that Existentialism and Marxism
are mutually contradictory.7
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As a result of his experiences in Russia and after his
exile in the West, he diagnosed the problems of his age
to be specifically man's state of unfreedom. In his
book Slavery and Freedoill he goes to great lengths to
explain the various ways in which man has become enslaved
to externals and has lost his integral ima 0 e. However,
Berdyaev saw the modern crisis in Apocalyptic terms.
For him the world wars were not merely crises in history
but a judgement on history. The history of man he claimed
has reached the end of an epoch and is now on the thres-
hold of a new beginning. Berdyaev conceived the crisis
of Western man in these apparently exaggerated terms
because of his Christian perspective.
Retreating from Existentialism which he claimed stopped
at mere individualism and Marxism which was hostile to
man, BerdyaeV,in search of a philosophy that would,
1. recognize the primacy of individual freedom, and
2. restore to man his essential humanity, found himself
drawn to Christianity. He claimed that it was Christianity
alone that presented to man in the God-incarnate what human
beings can potentially be in their freedom and humanity.
Hence, he held up to enslaved man, whose humanity had become
distorted,the Christian interpretation which he believed
was the only enduring preserver of human values. He said
of his conversion:
I became a Christian because I was seeking for
a deeper and truer foundation for belief in
man. 8
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Berdyaev's Christian view of man presents a multitude
of problems to the philosopher of Russian orthodoxy. His
vision of man bears an orthodox stamp, yet at the same
time the subjective emphasis of his philosophy he
developed from his acquaintance with the German mystics,
German Idealism especially Kant and finally the Existen-
tialists.
Berdyaev's philosophy is primarily concerned with the
freedom and humanity of man. It is therefore completely
anthropocentric and hence at odds with conventional
Christianity. God, the world and history are seen in
terms of the Absolute freedom of man. Freedom is a
priori and the Christian revelation is adjusted in accord-
ance with this a priori.
Although many have called Berdyaev a Christian philosopher
and there is an element of truth in this, it must be
stressed that Berdyaev sees Christianity in terms of
man and,this being the case,he often indulges in permutations
of the conventional interpretation of God and Christ to
preserve above all else the freedom and dignity of man.
F~ thus presents a highly controversial idea of G(j
arid may even be accused of delimiting the powers of God
to increase the powers of man. One finds that Berdyaev
lS often forced into this position because his ~ priori
is freedom, not revelation. In his Dream and Reality
Berdyaev wrote!
Freedom is a primordial source and condition
of existence, and characteristically I have
put freedom rather than Being at the basis
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of my philosophy. I do not think any
other ~hilosopher has done this in such
a radical and thoroughgoing way.9
In fact, no philosopher or theologian had, but it is
this thorough-going idea of freedom that is responsible
for the fact th~t he was charged with heresy by the
ecclesiastical authorities and very nearly expelled from
Russia by them.
Berdyaev's Christian perspective raises methodological
problems. He has a tendency to write in a tautological
fashion for he sees man in terms of Christ and Christ in
terms of man. His philosophy cannot be seen as a logical
argument. Rather his method must be likened to a wheel,
,
where his ideas radiate from man to the Christian under-
standing of him and from the Christian world view back
to man. This makes Berdyaev difficult to evaluate
except in terms of Biblical consistency for ultimately
he presents his reader with the option of either accepting
his views or rejecting them on faith. Of course this is
problematic from a philosophical standpoint, but Berdyaev
has radically redefined philosophy to make it consistent
with his pursu~t of truth. His contention that not only
religion but philosophy too leads to truth remains to be
evaluated. Here, he follows the existentialists in the
shift from the quest for absolute truth to the more
meaningful quest for authentic knowledge. This con-
flation of truth with knowledge has presented innumerable
difficulties to many thinkers. This explains why research
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done on Berdyaev has been strait jacketed within a theo-
sophical mould. BesideS a few scholars like Oliver Fielding
Clarke, An Introduction to Berdyaev; Donald Lowrie,
Rebellious Pruphet; Samuel C. Calian, The Significance
of Eschatology in the Thought of Nicholas Berdyaev; David
Bonner Richardson, Berdyaev's Philosophy of History and
Fuad Nucho, The Existential Paradox of Freedom and
Necessity, a critical study, who have attempted a sys-
tematic rendering of Berdyaev's philosophy, his writings
have been confined to anthologies of Russian thinkers or
articles in religious journals. Even these researchers
show confusion in their writings. But this is not a
reflection on their ability but rather on the way
Berdyaev develops his ideas. He does not develop his
thought along a logical sequence and he knows himself
to be unsystematic. Each of his ideas is dependent
for its clarification on the next and produces the
difficulty of where does one start to explain his thought
for to start at anyone point requires the assumption of
another. This problem is obviated somewhat in this
dissertation because not all the aspects of Berdyaevis
thought are of equal importance or re] evant to the central
theme, that is, the existential .;.mplications of his idea
of Freedom. However, the quest for the e$sentially humane
which is the main existential import of Berdyaev's philo-
sophy may, if one stretches a point, be traced along a
linear path.
This is not to imply that a logical argument along a linear
path is the best method in philosophy to layout one I s
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ideas. Berdyaev himself would quarrel with such a
method. 1D What it means "is that the nature of the topic
demands a logically developed argument for the existen-
tial import of Berdyaev's idea of Freedom.
The purpose of this dissertation is to show that
Berdyaev's search for what constitutes the humane in
terms of his idea of Freedom is an attempt to cope with
the dilemma man's alienation from his own self-understanding
has produced. The various steps of the argument are,
(1) an overview of the ascendency of Leason in the West
and Atheistic socialism in the East an~ the abdication
of freedom in both these cultures. Berdyaevis philosophy
is developed in response to these traditions, hence a
description is necessary to make his ideas intelligible;
(2) The meaning of Freedom as Berdyaev conceives it and
the purpose of man;
(3) The destruction of personality in the Humanistic
revolution in the West and socialist revolution in the
East;
(4) The quest for Personality in terms of
a) Personality and Freedom and Necessity,
b) personality and Creativity,
c) Personality and History,
d) Personality and Eschatology and the reconstruc-
tion of the image of man, and
(5) a criti~~l ~ppraisal of the implications of Berdyaev's
Flf)1lght for man and for philosophy.
J..LJ:.
Footnotes: Positio
1. Scheler, M. Cited in Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom,
p. 34.
Berdyaev, on arriving in Berlin after being exiled from
Russia, met with Scheler and Keyserling.
2. °Existentialismo is used here to refer generally to a
number of writings of diverse interests, many of whose
authors repudiate the term. They are joined together,
however, by their preoccupation with certain common






The Russian Revolution, p. 3.
5. This theme has been developed by many commentators on
ideJlogy but it is suggested here as a theme for
consideration.
6. Berdyaev, N.A. Dream and Reality, pp. 103f.
7. Ibid. , p. 93.
8. Berdyaev, N.A. Dream and Reality, p. 180.
9. Ibid. , p. 46.
10. Cf. Berdyaev, N.A. Freedom and the Spirit, p. X1X.
It must be borne in mind that to argue logically for a
point of view does not necessarily mean the
development of a dogmatic constitutive model.
However, it can be argued also that any attempt at
explanation, no matter how simpie, does presuppose
a constitutive model. This dissertation attempts
to outline the fundamentals of Berdyaev's 'model'.
CHAPTER I FREEDOM IN HISTORY
In Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov the Grand Inquisitor
says to his prisoner, Christ Jesus:
You want to go into the world and you are
going empty handed, with some promise of
freedom, which men in their simplicity
and innate lawlessness cannot even
comprehend, which they bear and dread -
for nothing has ever been more unendurable
to man and to human society than freedom.l
As harsh as this may sound, there is an eternal truth in
the words of the Grand Inquisi·r·or, \'lhose triumphalistic
contempt of the promise of Chri~t is followed by his claim
that 'he and his followers have at least vanquished freedom
2
and have done so in order to make men happy'.
The message that rings out from the words of the Inquisitor
is that freedom is too heavy a burden for man to bear and
that he is happier, indeed content, in his unfree state.
Freedom has not been wrenched from him; he willingly gave
it up.
A survey of the intellectual histories of both East and West
provides. sufficient evidence for the slaims of the Inquisitor.
The ascendency of reason in Western philosophy produced a
belief in the manifold powers of reason to both explain the
world for man and to preserve his freedom in terms of reason.
The ascendency of atheistic socialism in the East perverted
the Russian spirit, and, in Dursuit of happiness in the social
collec~ive, destroyed the freedom of the individual.
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The men of both·· Eastern and- Western cultures appeared to
willingly surrender their freedom in the hope of 'earthly'
justice and happiness. The Grand· Inquisitor is right in
concluding that 'these men are more than ever convinced
that they are absolutely free, and yet they themselves
have bLvught their freedom to us and humbly laid it at
our feet'. The man of the Enlightenment was complacent.in
the belief in the progress of reason to promote the
happiness of man~ and the man of nineteenth century
Russian socialism, influenced by Hegel, also optimistically
believed that an earthly justice is desirable and possib~e.3
Only a few dissenters like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche ln
the West and Lev Shestov in the East saw through the il-
lusion and called men to a greater awareness of the com-
plexity and essential absurdity of the human condition.
These, however, were only a few lone voices who, how-
ever, failed to penetrate the consciousness of nineteenth
century man.
It was only at the end of the nineteenth century and the
beginniY1g of the twentieth that political and cultural
events combined to precipitate,in Berdyaev's words, 'a
judgem'·nt in history on the history of man I. 4 The first
and second world wars; the advent of communism; the
possibility of complete extinction through the atom bomb
and the bewildering technological revolution shattered the
complacency of Western and Eastern man. Belief in the
omnipotence of reason or the possibility of happiness for
all in a socialist community was completely crushed.
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Twentieth century existentialism emerged from this
milieu. Taking their cue from the 'protestors on behalf
of man' in Western and Eastern history like St. Augustine;
Pascal; Kierkegaard; Nietzsche; and Shestov, they stripped
philosophy of its illusions and brought home to twentieth
century man the truth of his unfree condition.
The existentialist revolt against conventional philosophy
charged the history of ideas in the West with denying the
primordial freedom of man by constituting systems 6f
thought which bore little or no relevance to the destiny
of man or the nature of his being. The irrational elements
in human psychology, which after the world wars were plain
for everybody to see, had been ignored in favour of the
neat resolution of all contradictions into a rational
whole. Philosophy had explained the world in terms of
only one aspect of man, reason, and had, therefore,
presented a distorted picture of man.
Man's contemporary dilemma is that the events in the
twentieth century did not correspond at all with his
hitherto under~tanding of himself and his world. He
discovered that while philosophy may ignore the ambiguities,
contradictions and passions of human personality, it is
these impulses which forge the history of man and which,
therefore, cannot be ignored in any future deliberations.
While the existentialist revolt against the omnipotence
of reason may apply more to the West, their emphasis on the
individual is important for both cultures. Russia remained
18.
by and large outside the overriding influence of reason
yet it too, through a distorted understanding of their
own culture and destiny, precipitated a totalitarianism
tliat~ ove:r::whelmedindividual freedom with the social whole.
Russian intellectual history nf the nineteenth century was
stimulated by a passionate interest in the fate and free-
dom of man, man and his relation to society and man and
God. The themes of humanism, personalism, existentialism,
individualism and the urgency with which they were dis-
cussed could have only emerg,~d from a people whose
philosophy issues from a religious passion to which its
history had predisposed it. While all this is explained
in greater detail in Part 11, suffice it to say that in
spite of these almost irrational themes Russia too
degenerated to a condition of bondage in a form hitherto
unknown in Europe and Asia.
Since Berdyaev was a child of this crisis and developed
his philosophy of freedom in direct response to the
problems in East and West and since he purports to give a new
interpretation to'being human~ th~ discussion begins with
the interpretation of man wh:ch led to the abdication of
freedom in the East and West.
Although there are numerous factors which contributed
to the existential crisis of modern man, the fate of man
in both cultures mentioned will be traced through two
distinguishing features,namely, the supremacy of reason
in the West and the rise of atheistic socialism in the
19.
1.1 The Ascendency of Reason and the Corresponding Abdication
of Freedom in the West
The unconditional freedom of the creative human personali.ty
was unknown to the western worli until the ni.neteenth
century. Freedom was, throughout Europe's cultural history,
derived either from ethics, that is, the ability to choose
between right and wrong u or from politics, that is, the
tension between freedom and authority in the relationship
between the State and the individual. This narrow view of
freedom resulted from the fact tha·t it had to be worked
out from a philosophical system which could explain the
·.'orld in terms of reason. Reason was a priori for it de-
termined the question What can I know? and from this
epistemological st~rting point the metaphysical explana-
tion for the world was deduced and a consistent system of
ethics derived. Clearly, if freedom is derived from
epistemolog~ then freedom is not dynamic but static for
men are 'free' to act according to logically reasoned out
rules of morality.
In spite of the fact that Christianity with its inherent
dynarism and proclamation of the unconditional freedom of
all before God was introduced early into the Western world,
its moorings in the Graeco-Roman culture prevented either
a dynamic concept of history or the idea of the funda-
mental freedom of man to emerge.
This Gaeco-Roman link explau1s the rational orientation of all of
Western culture until the shock of the two world wars.
20.
Philosophy had its beginnings and remained under the
influence of the ration~lly based Roman and Greek history
of ideas.
In a letter ostensibly written to Count E.E. Komarovski
in 1852, Ivan Vasilevich Kireevsky (1806-1856), the Slavo-
phile thinkeruclaimed that the three main components under-
lying Western culture which makes it different from its
Russian counterpart, and which gave the whole of the West
its specific character were:
1) the sperial form in which Christianity reached it;
2) the special aspect of the civilization of the ancient
world which it inherited
3) and, lastly, the special elements which entered into
the formation of its poditical organization. 3
While Kireevsky may have been correct in isolating these
three points as the distinquishing features of Western
civilization, the first two are of greater relevance
to this discussion.
The Roman influence which predated Christianity was all
pervasive for/even after the fall of Rome, the rigorous
logic of the Roman mind pervaded all aspects of Western
culture. The rigid grammar and the form of law are
only two of the manifestations of the mental orientation
of the Romans. Logical form and consistent application
of it,weremore important than content. This explains why,
in a slave-based society where the idea of every individual
being born free was entirely unknown, laws determining the
21.
rights and duties of individuals were chiselled to a
refinement unsurpassed by any contemporary culture, and
which forms the basis of much of modern common law. This
is why the idea of individual freedom in the west has been
confined largely to political debates where the relation-
ships between individuals are determined by laws, and
authority and freedom worked out accordingly.
When Christianity was introduced into the midst of this
logically, formalistic worldfits inner dynamism was in
immediate contrast to the Roman inclination towards rational
self-seeking. So while Christ~anity had brought a new
religious content to a'pagan'w0 rld it did not manage to
break the logical cast of the Roman mind and the dynamism
of Christian spirituality was smothered into the formal
ordering of concepts. Kireevsky accused Western theolo-
. 5
glans of destroying with their lonesidedness the harmony
and wholeness of their introspective speculation,.6 Hence,
they were 'incapable of visualizing the unity of the Church
in any other form than that of a formal unity under one
bishop'.' Because abstract logic had been elevated above
the 'common consciousness of the.Universal Church', the Western
church' 'sowed within itself the ine~capable seeds of the
Reformation,.7 The reason for t>is is that while in a
spiritually based, universal consciousness there is suffi-
cient room for organic development, in a formal, syllogisti-




The long and bloody history of the spread of Christianity
in the West deserved Berdyaev's criticism when he declared
that one of the contributing factors to the crisis of
modern man was that the church had not accomplished its
mission here on earth. It was the church, he maintained,
that did not offer an image of man as an integral whole
with an imperative to spiritual living and creat~vity.
Contrary to the development of Christianity in the west,
the Russians found themselves in entirely unique circum-
stances. There was no firmly established pre-Christian
culture like the Roman or Greek, so when missic~aries from
Constantinople brought the message of the Easte;n Orthodox
Church to the people of Kiev and Novogrod in 988,it was
the Orthodox Church which formed the basis of the culture
of Russia. According to Nicholas Zernovin Three Russian
Prophets, 'Russia is a cultural unity ••. that has been
shaped by one factor above all, Orthodox Christianity,.8
Zernovsums up the relative differences between Russia and
the West succintly when he declares that 'the western social
and political order has been built on the idea of the Law,
the Ten Commandments, the Roman ideal of justice and the
notion of privilege were the three solid pillar~ which
supported the imposing edifice of European civilization.
But the Russians were brought up in the Spirit of the
Sermon on the Mount,.9
This is what accounts for the conspicuou~ absence of
epistemology in Russia, for Russian intellectuals were un-
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concerned with the problems of knowledge and were more
concerned with the twin ideas of personal integrity and
the rela'tion between the individual and community.IQ. .
There was a notable absence of exclusive intellectual
speculation in both the philosophies and theologies of
Russia; in fact Russia is not credited with a systematic
philosophy until Khomiakov in the nineteenth century, and
its theological tradition cannot even be compared with
the tradition of the West. The attempt to capture and
understand reality rationally and to systematically develop
this rational understanding is alien to Russian thinking.
Western theology on the contrary had already been cast into
the logical mould by Tertullian and St. Augustine
It only became imaginatively speculative when after the
fall of Constantinople, Greek philosophy invaded the West.
It is from this point on that the tussle between the
Hebraic and Hellenic cultures begin.
The history of this tussle in the West became, in the end,
a description of the ascendency of the Hellenic over the
Hebraic. This is what precipitated Berdyaev's comment
that it was the Russians who, outside the influence of the
Hellas had remained truer to the Spirit of Christianity
than the West. This sentiment is echoed by Berdyaev's
friend Lev Shestov who in his book Athens and Jerusalem
claims that there can be no reconciliation between a
philosophy which would be scientific,and biblical revelation.
Athens, he claimed, can never agree with Jerusalem, and
yet for two thousand years the foremost thinkers of the
Western world have firmly believed that a reconciliation
'24.
is possible and have bent their strongest and most
d ff . , 11determined efforts towar s e ectlng It.
The major difference between the Hebraic and Hellenistic
world views were conceived, from the time of St. Paul,to
be the problem of Faith and Reason, that is, the particular
versus the Universal. The Greeks, the first philosophers In
Western history, discovered the 'universal abstract of
essences'. This discovery, claims William Barrett in his
Irrational Man, 'marked nothing less than the earliest
emergence and differentiation of the rational function'
and established for the Greeks the ideal of detachment as
the path of wisdom.
12
Starting from Plat~who articulated
his forms as the eternal reality which must be grasped for
man to live authentically, all of Western metaphysics have
been based on this 'essentialism'.
According to Berdyaev?the Greek preoccupation with reason
goes hand~in-hand with an aesthetic conception of the
cosmos. He claims that the 'Greeks conceived the world
aesthetically as a finite harmonious cosmos, ••• creation
was static, .•• a sort of classical contemplation of a
13well-ordered cosmos'.
The Greek resolution of all human capriciousness into a
well ordered whole revealed a history with no crisis; every-
thing was static and rationally explicable in terms of a
universal metaphysical reality. The Jewish consciousness,
on the other han~conceives history as a linear movement
aspiring to the future. The Hebraic world-view possessed
25.
an inner dynamism with a definite eschatology.
Berdyaev claims in Meanihg in History that the lack of
dynamic history in the Greek metaphysic results from a
lack of knowledge 6f freedom. He asserts that 'submission
to fate is the most characteristic feature of the Hellenic
spirit. It had no conscious knowledge of freedom, that
freedom of the subject to create history'. It was the
Christian world then, that revealed the 'irrational prin-
ciple underlying human freedom and the free creative sub-
ject without which the fulfilment of the historical
" 'bl I 14process 1S 1mpossl. e .
To sum up, the Greek world view with its perfection of
f d · d th' , 115 dd' d . h' f d-arm enle e lrratlona an enle Wlt lt ree om
and history in favour of the 'essential' and the universal.
Their culture is marked by a preoccupation of ideas rather
than of man. The authenticity and freedom of the individual
Greek could only be guaranteed if he lived in harmony with
nature and with the cosmos.1 6 Lack of harmony and capri-
ciousness gave rise to conflict and unhappiness. 'Freedom l
was entirely missing from their frame of reference.
In the absence of the admLssion of the freedom of the
individual to create his own destiny, the dynamic character
of history is denied, for it is in history that one wit-
nesses the tragedy17 of free action, evil and darkness. IB
In Berdyaev's mind, history, eschatology and freedom are
all allied concepts belonging to the Christian not to the
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Greek or Roman world-views. Therefore it was Christianity
which bequeathed to the Western world the idea of progress.
within Christianity history was the movement of the spirit
and the self-creativity of the individual man, but it
came in Western culture to mean the progress of SClence
and reason, where progress seemed to have implied some
ineluctable advancement in 'science' ari reason. This be-
came particularly striking during the Enlightenment when
the idea of progress in history became completely
secularized. Enlightened man believed in the progress
of human reason to greater and greater heights of
maturity and knowledge.
The importance of all this for philosophy is that Christi-
anity did not interrupt the prevailing belief in the de-
tached application of reason to lead to wisdom. The
rational faculty was accepted by Christian theologians
as the highest faculty in man. Reason was now elevated
to unprecedented heights for revelation was accepted and
made to accord with reason. Rational proofs for the
existence of God were repeated and numerous during the
Middle Ages. Theologians like Thomas Acquinas and Duns
Scotus betrayed in their writings the heavy influence of
Aristotle. Science was by no means in conflict with
faith - the secular and the sacred hung together.
Ironically, it was the Greeks who had differentiated
reason, but it was the theologians who unwittingly guaran-
teed the autonomy of reason for faith found justi-
fication in reason and not the other way around.
That reason gained autonomy in the Middle Ages needs to be
27.
Although the influence of this tradition can be traced
in German Idealism especially in Kant and Hegel, the
mystical tradition remained, by and large, outside the
mainstream of Western thought. For example, one may
cite the extreme catition that the Roman Church dis-
played toward. mysticism. Twenty eight of Eckhart's
propositions were condemned by Pope John XXI' in 1529
who also declared that the rest of his propositions were
heretical. This was not because Eckhart had challenged
the basic tenets of Christianity; rather he had intro-
duced a dimension to the religion which was in discord
with the existing doctrines of the church that had been
worked out logically and reasonably. The Church in the West
could not admit the existence of any faculty other than reason
to understand God. So the-seeds for the sepa~ation of fait~­
and reason were ironically sowed by the theologians of the
Middle Ages themselves, for with the autonomy of reason
guaranteedvit became no longer possible to keep reason in the
service of faith and by the beginning of the sixteenth
century the departure of reason from faith began.
The discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo and Repler shattered
the old ptolemaic/Aristotelian world-view., The rise of the
landedbourgeoisie~videncedby the new class of property
owners in England, accelerated the secularization process
and made man the centre of the Universe. Philosophically,
the influence of the age became very apparent in Descartes
(1637) who, while still heavily influenced by scholasticism,
had shifted the emphasis from God to man. When he attempted
to prove his own existence (res cogitans). and that of the
extended world (res extensa), by the rigorous application
of his methodological doubt,he displaced God from the centre
of reali,ty and made man the measure of all things. However,
it soon became plain that Descartes had only given us formal
concepts lacking in experiential content. This is not to
detract from the importance of Descartes in the history of
philosophy; it is only to show the status of reason in
Descarte~philosophy. Descartes made man a prisoner of
reason and did not realize that reason can in itself be
alienating.
Even the British empiricists/although they shifted the
attention from logical abstraction and innate ideas to inductive
reasoning from sense impressions, knowledge, for them, was
I L ~.
still obtained through abstraction from experience by
reason. Even the higher knowledge, for example the
existence of God, could be demonstrated. In his Essay
concerning Human Understanding Locke wrote that 'we have
the knowledge of our own existence by intuition, of the
existence of God by demonstration, and of other things by
• 9 20sensatlon • So while Locke attempts to prove that all
knowledge comes from the senses,it is reason that has the
constitutive task and still~ccupies the highest place in the
hierarchy of human faculties. In the same book he wrote,
'The Understanding as it is the most elevated faculty of
the soul 0 •• ' is employed with a g-reater and more constant
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delight than any other'. Clearly, then, empirical
philosophy did not materially disturb faith in reason.
A notable exception to this tradition was David Hume the
most extreme of all the British Empiricists fo~while
he too pointed to the senses as the data of knowledgefhe
denied that reason had any constitutive function at all.
Reason could not prove the logical necessity or casual
sequence of physical events. Hume allowed only that co~
ordination and sensibility was possible through 'custom'
and I habi t I • M.an took for knowledge of facts what
he was used to through experience. The logical powers of
reason for Hume was confined to tautological mathematical
propositions. Hum;) left man then a prisoner of his senses.
It is for this reason that Hume had to be superceded for
Western philosophy could not suffer the complete denial
of the faculty of reason. Lev Shestov, to whom we have
already referred, complained that the only way Hume could
have left a lasting impression was if he realized the full
implications of his conclusions, that is, he would have,
30.
through the denia~-of the constitutive function of reason
in knowledge, been opened up to the wonders of faith.
But, Hume, every bit the s~eptic, was satisfied with the
answers he had given to the deficiencies of reason.
An attempt has been made so far to explain that the history
of Western thought could not honestly be described as
spiritual and organic. The intellectual history of Western
• I I
man has been dominated by the questlon What can I know?
It is false to believe that Christianity interrupted the
pursuit of this quest or even changed the direction of the
history of ideas in philosophy in any meaningful way for
the epistemological questions asked in antiquity persisted
throughout the Middle Ages right up to the enlightenment.
When after the Middle Ages, the perception of the world
changed from theocentric to anthropocentric, it should be
clear that the separation of the sacred from the secular
had resulted from an unhappy union in the first place.
Western man who believed that religion was knowable through
reason soon discovered that reason as a differentiated and
elevated faculty will not remain long in the service
of theology. Not that this should be the case, for religion
finds its justification not in reason but in existential
commitment. The nature of religion~which is hardly
rationalqcannot remain tied to a narrow science, and the
nature of reason when once differentiated will
relentlessly pursue its own course and is bound to repudiate
dogmas which inhibit its possibilities.
31. '
It was not until-the Enlightenment,however, that tha_split
between reason and religion was complete. The Enlighten-
ment cannot be regarded as. an adequate description of a
particular period in the history of Europe but is rather a
philosophical category whi~h designates a turning point in
the history and self-understanding of Western man.
The most distinguishing feature of the Enlightenment was
the emergence of the self-consciousness of reason and the
awareness of its possibilities. Reason no longer tolerated
'supernatural ideas' that put themselves above it. The idea
that human beings by the exercise of reason could penetrate
to the depths of natural science and human nature, and
create for themselves a better life was fashionabJe.
Kant in his essay on the Enlightenment gives probably the
best description of the consciousness of Enlightened man. He wrotE
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his
self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is
the inability to use one's own understanding
without the guidance of another. This
immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is
not lack of understanding, but lack of reso-
lution and courage to use it without the
guidance of another. The motto of the
enlightenment is, therefore, Sapere aude! .?2
Have the courage to use your own understandirtg!-
When Kant asserted that 'the public use of iian' s reason
must always be free', for 'it alone can bring about en-
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lightenment among men' 1 it is clear that freedom here
meant freedom from dogma; freedom from the church; freedom
from superstition, and freedom to use one's reason.
32.
The idea-that reasoh--itself may be restricting never
occurred to the man of the Enlightenment. There was a
aenuine belief in the abillty of reason to free man to
:J
trust in his own ability; to understand the ways of the
VJorld and the ways of lnen.
Kant,although ,he was a true son of the Enlightenment, is
also the turning point in the ascendency of reason in the
West. His 'Copernican revolution' turned the focus from
the object of knowledge to an examination of the faculties
of the subject of knowledge. Kant is very important for
the development of Berdyaev's mature philosophy, but for
the purposes of this chapter he is impor~ant insofar as
he turns reason in on itself. His transcendental philosophy
undermined both the scepticism of Hume and the limitless
rational possibilities of Descartes and his followers.
According to Kant, u,nderstanding was a combination of reason
and sense perception. 'By a transcendental act of rational
organization the understanding arranges in an orderly manner,
. 1 h th ff' 1 ~ db' ,24as spatlo tempora p enomena, e stu Yle ae Y experlence.
Obviously then, knowledge was restricted to the world as it
is. Kant undermined the rational dream that all is knowable
through reason and destroyed the scepticism of the Empiri-
cists by introducing the universals in the form of rational
categories. Hence, man, according to Kant,is only capable
of knowing that which subsists in the spatio-temporal world.
He claims, however, that while the world outside phenomena,
noumena,is unknowable,man as a rational being in possession
of rational categories may through the act of 'rational
33.
striving' be shown 'the ought: This means that man may
free himself from bondage to the senses and achieve trans-
cendental autonomy. Reason is for Kant then the liberating
faculty.
Berdyaev regarded Kant as the philosopher of freedom var
excellen~ in Western culture and he is no doubt right since
Kant was the first philosopher to have actually addressed
himself to the problem of freedom; but even for Kant free-
dom was rationally based. His idea of freedom is derived
from his theory of knowledge and is therefore also epistemo-
logically based. Fredrick van der Pitte makes this point
succintly when he writes in the introduction to K~ntUs
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View that recogni-
tion of autonomy forces man to postulate freedom as a fact
of his own moral experience - and it is freedom which is
the true nature of man, and which Kant employs as the
'keystone of the system of pure reason and even speculative
reason".25 While Kant appeared to be primarily concerned
with man's freedom, he saw freedom as the choice exercised
in the moral realm for 'reason in its practical aspect ...
points to the moral realm as the arena of freedom. The
true ends of human existence are concerned with the realiza-
tion of the moral law, the fundamental presupposi+:ion for
which is the idea of freedom , . 26 For Kant, freedom was not
endemic to the condition of man. True to the spirit of the
Enlightenmen-t, he. conceived freedom in and through reason.
For Hegel, too, who tried to reconcile the dualisms left
by Kant, freedom appeared to be the 'most important category
f ' 2-7o reason.·
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However, HegeI's idea -of freedom was part
of a more dynamic, historically motivated system than Kant's.
In an attempt to go beyon~ the separation Kant had effected
between things-in-themselves which are unknowable and the
restriction of knowledge to phenomena, Hegel replaced
Kant's epistemology with a dynamic logic. He substituted
for the transcendental critique ~n immanentist one to surmount
what he called Kant's 'fear of the truth,.28 Hegel argued
that for Kant truth subsisted in noumena which is inacces-
sible to man, but truth can be accessible if the alienation
between reality and the knowing subject can be overcome.
For Hegel truth subsists in freedom which obtains when
the subject comprehends the independent objectivity, of all
objects. As long as an object exists which the subject has
not mastered by pure thought, the subject is unfree. The
free subject has no object
29
and that is the moment of truth.
According to Marcuse,Hegel claimed that reason presupposes
freedom, that is, the power to act in accordance with know-
ledge of the truth, the power to shape reality in line with
, , 1" 30 d'ltS potentla ltles. Free om ln turn presupposes reason
for it is knowledge that enables the subject to gain and
, 1d 31.Wle_ power. Wlthout delving into the details of Hegel's
phenomenology or logic one can claim safely that for Hegel
the real is the rational and if knowledge is accessible
through reason, then reality, that is, 'noumena' is
accessible to man. This means that the distinction between
phenomena and noumena falls away. Absolute knowledge is
achieved by the logical outcome of the negations of historYt
that is,32 life is self-generative and exposes itself in
successively unfolding forms. The process begins with
simple contradictions and develops to more-complex ones y ..
the resolution of each leading to the 'blossomirig' of
consciousness. The whole-process achieving all the time
a greater awareness and a higher degree of freedom,33
Hegel replaced Kant's dualism ~ith a monistic whole where
ultimately everything will become knowable to the rational
Fubject. In presupposing the rationality of both subject
and object,Hegel's idea of Freedom is still based on
epistemology for the knowing subject is free only at the
coincidence of absolute knowledge and his own rational
faculty. This means that reason is still supreme and
freedom is achieved again only in and through reason.
This explanation of history as the progress toward the
self-understanding of Absolute Spirit provoked a series of
reactions, the most important being Existentialism, Positi-
vism and Marxism. Existentialism and Marxism, which is
discussed in Part 11, is more important for our purposes
than Positivism since it has a direct bearing on the
discussion on Berdyaev although Berdyaev's philosophy
responds to the problems inherent in all three reactions
to Hegel.
The Existentialist revolt which began in the nineteenth
century as a rebellion on behalf of man 'against the excesses
of the philosophy of ideas and the philosopy of things' 34
gathered momentum and burs·t into Western culture immediately
after World War I. Existentialism was a necessary reaction
to the all pervasive presence of reason which had failed to
bear out the expectations placed on it. The first World
:.)t) •
War was a parody of the belief of the Enlightened man in
reason. The Existentialists-by and large ~efuse classifi-
cation and repudiate labels, many of them have even refused
to be called 'existentialist: This is in obvious reaction
. 'd d bR' l' 35to the 'classification of reallty deman e y atlona lsm'.
However, the existentialists are called such, not because
they represent .~ cohesive body or form a school of thought
in any meaningful sense r but rather because they share common
themes, the most significant being:
1) the contingency of being human: in the face of the fixed,
static, constituted systems of conventional metaphysics,
numan contingency was pushed into the background, and its
problematic nature excluded from philosophical deliberations.
2) the Importance of Reason: Existentialists to a man agree
that philosophy born from reason alone gives a one-sided,
partial picture of man and renders man impotent in the face
of reality.
3) Being-in-advance of itself.: a Heideggerian concept which,
nonetheless, applies to all the existentialists. This means
that man is always in the making, that is, his being is
always becoming. Since it is man who must confer meaning
on the world and create his ow~ values he can be seen, in
terms of his future potential as a being who is ahead of
himself, in a state of constant becoming.
4) 'estrangement 'or 'alienatiorl: describe the inauthentic
condition of man when man is out of step with his 'authentic
b
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elng. This usually implies a condition of unfreedom. For
each of these thinkers, alienation meant separation from the
source or ground of freedom - that which makes freedom
'possible: whether it be Being, or God or transcendence.
four were
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5) temporality: time plays a very important part in the
thought of existentialists. While they have often been
accused of denying or not emphazising sufficiently the
historical, their preoccupation with the implications of
time is more than enough evidence of the fact that they
took for granted man's historicalfacticity and his inevitable
death. In recalling man to his subjective being the
existentialists shifted the attention from a historical,
epis"temological and metaphysical construct to the tempora-
lity of existence and Ideas.
6) Dread or Angst reveals the mood of the existential
thinker in the face of the awesome possibilities his free-
dom presents to him. It is not an emotion, like fear
which is directed to an object; it is rather the existential
condition of man in the awareness of his being and his
freedom. 36
While all the existentialist thinkers, despite their
peculiar emphases and orientation, share these common themes,
Berdyaev still divides them into two distinct camps and
claims to follow in the spirit and mood of the one rather
than the other. In his Dream and Reality he wrote
I regard my type of philosophy as 'existentialist'
even though one should qualify this by pointing
out that true existentialist philosophy is
represented by St. Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard,
Nietzsche rather than Heidegger, Jaspers or
Sartre. 37
His reason for this categorization was that while the first
suffering existential thinkers the latter )<
three gave to the West a philosophy of existentialism.
According to Berdyaev the detached philosphizing of the last
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three thinkers indicate that they reflected upon rather
than ~ived in- existential suffering. While Berdyaev's
'classification' may seem problematic to most, it appears
that he is only trying to show that the former differ in
terms of the passionate nature and personal anguish that
permeate their writings while the latter appear to reflect
on this passion and suffering.
It is for this reason and the fact that modern existentialism
begins with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche that a little more will
be said about them than about the others.
The early reactions of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard reflect
strikingly the condition of man in the nineteenth century.
Both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard realized that the 'world
did not', as Hegel had presume~confrontman with objective
J8
meaning, rather meaning had to be imposed on the world".
Writing in Homer's conquest Nietzsche declared,
Disinterested contemplation is rank absurdity.
Let us from now on be on our guard against the
hallowed philosophers myth of . •• .
'painless, timeless knower. Let us be aware of
the tentacles of such contradictory notions as
'pure reason', 'absolute knowledge', 'absolute
intelligence'. All these concepts presuppose
an eye sUGh as no living creature can imagine,
an eye required to have no direction, to
abrogate its active and interpretative powers
- precisely those powers that alone make of seeing,
seeing something. All seeing is essentially
perspective, and so is all knowing.39
In these words Nietzsche expressed the sentiments of all
who are called existentialist for the disillusionment
with the world and man, especially after the events of
the twentieth century, caused them to abandon absolutes
and universals and begin anew on the particular and
individuaL _~ __ .
Both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard approached the problem of
meaning in a world without God in vastly differing ways.
Nietzsche who according to Emmanuel Mounier y is the exact
counterpart of John the Baptistytried to announce the
end of the evangelical era by proclaiming the death of God
to the men who after having been responsible for it, dared
40not accept it as a fact.- ., Albert Camus claims that
Nietzsche did not form a project to kill God but he simply
found him dead in the soul of his contemporaries and then
undertook to discover what the shape of human life conse-
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quently had to be. It is for this reason that Zarathust-
hra challenges man to the task of self-enoblingsince the gods
are dead.
According to Nietzsche the death of God makes man sovereign
for the only means left to restore dignity to many who has
killed God, is to make him worthy of the crime, that is, man
must take the place of God. Man, therefore, stands before
Absolute freedom, for as Dostoevsky said somewhere 'without God
everything is permissible' 7 and the responsibility is on
him to confer meaning on the world. Nietzsche's Superman,
then y is designed to cope with these expectations for he
alone does not shrink from the awesome challenges presented
by the death of God.
Although there are some obvious problems with Nietzsche's
solution, the details of which are not relevant to this dis-
40.
cussion, his frustration with nineteenth century man's
failure to rouse himself and realize his potentialities
in the face of the vast freedom before him, echoes
throughout the existentialist rebellion. Also,he leaves
a lasting impression of the anguish of individual soul in
its meaning conferring role.
Spren Kierkegaard takes a completely opposite view to that
of Nietzsche. Like Dostoevsky, whose spirit he shared,
Kierkegaard denounced the legitimacy of the rights of reason,
of common consciousness, of omnitude, 'it is the living
individual and his freedom that are ultimate, and not
. 1 h ' 42natural laws or universa trut s .
Kierkegaard was in open rebellion against a mediocre culture
which had substituted for passion an objective philosophy, and
which hadpaid-lip-service to a 'diluted' Christianity. In
his Journals he wrote,
Passion is the real thing, the real measure
of man's power. And the age in which we
live is wretched, because it is without
passion.41
Christianity for Kierkegaard was characterized by passion;
by a radical subjectivity. According to him man forged
his destiny and brought himself to a confrontation with
,the eternal by the choices he makes, the choice to 'leap'
from the aesthetic where he remains a spectator of the
affairs of the spirit, to the ethical where he is by
participation bound by moral laws and finally the choice
to confront the Abyss, the eternal God. It is in the last
that the individual begins to live authentically.
41.
The importance of both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in the.
history of philosophy is that they reacted to the medio-
crity of their age; the all pervasive hypocrisy and bour-
gaois. complacency and the illusion of freedom. Bo-th
men were singularly condemnatory of Hegel's absolute
spirit as a gigantic hoax which did not square with the
realities of day to day living.
Nietzsche's significance is that he brought to an end
the Humanist tradition which began during the Renais-
sance with his radical idea of the Superman and took
to a logical conclusion the subject=object dualism, a fun-
damental presupposition of much of western thought.
The subjects turn the world and other
subjects into objects which must be transcended through
subjugation. Superman is 'mature man' who breaks through the
subject-object prison.
Kierkegaard's impact lay in the fact that he brought to
a head the crisis in Christianity which began with Luther.
His was an attempt to restore the immediacy of the reli-
gious experience typified in the attitude of Job or
Abraham to their God in the face of a diluted bourgeois_
Lutheranism.
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard brought to a close the pagan and )<
Christian strands which moulded western philosophy and
opened a new epoch in the self understanding of man.
However, the influence of these men were only felt after
the first world war when the cultural climate of Europe,
~ - - - - - -- --------_._---~---_.--~_.__._-_._------ ---------
disposed men to an understanding of the truths contained.
in their writings.
Post war existentialism, although markedly different in
spirit from its forebears, nonetheless exposed the
rootlessness and goallessness of modern man. A brief
account of the ideas of the main post war existentialists
who are of importance to the understanding of Berdyaev
will be mentioned here. They are Heidegger, Jaspers
and Sartre ~ Heidegger and Sartre are the progeny of the
phenomenology of Husserl. It was Husserl's intention
to construct a presuppositionless philosophy that would
radicalize Descartes' demand that all philosophy be
grounded in absolutely certain insight. Influenced by
the natural sciences he believed that the ground must
be sought in phenomena but an analysis of phenomena can
only take place by an analysis of consciousness.
Consciousness is always consciousness of something since
. h . db' '1' 44every act lS c aracterlze y lntentlona lty. Husserl,
therefore, claims to have overcome the distinction between
phenomena and noumena by treating phenomena itself as a >(
window to being. Freedom for him obtains in the Lebens -
Wel!- (which Heidegger used) , in the way of existing,
and its expression is through the whole of human existence.
Echoes of Husserl are strong in both Heidegger and Sartre.
For Heidegger Freedom is openness to Being. Man is the
window to being for man is the only conscious, reflecting
creature on earth. Heidegger, therefore, does not define
43.
man in terms of objects but rather as Dasein or 'thrownness. I
The condition of freedom for Dasein is the 'standing opens
to Being. Freedom then is not choice or will, but the
ground and existence of truth. Hence, the history of men
, '1' d l' f B' 45is seen 1n terms of the unve1 1ng an concea 1ng oe1ng.
M1en one is alienated from Being one is lost in a world
of beings. Freedom is the awareness of the thrownness
in'co a foreign world and the threat of inau"thentic exis·tence
by lapsing into the world of beings and becoming closed to
Being.
For S"artre toq freedom is a condition of consciousness
which obtains in the dialectic of the being inmitself and
the being-for itself. ForSartre freedom is a lack - it
is this lack which prevents consciousness from being
identical with the object of consciousness; and the
relationship between Being and Nothingness 46 ,which is
the title of his book, is the condition of man.
Man, for Sartre, is condemned to be free for freedom is
evidence of the structure of his consciousness. Hence,
man who 'falls into existence' is the creator of his own
values. As an atheist, Sartre has no recourse to any
higher reality so he demands of man that he recognize
both the la.ck of meaning in the world and his own free-
dom to confer meaning on the world.
The influence of Busserl on Heidegger andSartre is obvious
for they followed him in deciding that freedom ultimately
depends on the structure of the consciousness.
Jaspers differs from Heidegger andSartre in his emphasis
on the transcendent. While refusing to commit himself to
any specifically theistic view he maintains that man's
authen·tic self is revealed in what he calls 'border situ-
ations'; for exampleymoments of dread, guilt, awareness
of death are experiences that impinge on our conscious-
ness and are our moments of awakening. It is in his
grasping of his finitude tha~ man becomes aware of his
opposite~ namely Being as transcendence, for transcen-
dence manifests itself in Exist~nce. Jaspers, unlike
Heidegger andSartre allows for transcendence and
claims that man is forced to conaider it in order to
apprehend his own limitations andin the ability to do this
lies his freedom.
This all too brief exposition of these thinkers was intended only
to point to their idea of freedom which will be evaluated
during the course of the discussion in terms of Berdyaev's
idea of Freedom, and also to show that in many respects he
goes beyond them especially :;.n his ideas on what consti-
tutes the humane.
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1.2 The Rise of Atheistic So'cialism and the Abdication of
Freedom in the West
If the differentiation of the rational faculty and the
supremacy of reason could be held responsible for the
suppression of freedom and the denial of integrity in
the west, what could be responsible for the rise of
atheistic socialism and the abdication of freedom, in
a country which has remained by and large outside the
overpowering influence of roason? In Berdyaev's words
'How is it possible for Holy Russia to be turned into
1 f . 1 . th" ? 4 7 . tan arsena. 0 ml ltant a- elsm. Russla, con- rary
to expectations, gave rise to the most cruel, unfree
and totalitarian system which crushes rather than
nurtures human personality.
A brief description of the Russian consciousness and a
sketch of the main intellectual currents demonstrate
that atheistic socialism was both consistent with the
inner dynamics of the Russian spirit and ye-t a perver-
sion of the religious messianism of the Russians.
The Russian consciousness was given its perculiarly
religious character by the fact that Byzantine Christianity
was introduced to a people separated tribally and spread
over the vast plains of Russia and not into sophisticated
pagan societies like Rome and Greece where the 'national'
consciousness of the people had already been shaped.
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As it has already been pointed out in Part I,it was
the Orthodox Church which gave the Slavonic races its
hbmDgeneous character and "i.dea of nationhood.
In 1453, the historical circumstances surrounding the
fall of Constantinople had a tremendous influence on
the Russian world-view. Henceforth Christianity would
be an integral part of the Russian consciousness, their
attitude to the Tzar and State and their perception of
the Russian mission influencing and moulding the Russian
history of Ideas throughout the twentieth century.
The fall of Constantinople was not only a bitter blow
for the Russians but a turning point· in their history.
Nicholas Zernov in his book Three Russian Prophets
remarks that the effect of the fall of Constantinople was
so great on the Russian mind that 'when the news spread
that the Emperor and Patriarch had perished in defence
of their city, there was all over the East a widespread
fear that the end of the world was nigh,.48
The Russians compensated for this calamity by trans-
ferring the centre of Christianity to Moscow. They
found justification for their belief in the Book of
the prophet Daniel (ii 27-49, vi, 1-28 ix, 24-27).
These passages describe the fate of kingdoms which after
being raised to pre-eminence are cast dmvn one after
another by the same Divine power. The texts prophesy
that the first and second coming of the Messiah would
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take place during the asbendency of the fourth great
Empire, that of Rome. However, this did not mean that
the power belonging to her was confined to a single spot.
When Rome succumbed to pride, the centre was moved to
A q
Constantinople and now it was transferred to Mo~co~~~
The identification of Moscow as the Wholy city' effected
in the Russian consciousness a conflation of religious
and national interests and imbued in them a messianic
fervour. Consequently, very great importance became
attached to the Tzar because of 'the power and trans-
cendent majesty of the Russian state', and gave to the
Tzardom a particular character. In his The Russian Idea
Berdyaev wrote, 'the Moscow Tzardom was in principle
totalitarian in its outward expression. It was a
theocracy in which the power of the Tzar predominated
over the priesthood, and at the same time there was no
unified life in this totalitarian Tzardom. It was
pregnant with a variety of clashes and cleavages. 50
Evidently, the seeds of Communism were sown during
the formative ye2~s of Russian culture when Moscow
with the Tzar at the head was identified with Moscow
as the centre of Christianity. This unhappy marriage
produced no unified life as Berdyaev pointed out and
the Tzardom was pregnant with cleavages. The confla-
tion of the religious and secular produced a schism in
the minds of the Russian peasantry. On the one hand
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the peasants were able to accept the authority of the
Tzar but on the other hand 'they fled from it and took
refuge in the assertion of their liberty,51 in Christian
faith.
Two very important events in the development of Russian
culture were linked with the schism:
(1) the crisis in the ecclesia between the obscurantists
and searchers after truth, and
(2) the reforms of ~eter the Great.
The reason for the first is that the schism precipitated
an apparent crisis of the ecclesia which produced a
series of events, the effects of which led directly to
the controversies of the nineteenth century, and even~
tually to communism.
It appeared that the problem was between the obscurantist
element of the ecclesiastical hierarchy who revered rites
d . d h h h d' . h 52 han ceremonles an t_.ose w 0 soug t lVlne trut. T at
the obscurantists and 'seekers after truth' could be ln
opposite camps is r00ted, according to Berdyaev, in the
doubt in the minds of the Russian peasantry whether
Orthodox Tzardom wa~ in fact the 'third Rome! The
'schismatics' apparently got wind of the change in Church
and State and ceased to believe in the sanctity of the
hierarchical power of Russian Tzardom, feeling that God
had forsaken the Tzardom,.53 Because of the belief that
Moscow was the seat of the anti-Christ they sought
inspiration from an apoc'alyptic Utopian vision. 'From
this~wrote Berdyae~larises an intensified quest for
the Kingdom of Righteousness as opposed to the present
~- 4
Tzardom of the day.j· The quest for righteousness
produced two streams a~ong the schismatics - the religious
and the revolutionary. The realization of righteousness
by the former had an eschatological bent g but it was
the latter, the revolutionary dimension, that championed
the cause of the peasants against the Tzar, and who
made Russian thought free and adventurous and directed
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lt towards an end.
Another major effect of the schism was the fact that
it paved the way for the introduction of Peter the
Great's reforms which created conditions that could
only be resolved in the end by a revolution.
The reforms of Peter the Great were both inevitable
and forced. The fact that Russia was at the time lagging
far behind the military and technical advancement of the
rest of Europe necessitated reform, but the manner in
which the changes were introduced gave rise to an
'identity crisis'.
Thereafter the major concern of the Russians was in
which direction does Russia1g destiny lie - East or
West.
Nicholas Zernov sums up the effects of Peter's reform
on the destiny of Russia succintly when he writes~
Peter attacked Muscovite customs only for
the sake of Western efficiency. He sought
to replace the family ideal of the old
Tzardom by a powerful bureaucratic and
militarist state of the European type.
But most of those who obeyed his orders
cared for nothing but their own pleasure
This attitude however was taken only
by a minority of the Russians - the bulk
of the people remained faithful to their
traditional outlook, resenting and mis-
trusting the Western way of life.56
Clearly, the St. Petersburg empire which fell to the
Bolsheviks in 1917 was built on a shaky foundation.
There was an immense gulf between the rulers and the
ruled - the young men whom Peter had sent abroad re-
turned full of technical expertise, bureaucratic
know how and were unable or unwilling to fit back
into Russian society. The ruled on the other hand
discontented with 'alien institutions borrowed from
57the west neither accepted nor assimilated them properly'.
The gulf that Peter the Great's reforms created was
one of the enduring themes among the intellectuals
several centuries later producing in 1874 ridiculous
movements in an attempt to bridge the gap like 'v Narod!'
('go to the people') 'a spontaneous unorganized crusade
by possibly thousands of young zealots who left the




Isiah Berlin, an .acknowledged expert on the Russian.
intelligentiia, agreed that the great social schism
between the educated and the masses in the time preceding
the Bolshevik takeover 'sprang from the wound inflicted
on Russian society' by Peter the Great in the sixteenth
59century. Berdyaev's assessment is that 'Peter
secularized the Russian Tzardom and brought it in touch
with Western Absolutism of the more enlightened kind',
so the Tzardom of Moscow did not 'give actual effect to
the messianic idea of Moscow as the Third Rome,60 and
strengthened the belief of the peasants in the God
forsakenness of M0scow for they now identified Peter
himself with the Anti-Christ.
After Peter and during the nineteenth century the 'general
questions of world outlook was either westernizing or
Slavophile, that is, ought Russia to go east or west!
Must she follow the path of Peter and go west or must
she turn to the time before him, to Muscovite Russia7 6l
The messianic vocation of Russia was no longer clear.
It had become compounded by the dilemma of the direction
of Russia's destiny. These two ideas, which had its
beginnings early in the history of Russia, formed the
underlying and unifying themes of the controversies
among the intelligentsia several centuries later.
A major reason for the delayed reaction to Peter's
reform is the fact that education was concentrated
mainly in the monasteries, especially in Kiev and
the Ukraine. Greek, Latin and scholastic theology
were the main subjects taught; there was little or
no place for the development of any original ideas.
However, after the introduction of Peter's reforms
the centre of learning shifted gradually to St. Peters-
burg where Peter actively encouraged the cultivation
of western ideas.
Russian intellectual history may be traced backQif one
stretches the imagination, to Gregory Skovoroda (1722-
1794) who is regarded by many to have made the first
attempts at an original Russian philosophy. He
attempted to synthesize ideas and doctrines of Platonism,
Stoicism and Western Scholasticism with the mystical
elements of Russian spirituality. Skovoroda deserves
mention if only to point out that from the first,
original Russian thought had a religious colour.
The Russian culture of the eighteenth century was largely
underdeveloped and i~maturef except for the importance
of Freemasonry and the Decembrists. Freemasonry was
the only spiritual movement which was self-organized in
Russia and it awakened Russian thought to the pre-
dominance of the moral over the intellectual. The
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Decembrists, the first rev~lutionary movement against
the State on behalf of the oppressed, was the direct
result of Freemasonry for they were trained in the)(
Masonic lodges. The merciless execution of all the
Decembrists confirmed them as the first liberationists
who opened up the nineteenth century to a series of
revolutions whiqh were to culminate eventually in the
fall of St. Petersburg in 1917.
The flowering of the Russian genius only really began
in the nineteenth century. In his book The Sources of
Russian Communism Berdyaev remarked,
To understand the sources of Russian
communism and to make clear to oneself
the character of the Russian revolu-
tion one must understand that singular
phenomenon which in Russia is called
, intelligentsia'. 'Western people could
make a mistake if they identified the
Russian intelligentsia wi th those who 62
in the West are known as 'intellectuals'.
The intelligentsia were a group formed out of various
social classes and held together by ideas about society and
life and not by a common profession or economic status.
The Russian intelligentsia was born between the years 1838
and 1848. The sudden and passionate outbreak of intel-
lectual flurry was made possible by the Napoleonic wars
(1813-1815) when Russia played a major role in the
liberation of Europe. Russia's entrance into Europe
produced an incursion of Romantic ideas especially those
of Schelling and Hegel who stressed the creative role of
54.
the nation's character. German Idealism generally had.
an influencing effect on Russian thought.
The first 'patron'of the Russian intelligentsia was
Alexander Nicholayevich Radischev (1749-1802). His
motivating belief in the primacy of the people over the
State was a premonition of the fate of the revolutionary
intelligentsia. Radischev, under the patronage of
Catherine the Great, went to Leipzig to study and his
experiences in the West~especially the revolutionary
climate in Europe,had a permanent effect on him. In an
Utopian sketch (A project for the Future) from his book
A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow he depicts Russian
society as approaching the pinnacle of perfection albeit
with one major exception - serfdom. For Radischev serf-
dom was so great an evil that it successfully negates
all else that may be good in Russian society. To the
question why is serfdom an evil? Radischev answers:
1. It is a violation-of man's natural rights to free-
dom and equality;
2. -It contravenes man's natural right to property',
3. It is economically inefficient;
4. The constant example of parties in 'slavery' is
morally harmful, breeding conceit on the one hand and
servility on the other;
5. Serfdom threatens the very existence of civil
society when the oppressed arise and demand en masse
h . 63t elr due.
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Radischev's thought was aflame with the ideas that ignited
the French Revolution. His clear grasp of the social
implications of serfdom for Russia's future anticipates
the revolution which took place almost two hundred years
after he had seen its inevitability. Berdyaev asserts
that the sentiments of Radischev set the tone for the
social concerns of the nineteenth century and fed the
Russian 'emotional bent for revolution' which was the
'outcome of the unbearableness of the actual conditions
. . . 64
in which they lived, thelr wrongness and their ugliness'.
The second forerunner of Russian intellectual history is
Peter Chaadaev (1794-1856). He emphasized the unity of
all aspects of life and stressed that Russia especially
had been given a mission by God. This he asserted in
A M~d Man's Apology thus giving expression to an issue
that not only had a formative influence on the intellectual
life of the nineteenth century,65 but adapted itself to
the atheistic socialism of the twentieth, for Russia
believes, no less now than previously, that she has a
mission to the world.
So first with Skovoroda, then Radischev and finally
Chaadaev Russian thought approached an original and inde-
pendent philosophical expression. From Radischev onwards
the paths leading to the revolution are much clearer.
Characterized by an essentially religious consciousness,
the emergence of which has already been discussed, the
controversies of the Russian thinkers had at its centre,
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whether they realized it or not, the question of an unjust,
God and the sufferings of the masses. Atheism in Russia
was an inverted religious phenomenon for it was a rebellion
against God on behalf of the people. The social emphasis
in Russian thought may be said to be the only unifying
factor among the divergent reactions and solutions to the
crisis in Russia. Marxism in Russia was one of the 'solu-
tions' to the problems in that country and spelt for many
the end of misery and the realization of righteousness
on earth. Howeve~ the Marxist phenomenon showed up the
irreconcilable gulf, between the idealists and materialists,
among the intelligentsia. Both groups primarily concerned
with the 'good of the people;, offered widely different
perspectives on this problem each believing that the other
was a betrayal of the dignity of man. That Marxism in
the form of atheistic socialism gained ascendency over
the idealists, among whom was Berdyaev, was a matter of
emphasis and historical circumstances.
The history of the rise of Marxism, following a
chequered pattern, begins with the dispute on the destiny
and vocation of Russia by two loosely formed groups, the
Slavophiles and the Westernizers.
the most prominent,strove to work out a Christian world
conception on the fundamentals of Orthodoxy. They valued
the peculiarities of Russian culture and insisted that
,57 .•
Russian political life develop in a direction different
from those of Western nations. Lossky credits these
thinkers with the real beginnings of independent philoso-
phical though~:. In his book The History of Russian
Philosophy he claims that neither set out a systematic
philosophy; they set down the plan and created a spirit
of philosophical movement which was original in its
ach±evements. 66 In his most important work On the
Necessity and Possibility of New Principles in Philosophy
Kireevsky laid out the difference between Russia and the
West. As a convert from Hegelian philosophy he pointed
out more sharply than most that Hegelian philosophy was
a 'typical one-sided product of Western rationalism' and
must be resisted. He argued forcefully that Hegel's
identity of the dialectic of abstract ideas with reality
was the final and logical conclusion to Western civiliza-
tion. 'New principles' would have to be sought as a way
out of this impasse and for Kireevsk~ Russia provided
the key. Russia had escaped from the rationalism of
Greece and Rome and had consequently averted the 'conflict
of reason and faith in scholastic philosophy, the rejection
of reason in the Protestant reformation and finally the
rejection of faith of post Protestant philosophy,.67
Thus Russia, innocent of these reactions in the West,
could bring 'new principles to the revitalization of this
" 68philosophy' and to 'break through the Hegelian impasse'
Kireevsky's main contribution to philosophy was his attempt
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to make 'integral cognition' that is 'the realms of feeling,.
motivation, desire and intention' a new basis for
epistemological enquiry. For Kireevsky faith 'defined
in this way is the source and criterion of philosophizing'.
He stressed that true knowledge is not the function of a
single human faculty (reason) but 'involves the community
of believers who are organically united to one another
within the Christian life of Orthodoxy:.69
Kireevsky anticipated Khomiakov's idea of Sobornost.
The freedom of man appeared to be the motivating force
of Khomiakov's thought. The 'primary reality for him is
free thought' or 'integral reason'. The editors of Russian
Philosophy maintain that for Khomiakov 'the integral
man is a unified organism who experiences himself as free -
in an experience which cannot be doubted .•.. An experience
which leads to the level of 'definitive consciousness, which
is the faculty of "faith". For man ultimately exists as a
spiritual reality independent of the determinism to which
both pure rationalism and pure materialism would subject
him' .70 Khomiakov claimed that both the 'extreme and
unjustified 'pure rationalism' of Hegelianism, as well as
the 'pure materialism' of the Hegelians of the left, equally
involve 'a determinism' which does away with individual
freedom and the independent rights of human subjectivity
for they are but two sides of the same system. According
to Khomiakov the 'Western Christian hierarchy is based on
1 1 , , ,71·a ega lstlC understandlng' of unity and freedom;
Western man has only two choices. The sacrifice of free-
dom for unity - Catholicism or the sacrifice of unity
for freedom - Protestantism. Khomiakov refers' to the
failure of western Europe to realize the Christian
ideal of wholeness of life. The Russian idea of sobornost, for
him means 'the combination of unity and freedom based
upon the love of God and his truth and the mutual love
of all who love God,.72
vfuile the basic tenet of Slavophile philosophy as empha-
sized by Kireevsky and Khomiakov is the specific character
I I
of slavdom as the only authentic representative of Christian
culture and its place in world history, many implications
may be drawn from this thought which sheds light on the
character of Russian consciousness. As it has already been
claimed, Russia not only stood outside the excessive
influence of reason but consciously repudiated it in favour
of a more total or holistic outlook which when forced into
epistemological categories was called 'integral cognition'.
However while the Russians may have prided themselves on
the apprehension of things in their totality, their passio-
nate disposition and the almost complete absence of the
mitigating influences of reason disposed them, in many
instances, to a totalitarian rather than 'total' outlook.
So what was in essence a Russian advantage could just as
easily have become her greatest disadvantage. Berdyaev
appreciated fully the implication of this holistic atti-
tude of his country men when he wrote in The Sources of
Russian Communism---------- ,
The Russian spirit craves for wholeness.
v·...J .•
It cannot reconcile itself to the classi-
fication of everyth~ng according to
categories. It yearns for the absolute
and desires to subordinate everything to
the Absolute and this is the religious
trait in it (It indic~tes the religious
integration of the Russian soul.) But
it easily leads to confusion - takes the
relative for the Absolute, the partial
for the Universal, and then falls into
idelatry. It is a property of the
Russian spirit, especially,to switch
over the current of religious energy to
non-religious objects, to the relative
and partial sphere of science or social
lifeo This explains a great deal. 73
Indeed it does! Berdyaev's comment bears out the claim
that the Russian consc-iausness is essentially a religious
one. But the disadvantage of this is that the very same
religious consciousness, characterized by passion, by
absolutism, and even by dogmatism could, depending on cir-
cumstances, be made to serve a secular end. In this
description of the Russian spirit lies the explanation
for the eventual rise of socialism, for the Russian
attitude to social concerns was essentially a religious
attitude. It was the transfer of religious passion from
a 'transcendental object' to an earthly end. This
characteristic may also be identified among the wester-
nizers, the group to whom the Slavophiles were opposed
in their assessment of the destiny of Russia.
The westernizing movement was, by and large, contempora-'
neous with Slavophilism (1840-1860) although its influence
was more far-ranging than the latter's. In fact it branched
out into Nihilism in the 1860's and Populism in the 1870's
and 1880's.
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The Westernizers may be traced to two circles: the Stankevich. .
circle of 1831 whose members V.G. Belinsky, M.A. Bakunin
T.N. Granovsky, V.P. Botkin Q met to read German especially
Hegelian philosophy, and the Alexander Herzen, N.P. Ogaryov
circle which had a more poli-tical bent, concentrating
mainly on French writers like saint Simon.
The westernizers could not accept the idolization of the
pre-Muscovite period; they believed that Russia's mission
to the world could only be effected if she followed the
initiative of Peter, for she was a European nation who
had, unfortunately, been retarded by the r1ongol invasion,
but now the time was right for her to assume her place
in Europe again.
The westernizers were profoundly affected by German philo-
sophy and many of their ideas are merely Russian inter-
pretations of German idealism. Under the impact of
Hegelian philosophy this strain of Russian thought took a
path that identified it as western and opposed it to
Slavophilism whose main source of philosophical inspiration
was Orthodoxy.
Hegelianism had become the major influence among Russian
thinkers and it would appear that each of these men
'assimilated Hegel in his own way and then reacted against
his philosophy' and it was largely 'in reaction to Hegel
that their own original philosophical ideas emerged,.74
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Inclined towarJs a revolutionary interpretation of Hegelian-
ism from the startuthe westernizers thought they saw in
'Hegel the necessary law of historical development and
they interpreted the direction of this development in their
75own sense'. However, the political reality of Russia did
not square with their interpretation of Hegel and they
quickly forsook Hegel for Feuerbach and the Hegelians of
the left. Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity in which
he claimed that God was the projection of the 'perfect
state of man' and that the realization of man's potential
can only come about through the 'substitution of man for
76God;' left a permanent impression on many of the
westernizers. Under the influence of his thought many of
the westernizers became frankly atheistic and man centred,
making an important contribution to philosophical anthro-
pology. Many commentators on Russian thought are in
agreement that atheism in Russia was born from the frus-
tration engendered from the difficulty of understanding a
creator who made 'an evil and incomplete world full of
suffering. They themselves desired to make a better world
in which there should be nO'wickedness and suffering! 77
The nature of Atheism in Russia then, according to
Thomas Masaryk in his book The Spirit of Russia is. ,
ethical and social, rather than metaphysical. The Russian
atheist is 'quite forthrightly preoccupied with the ethical
t f 1 " ,78aspec 0 re 19lon. It must be remembered also that
Feuerbach had exercised a profound influence on Marx and
Marx's Theses on Feuerbach79 is one of his seminal works.
The westernizers were, then, under the influence of Feuer-
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bach and the Hegelian left,. which are the same influences
that acted on Marx, albeit independently, being prepared
for the reception of the Marxist doctrine.
The philosophical career of Vissarion G. Belinsky (1811-1848),
an influential westernizer, illustrates quite vividly the
conversion from Hege1ianism to revolutionary anarchism.
At first he accepted the general idea that society is the
higher reality and the individual must subordinate his
interests to the interests of society. However, it was
not long before Belinsky realized the incompatibili~y of
Hegelian philosophy with the Russian reality and in a letter
to Botkin in 1840 he wrote IWhat is it to me that the
Universal exists '''when personality is suffering" 1.
80
Berdyaev asserts that Belinsky1s revolt against Hegel 18
a revolt on behalf of living human personality, and the
conflict for living human personality resolved itself into
a conflict for a socialist structure of society. Thus was
formulated the characteristically Russian type of individua-
l , t' . l' 81 h' h' .lS lC SOCla lsm. In lS ent USlasm to flght the cause
of the oppressed, Belinsky soon denied the individual and
went so far as to assert in his revolt against the state
that he is quite prepared to sacrifice some people for the
happiness of the majority.
This makes Belinsky more than any other revolutionary the
'intellectual ancestor of Russian communism' .82 Not only in
his ethical but also ln his social views he approximates
close to Marxism for he saw the importance of both the
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industrial development and the bourgeoisie. Belinsky could.
be regarded as the first fully fledged socialist although
it must be remembered that his socialism was 'more a matter
of sympathy with the oppressed than of attachment to parti-
. 1 . 183cular economlC t1eorles.
Alexander Ivanovich Herzen (1812-1870) agreed with Belinsky
on a number of the main themes. His journey to the West,
especially to Paris and London, convinced him of the moral
superiority of Russia over the West. Russia's strongest
point was/for Herzen,the absence of a bourgeois class.
True to the Narodnik spirit Herzen was opposed to a
political revolution that might drive Russia into the
bourgeois path of development. He was anti-Hegelian in
the sense that he did not believe that society moves up
inevitably to the attainment of a higher and perfect state;
and secondly he could not sacrifice human personality to
history for he could not accept either that man could be
an instrument for the attainment of inhuman ends or that
present generations should be sacrificed for the generations
that are to come. According to Berdyaev,Herzen grasped
the fact that I ·the religion of progress does not contemplate
anybody or anything or any moment as a value in itself,.84
Herzen's reVOlution was not the revolution of political
socialism designed to bring Russia in line with the bour-
geois west by the sacrifice of thousands. He based his
socialism - like the Slavophiles - on the Russian village
communes. Herzen's influence was far reaching and laid
the foundation for the original Russian individualistic
socialism opposed to bourgeois socialism which was to be.
represented in the 70 l s by Mikhailovsky.85
The third most important westernizer was Michael Alexandro-
vich Bakunin (1814-1876). Bakunin was the only one among
the senior westernizers who made any direct contact with
Marx. He met Marx in Brussels in 1848 and joined Marx's
Democratic Federation. However, Bakunin could not agree
with the tactics of Marx and after a short period together
Bakunin left.
Bakunin's move to practical revolutionary action is bril-
liantly laid out in his book The Reaction in Germany
published in German in 1842, and in 1840 in the introduc-
tion to the translation of Hegel's Gynmasial Lectures.
Here Bakunin laid out the connection between religion and
the state asserting that with the destruction of religion
comes the destruction of the state. In him is evidenced
extreme m~terialism and anarchistic socialism for the
individual is merely the 'involuntary product of his
environment, with no freedom of will ••. Thus since there
is no law, immorality is merely a product of social and
economic inequality which will vanish with the state,.86
Bakunin stressed his ideas in his works God and the State
(1871) and The Paris Commune, the latter contains his
critique of Marxism.
Although the views of the Slavophiles and westernizers
were completely unsuited to the social and political
complexities of the 1860's and were even wrong in their
exclusive claims, the road to revolution began with them.
Berdyaev points out that the westernizers were \'lrong in
seeing nothing 'original and distinc·tive in Russian
history' and in considering Russia as 'only a backwater
in enlightenment and civilization'. They were wrong in
seeing the West European type of civilization as the only
81type'. The Slavophiles on the other hand were wrong
because Peter's reforms were quite inevitable c If
Russia had remained militarily, educationally and economically
backward she would have been unable to 'fulfil her great
mission'. Also the Slavophiles failed to appreciate the
fact that it was only during and after the Petrine period
that Russian culture blossomed. However, in spite of their
onesidedness and often parochial perspectives of the Slavo-
philes and westernizers, the conflict between them brought
to the fore the contradictions deep in the Russian soul
which after the 1860's grew, intensified and became
sufficiently acute to find its only resolution in a revo-
lution of the people.
Strong affiliations to Orthodoxy represented by Kireevsky and
Khomiakov subsisted side by side with the militant atheism
of Herzen, Belinsky and Bakunin. The primacy of the
personality whose cause was championed by the Slavophiles
and Herzen clashed with the predominance of society over
the individual and the ruthless utilitarianism of Belinsky
and Bakunin. Faith in the village commune (abschina) which
was the motivating ideal of Kireevsky, Khomiakov and
67.
Herzen was again opposed to the attraction of industrial
revolution and the creation ofa bourgeois class which
Belinsky ardently favoured. The only unifying factor
amidst all these irreconcilable conflicts of the 1840's
was the socialist theme.
The controversies were caused in the first place by a
genuine concern for the plight of the peasants. However,
socialist solutions at this stage were still of a very
individualistic character and had not yet become politicised.
Even the socialist theories of Hprzen and Belinsky were
naive in comparison wit~ the hirtorical circumstances of
the 1860's. The changes of the 1860's and the ascendency
of the political principle in socialist doctrines are
evident in the thought of the nihilist and populist thinkers.
Michael Bakunin's book The Reaction in Germany in 1842
anticipated the nihilistic movements of the 1860's. By
the middle of the 1860's the social climate in Russia
altered radically. After the accession of Alexander 11 in
1855 came a series of reforms which altered appreciably
the socio-political climate of the time. The two most
important pieces of legislation ~1hich had a direct effect
on the I intelligen"tsia' were the emancipation of the serfs
in 1861 and the relaxation of the censorship laws of 1865
which saw an incredible burst of almost frenzied intellectual
activity. However, the men of the 1870's realized that the
reforms had actually given the serfs little chance of
. 1f ff" . 88economlC se_ -su lClency or genulne freedom. Neither
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the 'retrospective Utopia' of the Slavophiles nor the
•
pursuit of a western-type civilization of the westernizers
were adequate to the needs of the time.
One of the most significant factors of the change in the
social climate was the change in the ranks of the intel-
ligentsia. Previously the intelligentsia comprised mainly
the gentry. The westernizers, for example, were all,
with the notable exception of Belinsky, members of the
gentry. Now among the men of the sixties few were from
this class.
The fact that ranks of the intelligentsia were being filled
by members of other social classes brought about a complete
change in the outlook of the revolutionaries. Now move-
ments for reform were no longer spearheaded by a cultured
few who acted on behalf of the oppressed. Nov! many of the
members of the intelligentsia were themselves oppressed.
This being the case they were not merely men of reform
but men 'fanatically dedicated to the cause of freedom and
justice, they were the first true members of the non-
aristocratic Russian intelligentsia'.
Another reason for the intensified agitation for reform was
the fact that the sources of influence had changed. The
nihilists had no appreciation for the idealist inclinations
of their forbears. They were nurtured on Feuerbach, the
French socialists, the German materialists Buchner, Moles-
chott, Vogt, the positivists like Comte and Utilitarians like \.
./ '
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J.S. Mill. Clearly, influenced by these thinkers, the men.
of the 60's adopted a hard materialist, positivist line.
One of the mostDenetratin~ movements during the sixties
were the nihilists. Also operating from a materialist
position they denied the existence of a merciful God.
Central to their thought was Egoism and the glorification
of science. The nihilists argued that 'only in an illcon-
structed society does egoism yield socially undesirable
consequences. In a properly ordered society the most
egoistic behaviour will also be the behaviour most produc-
tive of the public good. Fundamentally and naturally the
interests of society and the interests of the individual
od ° l' 89are l entlca •
One of the most outstanding nihilist thinkers was Nicholas
Gravilovich Chernyshevsky (1828-1889). Like the men of
the forties he started off as an Idealist too but he soon
abandoned his idealism for Feuerbachianism which he judged
to be more relevant and more meaningful to the times.
From Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity and his own strong
belief in the viability of the Russian social commune came a
rapid conversion to philosophical materialism, atheism and
socialism.
Chernyshevsky made his impact in Russia through two major
works The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy in 1860
which denied the spiritual in man affirming him only ~s a
biological cornpound, and his novel What is to be done?
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which explicitly lays down a socialist ethic. In it he
describes a socialist commune based on cooperation and
harmony.
When Chernyshevsky died,Dimitry Ivanovich Pisorev
(1840-1868) became the chief spokesman for nihilism.
It"is in his hands that the centrality of the Ego gained
prominence. His main contribution to the development of
this idea was his book Thinking Proletariat' (1865).
Russia was at this stage in the process of developing a
proletariat class. A phenomena the thinkers of the
forties were not faced with. On behalf of the prolitari-
at , Pisarev advocated the most destructive means of over"..
throwing the existing order. One of his more famous
statements is/
What can be smashed should be smashed.
What withstands the blow is fit to survive.
What flies into pieces is rubbish. In any
case strike out right and left, no harm
can come of it. 90
Nihilism was not a large movement. It's impact on
Dostoev-
Russian society from the point of view of Socialism was
largely positive. In the eyes of Dostoevsky the nihilists
represented the realm of the Antichrist. His caricature
of nihilists, notably Stavrogin in the bookTh~?osses~~d,
while it is a caricature, nonetheless points out the empty
but hardened mood of these circles and predicts that it
would be through them specifically and through their
attempts at the secularization and radicalization of societ
that materialism and socialism would flourish' .91
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sky's predictions were borne out by the fact that the.
nihilists were indeed the direct ancestors of Marxism-
Leninism.
According to Berdyaev, 'Russian nihilism sinned in its
fundamental inconsistency °, and this is epitomized by
Pisorev. While Pisarev 9' fought for the liberation of
personality and demanded that the personality, or more
correctly the Ego, be raised above the social environment,
'from whence is personality to get the strength for such
a conflict sincep'isarev and the nihilis,ts were materia-
l , d ' l' '1" ,?92lsts an ln mora lty utl ltarlans .
Nihilism as a movement did not outlast the sixties;
it . soon gave way to the Populists who held sway during
the seventies. Populism,which is the last apparently
cohesive mov~ment before Marxism/is more removed intel-
lectually from Marxism than nihilism was. One possible
reason could be that they also saw Berdyaev's criticism
of the nihilists and attempted to temper their materialism
to cope with it.
Populism as a movement still held to a formal agrarian
socialism which was based on thel'glorification of the
Russian people, especially their moral fibre.
From the centrality of the peasant village commune the
f 93uture of the socialist order was worked out. Chief
spokesman for Populism was Peter Lavrov (1823-1900).
Lavrov pointed out that moral and historical phenomena
were not incompatible with positivism and socialism.- .
Indeed he insisted that a debt was owed to the peasants,
a moral debt; Lavrov was prepared to admit that there were
spiritual and historical phenomena outside of scientific
phenomena but even this admission did not materially alter
the scientific-materialist basis of his thought. He did
manage, however, to convince many young men that the
pursuit of 'lofty ideals' which were scorned by the
'thinking realists' and 'rational positivists' of the
sixties are legitimate but that they owed a debt to the peasants
to be able to enjoy such a luxury in the first place.
According to Lavrov, this was the case because of the toil and suf
fering of the unprivileged peasant masses which had allowed




The same moral emphasis of the populist doctrine is stressed
by another chief spokesman, Nicholas Konstantinovich
Mikhailovsky (1842-1904). Mikhailovsky too insisted on
the 'subjective factor in human action and history', by
which man could properly study man, despite adopting a
positivistic attitude towards religion and metaphysics. 95
Mikhailovsky followed Lavrov in his repudiation of any
deterministic theory of history insisting that historical
goals may only be reached through the conscious and
deliberate effort of man.
Clearly this combination of anti-metaphysical positivism
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and a thoroughgoing moral idealism, is far removed from.
the ruthless positivism in Marxism. The importance of
populism on the path to the Revolution lay in two important
pointf::
1. Man's earthly social well-being is his most important
concern - that human society is alterable by deliberate
human action - with one difference this ancient Russian
theme was distinguished during the Populist phas;e by a
great and frenzied commitment to the people. So while
theoretically the Populists were removed from Marxism,
they did in fact help intensify the concern for the under-
privileged masses.
2. The Populist-movement was the target of attack by
the socalled Bakumists especially on the issue of
gradual revolution. The opposition between these two
groups spawned a number of radical groups 'shading off
into revolutionary terrorism'. Parties like Land and
Liberty (1876), Black Repartition faction, Peoples Will
Party - the last was responsible for the assassination
of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 - had their roots in
Populism.
Populism then was part of the dialectic that led even-
tually to the revolution even if it was more the negative
pole of that dialectic.
The beginning of the twentieth century saw a remarkable
cultural renaissance in Russia. The social climate of
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Russia, the revolutionary f~rvour, the results of almost
a cen-tury is controversies stimulated in the twentieth
century a profound spiritual di,quiet and religious
searching.
There were three major sources behind the Russian
Renaissance at the turn of the century. First the source
of greatest significance for the Intelligentsia had its
origin in Marxism. Paradoxical as this may seem, Marxism
had caused a crisis of the left Intelligentsia, i.e.
those who placed their faith during the second half of
the nineteenth century upon Russian narodnik socialism
and later Marxism. The Group that formed The Emancipation
of Labour' which was part of the left Intelligentsia
actually laid the foundations of Russian Marxism.
However, the philosophy of history introduced by Marxism,
which was a spiritual and intellectual movement, flourished.
The Intelligentsia was obviously split at this stage.
There were those who accepted Marxism in its entirety--
and they formed the nucleus that would spearhead the
Co~munist revolt. Then there were the others who accepted
it only in part - they made the transition from Marxism to
idealism and finally to Christianity. Berdyaev attempted
to unite both Marxism and Idealism.
The second source of the Renaissance was the development
of the eschatological perspective. An eschatological
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bent is endemic to the Russian consciousness, a fact which
has already been discussed.-' But now- the eschatology of
the nineteenth century thinkers, for example Dostoevsky
and TolstoYi were being assessed and evaluated, the
details of which are not really relevant at this stage
The Russian Marxists attempted to find fulfilment
of their eschatological desire in an 'earthly paradise'
while o"thers, like Berdyaev i maintained it within a
reli.gious world-view.
The third source Gf Russian Renaissance was connected with
the blossoming of Russian poetry. It was the age of
symbolism, the chief representatives being Alexander Bok;
Andrei Byelli, and V. Ivanov who drew their inspiration
mainly from Vladimir Solovyev. Berdyaev was also one of
those strongly influenced by Solovyev.
Symbolism sees a spiritual reality behind visible reality
and is the link between two worlds. The symbolists
believed that there is another world which represented
symbolically in this world.
The Russian Renaissance is the most ironical development
in Russian history. It showed an unprecedented depth of
creativity in the Russian spirit yet it predated by only
a few years the advent of the most repressive totalitaria-
nlsm.
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The discussion on the rise of Russian Communism traced
the main themes of Russian philosophy from 988 to 1917.
It sho\vs how certain historical circumstances predisposed
the Russian spirit to both totali~arianism and to spiritual
anarchy. This survey of the development of Russian thought
was an attempt to place Berdyaev in historical perspective,
to outline the main influences on his thought and also to
outline the main ideas he was at pains to refute or affirm.
It will become clear during the course of the discussion
that almost none of Berdyaev's central themes originated
in his works. Everyone of them may be traced back to
motifs in Russian intellectual history. In his own
philosophy, however, these themes underwent a vital cross
pollination, the unique fruit of which the remaining
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Chapter 11 The Meaning of Freedom
Berdyaev developed his philosophy of freedom in response to
the almost total absence of a explicit idea of freedom in the
traditional un~erstanding of man in philosophy and theology.
As a member of the Russian intelligentsia Berdyaev shared all
their concerns; the passionate concern for the plight of man,
and the anguished search for the meaning of pain, suffering
and evil. These themes underlay the cleavages among the
Russian intelligentsia. All the prominent thinkers of the
nineteenth century whether Westernizer or Slavophile, Popu-
list or Anarchist or Nihilist were motivated by
the same ccncerns. They differed, however, in their unJer-
standing of man and consequently on the meaning of his
suffering and the solution to his plight.
Man was for Berdyaev, as he was for the others, the raison
d'etre for the philosophical quest. However, Berdyaev,
under the influence of many Russian and western thinkers reali-
zed that the clue to the understanding of man lay in the
nature of freedom. Freedom is endemic to being human
and can only be apprehended from the vantage point af man.
Berdyaev's philosophy is an attempt to describe the re~ation
between freedom and man. His own struggle to understand this
relation led him from Marxism to idealism, from idealism to
existentialism (represented particularly by Dostoevsky) and
finally to personalism.
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In his bookp 1'he Divine and the Human~Berdyaev claimed
tha"t the quest for meaning by the traditional philoso-
phers had failed in three respects:
(i) they had not explained the existence of
evil which triumphs in the world;
(ii) they have not discerned the tragic
character of the world process;
(iii) they provided no possibility of
, h d' 1constructlng a t eo lCY.
Berdyaev kept ties with Marxism and Existentialism
because he thought he saw in these disciplines answers
to the above questions. However p while he was quite
correct in discerning that Marxism and Existentialism
had attempted to cope with these problems/they had either
traded freedom for authority, or they did not go far
enough or they debased the image of man.
Berdyaev realized early in his philosophical journey
that the question of freedom entailed the problem of
evil, and it is the interrelatedness of the two which des-
cribes both the dynamic character of human personality and
the tragic nature of human history. The denial of evil
is bound to lead to the denial of freedom and, earthly'
solutions to the problem of evil will be of an authori-
tarian nature. Alternatively, if freedom is affirmed
in the absence of a higher truth, evil is still not
transcended and man becomes a victim of empty individualism.
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In his attempt to penetrate to the meaning of per-
sonality and the nature of freedom, Berdyaev strove
for an understanding of freedom that would preserve
the autonomy and dignity of man even if this entailed
suffering.
He had joined the young Marxists initially because he
felt that Marxism offered 'an integrating view of
man which united thought to action e and which spelt
'mans victory over irrational forces of nature and
. ,2
soclety. In Berdyaev's words,
The Marxist movement of the late
nineties was born of a new vision:
it brought with it ••• a purpose
and a new conception of man. It
had, furthermore, a distinctly higher
intellectual and cultural standard
than most of the preceding movements.
Marxism, at that juncture, was in
fact a signal for the spiritual as
well as social liberation of man.
What attracted me most of all was
its characteristic appreciation of
the moving forces below the surface
of history, its unconsciousness of
the historic now, its broad histori- 3
cal perspectives and its universalism.
Marxism for Berdyaev and for many uf the intelligentsia
was not the solution for the socio-political problems
of Russia only; it represented for them the solution
to the liberation of all men. As it has already been
pointed out/the early Marxist movements in Russia
appeared to be for the religious and atheistic left
and right wing thinkers alike, the final answer to the
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tragic conflict of man with his fellow man; man
with nature and man with the State. Berdyaevis
association with Marxism arose from the fact that
he, like many others, believed that idealist values
like the independent existence of truth and goodness
could be combined with the social truths of Marxism.
In other words/he based his socialism upon an
idealist foundation.
4
However, it soon began to
dawn on him that freedom of the individual
in Marxism was an illusion,and that there was an
irreconcilable contradiction between the idealist
and materialist sides of Marxism. J
In Truth and Revelation Berdyaev described his dis-
illusionment with the revolutionaries~
••• I saw with grief that in the Marxist
camp also there was no reverance for the
dignity of personality, and the libera-
tion of the people was too often associated
with the enslavement of man and his
conscience. At a very early stage I saw
the results of this process. The revolu-
tionaries had no love for freedom of the
Spirit; they denied the rights of human
creativeness.6
Almost in response to Lunacharasky's criticism
that such a defence of disinterested truth, of the
independence of the intellect and the right of
personal judgement contradicted Marxism which sub-
ordinates the interpretation of truth and justice
to the revolutionary class struggle,7 Berdyaev
together with other 'idealist Marxists' like Peter
85.
Struve, Sergius Bulgakov and S.L. Frank broke com-
pletely from Marxism an~ adbpted a consistent Idealist
position. He declared of his beliefs vis-a-vis Marxism:
I maintained th8 existence of truth
and goodness as idealist values which
are independent of the class struggle,
of social conditions and the rest;
and I did not acquiese in the final
rejection of philosophy and ethics
to the revolutionary class struggle.
I believed in the existence of truth
and justice as determining my revo-
lutionary attitude to social reality
and not as determined by it. 8
Berdyaev rejected out of hand the Marxist doctrines
that truth belongs to the collective and not to the
individual and that no realm of truth and freedom
independent of historical materialism existed.
He was already by this stage converted to the Kantian
dualism which espoused an independent realm of truth
and freedom and so he considered the 'one-planeness'
of historical materialism an affront to the duality
of the human being. Man's consciousness was not
material and deterministic bu-t rather spiritual and
free. He not only rejected Marxism in terms of the
Kantian dualism but he rejected Western philosophy
also for having enslaved itself to Being which denies
evil, freedom and, therefore, personality. The
existential freedom of man as a result of the primacy
of ontology had been ignored in the West and even when
it was affirmed like the existentialists did,
it degenerated in some cases
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into 'empty actionalism',9 which inhibited the deve-
lopment of personality," and in other cases led to the
debasement of man. Berdyaev criticised existentialists
like Heidegger and Jaspers whom he claims also dis-
regarded the real problem of man. He asserted thatp
'0 .'they' never really consider the problem
of man nor do they attempt to build up a
consistent philosophical system on the
basis of philosophical anthropology.
They have not worked out or elaborated
the rich material inherent in their
systems into a definite philosophical
doctrine of man. They leave the 10
problem of human nature unsolved .•.
By this Berdyaev meant that while the post war
existentialists like Heidegger, Jaspers, Camus, and
Sartre had concentrated on the individual who was
being threatened by mass culture and absolutist
doctrines/they never really explained or accounted
for the uniqueness of personality. The existentia-
list thinkers identified and fought on behalf of
the individual, but 'explain' him or what his purpose is
they could not or did not.
Berdyaev argues that 'man is not the last end of
man', he cannot be set free in the name of man's
f d 11ree om. Man can be free to realize himself and
to create his own being only in the name of a higher
truth. If there were no independent realm of pure
freedom, no, higher truths, man is faced with complete
nothingness. It is not sufficient to espouse a
'theoretical liberty to accept truth, ... a liberty
founded not upon truth but on the right to choose no
Ij / •
matter what truth or lie, which means the creation
of a culture and a society without an object because
they do not know in the name of what they exist.
,12
Even the religious existentialists like Kierkegaard
and Bultman, although they have a defined higher truth
and see a meaning in the world, their theology
consistent with Protestantism in the West saw God
as \l>7holly other, and man as a completely debased sinner
before God whose only vocation was to work for his
. . d . 13 h t f thsalvat10n and h1S re empt1on. T e ques or e
humane has no place in the theology, albeit exis~
tential, of either Kierkegaard or Bultmann.
For Berdyaev the quest for meaning is the quest for
freedom, the search for truth and the realization
of the truly human. This much neglected idea ~ the
essential humanity of man can only be realized for
him in and through freedom in response to a higher truth.
In his charge that all of Western philosophy up to and
including the existentialists have neglected the human-
ity of man, and in his reaction to Western ontology
in terms of the major influences acting on him, for example,
Kant, Dostoevsky, Boehme, Baader and Solovyev,
Berdyaev develops his own unique idea of freedom.
He begins by claiming that, the Greek Philosophers did not address
the problem of the contradictory human personality.
They only managed to differentiate reason in man
and had to face thereafter all the attendant problems~ some of
which have been discussed in Ch. 1. In o,ther words v the
Greeks had only a parttal grasp of man; they could
not see that man is immersed in the depths of Being.
Therefore Being as a whole is not accessible to his
understanding. In The Beginning and End Berdyaev
wrote,
Greek philosophy as a whole is not yet
a philosophy of the Ego, it was not
the apprehension of Being from the point
of view of subject; and arising out of
the depths of human existence. Greek
thought is directed to the object. 14
Berdyaev maintains that in the search for the prim-
ordial the Greeks tried to penetrate behind the world
of senses to the unchanging reality. This meant that
the Greeks took for granted the ability of the human
mind to rise above phenomena which confronts us, to
penetrate through the world of becoming to Being.
Being became then an object of thought and thereby
came to denote objectification.
Berdyaev writes,
To this end
What reason finds is its own product.
Reality is made to depend upon the fact
that it becomes the subject matter of
knowledge, in other words an object.
But in actual fact the reverse is true v
reality is not in front of the knowing
subject but behind him, in his
existentiality.15
For Berdyaev p all of Western philosophy has fallen
into the trap of assuming an objectivity that does
not exist and have had consequently to cope with the problem 0:
whether the acquisition of knowledge is active or
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passive. Berdyaev claims that there can be no solu-
tion to this problem so' long as knowledge is regarded
as a mere subj ective reflec·tion of the obj ects, and
Being as an objective state from which the subject
has been eliminated. The tragedy of philosophy is
that Being can only be appre~ended through reason
otherwise no communion with Being is possible, for
the knowing subject stands in opposition to the ab-
stract object. This means that knowledge and Being
are in opposition to each other.
- The implications of this rational metaphysics is
that knowledge can only be passive reflection.
Creative penetration into Being is rendered impos-
sible by this static view of the world.
It was against this view of the 'world' and the
apprehension of it that the existentialists rebelled.
They repudiated the idea that man was an object among
other objects capable of being apprehended through
reason. In a telling passage from The Way to Wisdom
Karl Jaspers articulated the problem thus:
The truth is that man is accessible to
himself in two ways: as object of
enquiry, and as existence endowed with
a freedom that is conceived as object,
in the other as new object which man
is and of which he becomes aware when
he ach£.eve-s authentic awareness of
himself. We cannot exhaust man's
Being in knowledge of him, we can
experience it only in the primal source
of our thought and action. Man is fun-
damentally more than he can know himself. 16
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According to Berdyaev man has been accessible to.
the Greeks and Western philosophy in the first way
that Jaspers has described, 'as an object of enquiry' f
however" man can never knovif himself completely,,
historically conditioned and contingent, absolute
knowledge is denied to him. Berdyaev, therefore,
follows the existentialists in their qualitative
shift in the epistemological quest - the striving
for absolute knowledge has now been substituted for
the striving for authentic knowledge.
Berdyaev claims that in the West the beginnings of the shift 0
emphasis from the acquisition of objective knowledge
to the fact that it is the subjective personality
who is the bearer of truth and who confers meaning
on existence, lies in German Idealism/especially
Kan~who 'dealt a blow to the objectivism of the
Greek and scholastic philosophy from which it cannot
17hope to recover.'
He maintains that the 'Copernican revolution' of
Kant was the final break with the influence of Greek
philosophy and the doctrine of substance. Kant
moved the enquiry from the object to the knowing
subject. He had seen the confusion between the
processes of thinking and being, for reason had
accepted as objective being that which it itself
had produced. Berdyaev argues that Kant saw that
the object was the mere offspring of the subject ,
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that is, what refers merely to appearances and phe-
nomena must not be tran~ferred to what is noumenal,
to the things-in-·thems-,~lves.
Rant's criticism was that the subject matter of thought
is the creation of thought itself; it is the result of
theobjectifying act. However, the objectifications
of the constructions of the mind begin Uto exist'
independently and give rise to pseudorealities. For
Berdyaev, Kant was the antidote to this since he saw
that the 'existence of an idea does not imply the
, f l't ,18eXlstence 0 rea 1 y. In the face of this
inadequacy in traditional philosophy, Kant postulated
the realm of noumena and the realm of phenomena
connected by practical reason 'which does not objec-
tify and therefore breaks through beyond the world
of phenomena to the noumenal world which provides
. 19the norms for moral actlon.'
Berdyaev is of the opinion that Kant's philosophy
was the first step towards human emancipation,
toward freeing man from the constraint and slavery
to the objective world. The very fact of a critical
awareness of the subject! s participation in the ob-
jective processes implied the subject's deliverance
from the tyranny of the objective world . Kant,
for Berdyaev, was the first to make existential
metaphysics a possibility for he 'drew the dis-
tinction between the order of nature and the order
20 h' h' E' tof freedom' w lC lS X1S enz.
If, for Berdyaev, the order of freedom is the order
of existence then the order of nature is the order
of objectification and, therefore, unfreedom.
Berdyaev explained this more clearly when he wrote
that'J
Objectification is the ejection of man
into the externaliit is an exteriorization,
of him, it is the subjecting of him to
space, time and causality.2la
However,while Berdyaev accepted the basic distinction
Kant made between the world of space, time and
causality and the world of noumena and freedom, he
was highly critical of the Kantian metaphysics. He
pointed out that while Kant's metaphysics was based
on the subject, Kant saw the subject itself in an
objective and non-existential way., Hence he made
no real contribution to the understanding of the
ambiguities of human personality. In fact Kant's
metaphysics gave no account of the presence of evil,
suffering and death which are the major concerns of
man. Knowledge for Kant was still objective and
epistemological.
Furthermore,while Kant taught a doctrine of causality
through freedom he left unexplained the manner in
which noumenal freedom breaks in upon the causal
sequence of appearances. Although he asserts that
man can, indeed must, act in terms of the Categorica!
Imperative, which norm is outside the senses and
pertains to the noumen~l world, he appears to present
two worlds different and entirely separate from each
other; shut up in themselves without any possibility
of communion. The implication of this is that man
is merely a phenomenon unto himself and cannot
participate in the noumenal world. Berdyaev writes:
Man remains as it were corked up in
the world of phenomena, he is unable
to break out of it; or able to break
out only by way of practical postu-
lates. Kant regarded man from
man's point of view, as an appearance,
man was not revealed to himself as
a noumenon. 2lb
According to Berdyaev, this is the biggest shortcoming
in Kant's philosophy. He says Kant did not come to
terms with the fact that the knowing subject, the
thinking, reflecting passionate human being cannot be
reduced to a phenomenon - the singular uniqueness of
the human personality defies categorization.
Kant's philosophy, therefore, does not really shed
light on the question What is man? Berdyaev did not
regard as important Kant's idea of the freedom of the
rational will of man to act morally as a contribution
to the understanding of man as a person. In fact,
influenced by Dostoevsky, the German mystics,
Solovyev and others like him, he did not regard the
will as rational at all. He maintained instead,
that Kant's dualism is important because it made
possible a philosophy of authentic freedom wherein
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lies the clue to the mystery of man.
Berdyaev saw a much closer link between freedom and
personality in the Dostoevskian rather than in the
Kantian dialectic. According to Fuad Nucho ln his book
The Existential Paradox of Freedom and Necessity in
Berdyaevis philosophy, it was in the writings of
Dostoevsky that Berdyaev found an outline not only
1 f · l' 22of the problems of freedom but a so 0 lts so utlon.
In his book The Brothers Karamazov Dostoevsky offers
man_ two alternatives: the principle of compulsion
of the Grand Inquisitor and the principle of freedom
of Christ.
In the legend of the Grand Inquisitor the Pope has
taken Christ Jesus captive and while holding him
prisoner explains that the success of the Church was
gained at the cost of manis freedom, that Ithe
tranquil mind and even death is dearer to man than
the free choice in the knowledge of good and evil l • 23
The Grand Inquisitor glories in the fact that the
church on earth had vanquished freedom in Christ's
name, for according to the Inquisitor Ithere are
three forces and only three forces that are able
to conquer and hold captive for ever the conscience
of these weak rebels for their own happiness - these
forces are miracle, mystery, and authority . ... You
rejected all three when the devil tempted you with
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them... Oh, of course, you acted proudly and magni-
ficently, like God. Bctt men, the weak rebellious
race of menu are they gods?nChrist surely could not
have loved man if instead of taking possession of
men's freedom he multiplied it and burdened the
spiritual kingdom of man with its sufferings for ever. ,24
It is the church on earth, claims the Inquisitor, which
has served men for it. has. ,. removed from them the
terrible burden of freedom of conscience. The
Inquisitor asks of Christ~
••. You rejected tl~ only absolute banner,
which was offered to you, to make all men
worship you alone i.ncontestably - the
banner of earthly bread, which you
rejected in the name of freedom and the
bread from heaven. And look wha·t you
have done further - and all again in
the name of freedom! I tell you man has
no more agonizing anxiety than to find
someone to whom he can hand over with
all speed the gift of freedom with which
the unhappy creature is born. But only
he can gain possession of men's freedom
who is able to set their conscience at
ease. With the bread you were given
an incontestable banner: give him bread
and man will worship you, for there is
nothing more incontestable than, bread. 25
The argument of the Inquisitor turns on a particular
understanding of man. He sees man as a wretched
creature unable to respond to the call of love and
freedom of God but only too willing to deny his
higher purpose and subjugate himself before earthly
masters all for the sake of tranquility and material
happiness. They (men) will say 'we don't mind being
your slaves so long as you feed us.,26 The Inquisitor
unashamedly says to Christ 'I do not want your love
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because I do not love you myself ••. we are not
with you but with him (Satan): that is our secret!
It's a long time - eight centuries - since we left
you and went over to him. Exactly eight centuries
ago we took from him what you rejected with scorn. ,27
According to Dostoevsky man in the historical church
has been a child of authority, of Satan, rather than
a child of freedom, of Christ. Christ is the embodi-
ment of freedom. In him is the indissoluble link
be~ween freedom and personality. His call is to the
dignity of man; that man should follow him freely
even if this journey entails suffering. Nucho's
opinion is that the emphasis Dostoevsky-laid on the
independence and the dignity of the human personality
led him to distinguish be"tween two kinds of freedom:
initial freedom and final freedom. That the truth
shall make men free is the final freedom, but that
t f 1 t . h t th' ... 1 f d 28man mus ree y accep ~ e ru 1S 1n1tla ree om.
These two 'freedoms' are crucial to an understanding
of many of Dostoevsky's characters through whom he
deJT.onstrates that freedom may conduct a man either to
self-destruction or to the heights of spiritual
t f · . 29 h .rans 19urat1on; t e d1fference lies in whether man
rejects or accepts God.
Matthew Spinka in his book Christian Thought from
Erasmus to Berdyaev says of Dostoevsky's view of
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freedom,
The tragic judgement of freedom
Dostoevsky depicts in the judgement of
his hero's freedom passes into self will?
into rebellious self-affirmation of man.
Freedom becomes objectless and empty.
Such objectless and emptiness is the freedqm
of Stavrogin Versilov (in The Possessed)
the freedom of Svridrigailov and Feodor
Parlovich Karamazov (in The Brothers
Karamazov )...is disintegrating; the
freedom of Raskolnikov (in Crime and
punishmen~' ) ... leads to crime, and
the demonic freedom of Kirilov and
Ivan Karamazov destroys man. Freedom
as self annihilates itself, passes into
its opposite, disintegrates and destroys
rn.an.30
On the other hand freedom rightly used,
••. leads to the way of God-manhood.
In God-manhood human freedom unites
with divine freedom, the human image
with the Divine image. By an inward
experience, an inward living of free-
dom is attained in the light of that
truth ••• But Christ is not an
external law, an external rule of
life. His kingdom is incompatible
with the kingdom of this world and
Dostoevsky angrily denounces all
deviations of Christianity toward the
religion of constraint and force.31
Berdyaev accepted completely from Dostoevsky that the
'justification of both God and man must be looked for
in freedom of which the tragic process of the world
is only a function'. 32 Firstly, the irrational and
mysterious nature of the freedom of man which can
both destroy man or uplift him spiritually. Secondly,
the nature and source of evil, without which goodness
and freedom make no sense. Thirdly, the existence of
good through compulsion which serves only to destroy
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the humanity of man and v fourthly and mos·t importantly,
the need for a higher truth which preserves the free-
dom of man once he has chosen the truth in freedom.
This apparent tautology implies that the truth is in
freedom and freedom in the truth.
Berdyaev realized from his evaluation of Kant that i>c
is not enough, in the face of our modern problems, to
declare that man is in his nature free. The question
is how does man remain free and not end in ideological
slavery and both na·tural and spiritual self-destruction
A which seems an immanent possibility .in the t.wentieth
century. The answer to Berdyaev lay in Dostoevskyv s
Christ.
The Christ-event as it was interpreted by Dostoevsky
provided for him the twin ideas of personality and
freedom. Berdyaev claimed that in no other religion
or philosophical system did one discern
what was expected of man or what man could potentially
be. It was only in the Christ-event that the calling
of man in his essential and existential freedom has
been revealed to him in all clarity. In his autobio-
graphy Dream and Reality he wrote,
In becoming a believer in God I did not
cease to believe in man and man's
dignity and creative freedom. I became
a Christian because I was seeking for a
deeper and truer foundation for belief
in man. 33
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The impact of Dostoevsky's understanding of Christia-.
nity on Berdyaev was so great that it is actually in
'his book Dostoevsky, which is only ostensibly an
elucidation of Dostoevsky's ideas, that Berdyaev works
out his own philosophy of freedom.
For Berdyaev, freedom is not a means to happiness;
freedom cannot be a means to anything. It is an end
in itself in which and through which the relationship
of God and man is worked out. The tragic aspect of
human history, which has been ignored by traditional
philosophers, is the result of the dialectic that
obtains between the primordial, initial freedom of
man to first choose the truth and the final freedom
that comes of having chosen on the one hand, and
the constraints of necessity, of objectification in
the realm of space, time and causality, on the other.
Berdyaev starts his argument with the assertion that
'the truth shall make men free, but they must freely
accept it and not be brought to it by force. Our
Lord gives man the final liberty, but man must first
f I" hI' h' I 34 hree Y ave c eaved to lm. T e paradoxical
nature of freedom is that there is a truth about
freedom as well as freedom in the truth. 35 The truth
about freedom is that man is by his very nature free
to choose but the freedom in the truth is the 'gift
of Christianity to the redeemed man,.36
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The nature ot freedom wa~ unknown to Greek and Indian
societies and it was only with the advent of Christia-
nity that the awareness came that man's freedom to
choose his destiny lay in his own hands. For Dostoevsky
and for Berdyaev, Christianity confirmed both the free-
dOIn of man to reject or choose truth and the freedom
in Christ once he chooses. For Berdyaev there is no
realization of freedom outside of Christ for objectless
freedom negates the authenticity of initial freedom.
This is a very significant factor in understanding his
idea of freedom, for although he follows Dostoevsky in
making a distinction between initial and final freedom,
he says quite clearly that the one condition of freedom
cannot be realized without the other. The implication
is that man cannot remain free although he is by his
nature free if he does not choose the only truth that
guarantees his freedom, namely, thelChrist alternative.'
Freedom without goal or direction ends in aimless,
rebellious, voluntary/circumscribed liberty that distorts
man and destroys his image. For Berdyaev the 'liberty
rich in fulfilment that confirms man as man ... is in
Christ'. In Dostoevsky he writes,
If there is no bond between human freedom
and divine freedom, then freedom does not
exist either. If all things are allowable
to man then freedom becomes its own slave,
and a man who is his own slave is lost.
The human image needs the support of a
higher nature and human freedom reaches
its definitive expression in a higher
freedom in truth. The dialectic is
irrefutable and draws us into the wake
of God-mad~ man, by whom alone human
freedom can be joined with divine free-
dom and the form of man with the form of
God. 37
101.
Berdyaev makes several bold claims in this statement:
1) If all things are allowable to man then freedom
becomes its own slave, that is, godless freedom turns
in on itself to destroy itself;
2) the human image is only realized in a thorough-going
freedom;
3) human freedom is defined in terms of a higher
freedom;
4) the God-man is the meeting point of human and
divine freedom, and the boldest of all,
5) the form of man joins with the form 0f God in
the Christ-event.
Berdyaev's substantiation for the above five claims
forms the outline of his later and more developed
philosophy. He starts with the contention that if man
is absolutely free all things are permitted to him and
that man may aspire to become himself God, as Adam did.
Here he echoes the concern of both Dostoevsky and
Nietzsche. Nietzsche argued that man had killed God
and in so doing had put himself beyond good and evil.
However, Nietzsche had also emphasized that to be
worthy of the crime of killing God, man must aspire to
be God himself. This is dramatically represented in
D t k ! C' d P 'h 38 'f' cl' hos oevs y s rlme an unls.ment I typl le. In t e
figure of Raskolnikov. Taking Nietzsche's commandment
to its logical conclusion,Dostoevsky makes Raskolnikov
decide to exercise the most extreme licence his terrible
freedom allows him - to take the life of one whom he thinks
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to be a lesser mortal. Raskolnikov's justification
for the murder of the old usurer was that it would
benefit himself and mankind. Although the book ends
with Raskolnikov's pitiful lament that he was not equal
to the crime because his conscience had failed him,
the torture of his conscience, which was more painful
than the penal servitude he was sentenced to, starts
him on the long path to the realization of the real
meaning of human freedom. The capricious exercise of
his freedom led Raskolnikov to crime, sundering
his conscience and enslaving him to an idea. He did
not recognize the absolute value of every individual
nor did he realize that in the name of freedom he had
destroyed freedom.
Freedom is an absolute 'category' in so far as it lS
constrained by no external force. The only limit to
freedom is freedom itself, meaning that I choose
freedom not only for myself but for all of mankind.
The only thing that binds man to this realization is
his recognition of the absolute value of every indivi-
dual. Berdyaev's comment on this was,
All things are not aliowable because, as
immanent experience proves 1 human nature
is created in the image of God and every
man has an absolute value in himself and
as such the spiritual riature of man for-
bids the arbitrary killing of the least and
most harmful of men; it means the loss of
one's essential humanity and the dissolu-
tion of personality, it is a crime that no
idea or 'higher end' can justify. 39
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Raskolnikov placed himse~f on the throne of God to
give expression to his freedom. His action he could
only justify in the absence of God for he accepted
no higher purpose for his freedom, and accordingly
set himself up as judge over his fellow being.
Berdyaev maintains that,
When freedom has degenerated to self will
it recognizes nothing as sacred or for-
bidden, for if there be no God but man
then everything is allowable and man can
try himself out at will. At the same
time he lets himself get obsessed by
some fixed idea and under its tyranny
soon begins to disappear.40
For Berdyaev as it is for Dostoevsky there is no other
basis for values except in God. There is no reason
for man to feel constrained by any values at all in
the absence of any higher truth; he becomes as a con-
sequence, a law unto himself.
There have, however, been attempts to construct
systems of ethics by atheistic philosophers who do
not accept that values need necessarily derive this
binding nature from God. Albert Camus is a good
example of an existentialist atheist who attempted
to make out a case for values in the absence of a '
higher order or God. In his books The Rebel 41 and
The Myth of Sisypus
42
, Camus argues that man has a
responsibility to rebel on behalf of values other-
wise he faces non-being. The protagonist in the
second book mentioned feels himself bound to roll the
stone up the hill continuously or be destroyed. It
lO~.
is through rebellion agaipst non-being, which is the
constant threat to man, that man creates values and
confers meaning on the world. Although Camus explains
that if man did not rebel. he would be destroyed, he
still does not present a convincing enough case for
why the individual should be bound by this ethic at
all. In the absence of God death signifies complete
nothingness, and if that is the case man is not him-
self called to any higher purpose. If transcendence
is denied, it still remains for there to be a value
system that is 'binding' by its own internal logic
which recognizes the absolute freedom of man.
The case of Raskolnikov answers to the first claim
that Berdyaev made that if all things are allowable
to man freedom becomes its own slave because freedom
becomes licence and has shown itself to be destructive.
The chaos that results from the arbitrary exercise of
freedom annihilates in the end the 'bearer' of that
freedom, man himself.
However, the fact that man could degenerate so easily
into self-affirmation raises the question of the presence
of evil in the world which obviously, as it has been
shown in the discussion on Raskolnikov,acts in and
through freedom. Indeed Berdyaev tells us that it is
freedom which opens the 'path of evil to man, evil is
proof of freedom, and man must pay the price' 43
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According to ~erdyaev the main argument levelled against
belief in God is the existence of evil in the world.
It was the central idea of the Russian atheists of the
nineteenth century, the main reason for the rejection
of God by the nihilists and the single most important
argument that Ivan Karamazov used in The Brothers
Karamazov against God. Paradoxically, Berdyaev inter-
prets the presence of evil as proof of the existence
of God, and not the reason for his absence. He claims
that,
if the world consisted wholly and
uniquely of goodness and righteousness
there would be no need for God for the
world itself would be God. God is
because evil is. And that means that
God is because freedom is0 44
If God may be freely chosen by man then the presup-
position is that man is rooted in a freedom outside
of God and that he may choose between God and this
opposite. Any suggestion to the effect that a world
harmony is an attainable ideal ignores the metaphy-
sical reality of evil in the world, the fact of which
makes both freedom and God meaningful.
Both Dostoevsky and Berdyaev stress that evil has
metaphysical origins. They vehemently repudiated
humanitarian positivist theories which explain the
evil of man with reference to the social environment.
Humanitarian theories signify for them the 'denial
of the depth of human nature and of the liberty of
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the spirit and the person~l responsibility that goes
with it,.45 Berdyaev asserted that g
If man is nothing but a passive reflection
of his social surroundings, an irrespon-
sible creature, then there is no such thing
as uman ' nor is there God, freedom, evil or
good. 46
Humanitarian-positivist theories are in any case in
conflict with certain fundamentals of Christianity.
Firstly, that man is a creature of sin is a metaphysi-
cal fact. Sin is part of the spiritual nature of man.
It is not a sociological category which implies that
man may be restored to his former perfection given the
'perfect' environment and setting. Admittedly no
sociologist would make so bold a claim but social
theories by and large claim to answer such complex
issues as the existence of religious phenomena (not-
able examples are Marx and Feuerbach), religious con-
, 47 d·h f '1 d 'k d .verSlon an t e presence 0 eVl an W1C e ness ln
-the world. Social theories have shed light on the problem
of evil by clarifying the social contexts that may
aggravate it, but they cannot answer the question
'why evil?'. Their theoretical frameworks remain at
the level of description; they are Procrustean beds
for metaphysics.
Secondly, and most importantly, humanitarian-positivist
theories forget that the ap~eal of the God-man was to
the free human spirit to redeem itself from sin. If
the sociologists are right that it is the environment
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that is corrupting man, then the Jews were right in
expecting a messiah who would be first and foremost a
social reformer and political liberator.
It is because evil has metaphysical roots embedded in
the mystery of freedom and not sociological roots, that
God is meaningful for if there were no freedom then God
alone would be responsible for evil and this would not
be consistent with the nature of God as he is revealed
in Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. The loving, forgiving
and merciful God who suffers alongside man is anti-
thetical to evil, not respon?ible {or it. Man is free,
then, to make a choice between God and evil. This is
why Christ made an appeal in freedom to the wayward
spirit of men to follow him, pointing the only way by which
the freedom of the individual man could be guaranteed.
According to Berdyaev, the kingdom of God is the king-.
dom of freedom. To respond to the call of God means to
transcend evil freely for any compulsory good is not
of the kingdom of God. Berdyaev draws attention to
the fact that,
(Christ) used no coercion to make us
believe in him as in Godihe h~d not
the might and majesty of the sovereigns
of this worldf the kingdom that he -
preached was not here. Therein lies
the radical secret of Jesus Christ,
the secret of freedom. 48
No sociologically based theory which guarantees world
harmony can effect such an ideal except through
compulsion, which is the power of the Anti-Christ,
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the power of Christ being .freedom through freedom
itself. The biggest 'price' that man will have to
pay for an earthly 'paradise' is the sacrifice of his
freedom. Berdya~v spells out the gloomy condition
of man in such a case,
••. evil and suffering could be
abolished and the world forced to be
good and 'happy', but man would have
lo~t h~s like~ess ~o G?d, which 49
prlmar~ly resldes ln hlS freedom.
This insistence on freedom as ~ priori settles for
Berdyaev two major problems that have confused western
thinkers for centuries and which have been the motiva-
ting reason for the vision of earthly Utopias:
1. the relation between freedom and/good and evil;
2. the relation between freedom and happiness. This
confusion does not arise for Berdyaev because freedom
is the primary reality. Good and evil are both rooted
in freedom so any identification or confusion of free-
dom with goodness and perfection negates freedom and
strenthens compulsion; obligatory goodness ceases to
be goodness by the fact of its constraint. But free
goodness, which alone is true, entails the liberty of
'1 50eVl • For Berdyaev there are two types of evil.
Evil which is self explanatory and obligatory goodness
which is also evil, for compulsion, power and authority
are symbols of the Anti-Christ. Compulsory goodness
can no longer be goodness since it denies freedom
thereby denying both man and God. Berdyaev sums up
the antithesis between freedom and evil thus,
I
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Free goodness invol'Zes Jche freedom of. evil
but freedom of evil leads to destructlon
of freedom itself and its degeneration
into an evil necessity. On the other hand,
the denial of the freedom of evil in
favour of an exclusive freedom of good
ends equally in a negation of freedom and
its degeneration into a necessity. But
a good neces~ity ~s not good because . 51
goodness resldes In freedom from necesslty.
For Berdyaev the ethics of good and evil are clearly
of secondary importance. Man is primarily caught in
the dialectic of freedom and necessity or compulsion,
and only when he has freed himself from compulsion
can he consider the free choice between good and evil.
In other words, only if the freedom to choose is
realized can man make ethical choices.
with regard to the problem of freedom and happiness,
,
the same argument holds true. Berdyaev argues that
happiness is not the last end of man. Certainly not
an enforced happiness nor a superficial happiness that
ignores the reality of evil or the tragic process of
history. Authentic happiness, for Berdyaev, is far
removed from the utopian visions of Marx and the
Russian socialists. He conceives happiness to be
the satisfaction of the individual who is not only
free to choose the truth but who remains free in the
choice. Of course; this may entail much suffering but
man can never be free from suffering because he will
always be faced with the choices between good and evil.
Any Utopian construction that anticipates a happy
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society which ignores the reality of evil is a denial
of freedom and a mockery of the human condition.
Berdyaev has thus moved from Marxism to Kantianism
by his separation of freedom from the realm of necessity.
Yet he has gone beyond Kant also by his rejection of
the Idealist separation of the realm of freedom from
the realm of nature. Berdyaev moved to Existentialism,
particularly the type represented by Dostoevsky.
Having identified in Kant that man essentially has a
dual nature, of freedom and necessity, Berdyaev found
in Dostoevsky what was missing in Kant, namely, the
connection between freedom and nature and its signifi-
cance for man. The phenomenon of the God-man, the
meeting point of the realms of freedom and necessity,
provided for Berdyaev the existential standpoint for
the understanding of man. The Christian worlddview
explained for him the essential sinfulness of man and
his 'conde~nation! to alienation and necessity; the
reason for evil which must exist if man is to choose
fr8ely between evil and God; and the inevitability of
suffering for the conflict in the human spirit between
the desire for freedom and the weakness of the 'flesh'
where flesh refers to any earthly restraint and which
must produce by its contradictory nature pain and
suffering. Ultimately evil and suffering are meaning-
ful if one sees the Christian message as a message of
voluntary redemption. This means that the Christian
message is essentially a message of freedom - God
presupposes freedom, evil and suffering.
•
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Berdyaev is well aware of the polemical nature of his
ideas and its incompatibility with the way in which
Christ has been previously interpreted. Indeed he
rejects the tradi·tional attempts primarily because
they could not cope wi-th the freedom of man. His own
personalistic philosophy which goes further than even
existentialism, in its insistence on freedoITI, grows
out of his attempt to. give a philosophical basis -to
Dostoevsky'~ and his own ideas on freedom and God p
God-man and man.
Berdyaev seeks a philosophical basis for the thesis
that the God~man is the incarnation of freedom and
that man 'participates'in an absolute freedom before
which god himself is powerless~ This basis he finds
in German mysticisim.
The mystics especially Jacob Boehme claimed that an
irrational principle lay at the basis of being. Boehme
conceived of God as the creator who emerges from a
state of undifferentiated immobility to become God.
This state of primordial and irrational freedom Boehme
~ called Urgrund. In The Destiny of Man Berdyaev wrote,
Out of the Divine nothing, the
Gottheit or Ungrund, the Holy Trinity,
God the Creator is born. The creation
of the world by God the Creator is a
secondary act. From this point of
view it may be said that freedom is
not created by God: it is rooted in
the nothing, in the Ungrund from all
eternity. 52
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While Berdyaev was profoundly affected by Boehme's
idea of preexistential freedom he could not reconcile
himself to Boehme's idea that freedom is in God. It
is the inmost mysterious principle of divine life for
Boehme. Berdyaev conceived it to be outside God
preferring not to speak of the 'unspeakable and in-
effable •.• mystery of God's life'. According to
Berdyaev,
Out of the Abyss, out of the Divine
nothing, is born the Trinitarian God
and He is confronted with meonic free-
dom. He creates out of nothing the world
and man and expects from them an answer
to His call - an answer from the depths
of freedom. 53
For Berdyaev the Gottheit or Ungrund is not in itself
creative for it is absolute, but the person becomes
in the creative act the correlative in freedom of man
and the world. So while the absolute is a mystery,
God the creator has been revealed. Kolakowski asserts
that the reason Boehme offered for the creative act of
God is that God emerges from his solitude and over-
stepping his own boundaries in search of himself,
engages in creative activity. God the creator becomes
then the correlative of the creature with each finding
definition and meaning in the other. 54 This point is
emphasized by Angelus 5ilesius who wrote,
Ich weiss, dass ohne mich Gatt nicht
ein nu kann Leben, werd ich zu nicht
er muss von not den Geist aUfgeben. 55
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According to the mystics, represented here by Boehme.
and Angelius Silesius , God needs man as much as man
needs God. God's creative act was an act of self
realization for he created man out of freedom in his
O'li'Tn image. Man then participates of the Divine in
God and is a spiritual being, because freedom obtains
in spirit. God becomes the correlative of man, the
father of man in so far as he created him but power-
less before man's freedom. Man is as potentially
free as God and, therefore, is capable of forming
himself as personality. According to Berdyaev, it
was to reveal to man his freedom and the fact that the
shaping of his personality, which is an act of
redemption lies in his own hands,that God revealed
himself in history in the Christ-event. God could do
no other in his impotence before man's freedom. He
can only teach and direct but he cannot compel.
Berdyaev asserts that the myth of the fall tells of
this powerlessness of the creator to avert the evil
resulting from freedom which He has not created. At
first the answer to God's call from the depths of
freedom was consent to creation, then it was rebellion
and hostility towards God in an expression of self
will to exercise freedom, and this is a return to
original non$being.
All rebellion against God is a return
to non--being which assumes the form
of false, illusory being, and is a
victory of non-being over the Divine
light. And it is only then that the
nothing which is not evil becomes evil.
Then comes God's second act: He descends
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into non-being into the abyss of free-
dom that has degener~ted into evil, He
manifests Himself not in power but in
sacrifice~ the Divine sacrifice, the
Divine self crucifixion must conquer evil
(in) meonic freedom by enlightening
it from within, without forcing it,
without depriving the created world of
freedom. 56
Man is capable of rebelling against God because man is
as free as God. God created man out of the depths of
freedom where good and evil have their source. Man,
therefore, is by virtue of his nature both potentially
good and potentially evil. But according to Berdyaev,
spiritual reality is beyond good and evil and man's
creation belongs to spiritual reality not to the natural
order. It is only when man rebels against God that
good and evil actually come into being for man's asser-
tion of self-will denies freedom and in so doing produces
its opposite - slavery which is the realm of ethics.
In the face of man's rebellion the only course left to
God is to illuminate slavery, calling man to a realiza-
tion of his essential freedom. Man in his freedom may
choose to either redeem himself or he may choose to
follow his own will.
The Christianity Berdyaev subscribes to is paradoxical.
It is made paradoxical by the consistency with which
Berdyaev draws the conclusions from the primary reality
of freedom: God and man both have their source ln
freedom - God creates himself and then man. While man
as created being is the product of God's creation, his
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essential freedom is outside the jurisdiction of God ..
Man ironically as created being has the freedom to rebel
or accept God. However g while man may have this apparent
freedom of choice, his choice is ~ctually the choice
between freedom and slavery. Christianity has the
secret of authentic freedom; the Anti-Christ is of the
realm of compulsion.
This explanation of course would call into question the
'validity' of the initial freedom in the first place for
~an appears to be free to choose either freedom or
slavery. The fall is the result of wrong choice and man
collapses into bondage. In the realm of nature he does
not recognize that he has a higher purpose and that he
must free himself to attain it. This is the meaning of
revelation. Revelation is the summons of man back
to freedom f a call away from compulsion. It draws
attention to the spirituality of man f the link man has
with the Divine Being, reminding man that he was forged
by freedom in the image of God. It is in the awaken-
ing of the spirituality of man f the rising to the call
of freedom, that person~lity is born. However, before
we go on to the discussion about personality, some of
the problems associated with Berdyaev's idea of free-
dom should be highlighted.
Firstly, Berdyaev's philosophy is thoroughly Idealistic.
RealitYf for him, is spiritual reality. The fallenness
of man is spiritual alienation. Man was created in
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spiritual reality; in eternity. He shares the freedom.
and divinity of God for he was created in an act of
God's self~realization. He is the creaturely cor-
relative of God defining himself in terms of God and
God in terms of him. God is an exis,tential reality for
Berdyaev. He is perfect personali-ty 9 perfect humanity,
perfect immortality, perfect freedom and perfect spirit.
The crea-ture he begot in his own image, argues Berdyaev,
shares in all of these features of God. At this point,
Berdyaev is not clear on what makes man different from
God. Solovyev, for example, had differentiated between
God and man by arguing that while divinity belongs to
God and man, God possesses divinity in eternal reality
'1 1 h' d h' 57Whl e man can on y ave lt grante to lm. However,
the creature in an expression of his freedom did not choose
his creator but the Anti-Christ (i.e. the opposite of
God - the power of necessity) thereby becoming estranged
and alienated from himself. This is the condition of
man in the natural order. He is a creature of conflict
and objectification. Every free expression of his is
trapped in space, time and causality maintaining man's
spirit in perpetual disjunction.
The realm of nature is explained by Berdyaev in terms
of the realm of Spirit. This immediately raises the
question of the 'reality' of the God-man. For Berdyaev
the suffering of Christ in history is the symbolic
revelation of the suffering of God in eternity. So
called 'religious' events in this world are symbolic
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expressions of the events in reality, that is, in
the realm of spirit. In his book Freedom and the Spirit
Berdyaev spends a whole chapter - "Symbol myth and dogma"
- discussing the nature of myths and symbols as the only
meaningful way of speaking about God, or the only way in
which God may communicate with us. Symbolism is not
alienation of spirit; it is the manifestation of spiri-
tual reality in space, time and causality. It does not
objectify and is not part of the natural order; it is
symbolic. The spirit of man which reaches out to spiri~
tual reality in acts of creation, on the other hand,
objectifies im~ediately.
If God belongs to a spiritual reality and corITmunicates
wi th man ·through symbolism, tha·t is 1 if symbolism is
the irruption of the spiritual into the natural, how
does man communicate with God? Here Berdyaev reveals
his mystical bias.
Communication with God is possible, through mystical
intuition. Mysticism is the penetration of the spirit
of man into spiritual reality. Berdyaev does not even
attempt to argue out a case for mysticism. As far as
he is concerned, those with heightened consciousnesses
experience mystical communion and t.hose who have had no such
experience have no heightened consciousness. Mystlcism cannot be discounted
for it may well be that. the critic is not in possession
of a height.ened spirituality.
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The mystery of God, for Berdyaev, cannot be rationalized,
.
yet he himself provides the most vigorously argued out
explanation for such far removed ideas like the 'birth
of God'. The only issue that lies outside Berdyaev's
logic or in-t.o which his logic canno·t penetrate, is the
stuff from which God was born a:nd the manner in ~t\lhich
He came into existence. Man has knowledge of this issue
only through mystical intuition.
It may be said in Berdyaev's defence that if one starts
with freedom and not Being, with man and not God,
speculation is inevitable to give coherence to, and
sense to one's, claims. It must be borne in mind, however,
that Berdyaev's idea of a becoming God is wholly outside
the Biblical purview. His limitation of the powers of
God would be considered heretical by most. However,
Berdyaev to absolve God from the responsibility of evil
is forced to make him impotent before man's freedom.
Berdyaev's insistence on the divinity of man is blas-
phemous to most. These objections will be considered
in greater depth later on. Suffice it to say now that X
Berdyaev'sinsistence on the primordial reality of free-
dom forces him to postulate a completely revolutionary
interpretation of the Christian message in terms of
which he attempts to offer an explana-tion of personality.
Hence, while his view of man only appears to open ~an
to the sin of hubris, nothing is further from Berdyaev's
aim. On the contrary, his is a call to even greater and
more meaningful commitment in faith and freedom.
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At the heart of Berdyaev's thought, says Fuad Nucho,
I lies a persistent attemp·t to understand what it means
to be a person. Berdyaev's philosophy of Freedom be~
. d d '., I 58glns an en s Wl~n man .
Berdyaev tirelessly points out in his discussion on
freedom that the most significant existential feature
is personality. In fact, according to Berdyaev,
personality is not only related to free-
dom but cannot exist without it. '1'0
realize personality is to achieve inner
freedom; to liberate man from all external
determination. 59
From Berdyaev's perspective freedom is only significant
if it can be actualized in his being for the reality of
human freedom and the responsibility incurred therefrom
is the central theme of existentialism. This means
that every human being is both an end in himself and is
solely responsible for his own destiny. In ~lav~ry and
Freedom Berdyaev wrote,
As a result of a long spiritual and
intellectual journey I have arrived at a
particularly keen awareness of the fact
that every human personality of the least
significant of men, bearing as it does
within itself the image of the highest
existence cannot be a means to an end
whatever. It has in itself an existential
centre and has a right not only to life, a
right derived by contemporary civiliza-
tion,but also a right to possess the
universal content of life. 60
While Berdyaev may say that man has a right to possess
the universal content of life, he repeats frequently
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that man is no-t born a complete personality with a.
universal content; he is only potentially so because
he was fashioned after the divine image. Man must
so to speak give birth to his own personality. In
Berdyaev's words,
Man is by no means a completely finished
producte Rather he moulds and creates
himself in and through his experience of
life 1 through spiritual conflict and
through -those various trials which his
destiny i~poses u~on him - m~n is.only. 61
what God 1S plann1ng - a proJected deslgn.
He enforces this point succinctly in a passage from his
Truth and Revelation,
The fundamental problem of Existential
philosophy is that of personality. I
am an Ego before I become a personality.
0 •• The Ego's purpose is to realize its
personality and this involves it in an
incessant struggle. 62
The Ego or individual was the fundamental category of
the existentialists. Berdyaev goes beyond the Ego
(and existentialism) when he speaks of personality.
For a clearer understanding of personality one ought to
look at the comparison Berdyaev makes between 'personality'
and 'the individual' in his book The ~eginning and the End.
According to him the individual is a naturalistic and
sociological category belonging to the natural world.
Personality, on the other hand, is a spiritual and
ethical category not born of natural parents but created
spiritually, giving effect to the Divine idea of man.
Personality is not man as phenomenon but man as noumenon.
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He goes on to declare th~t while the individual is
part of a race or society, the personality is not part
of a whole; it is spiritual and therefore has a claim
to be its ovm end and supreme value, with a claim to a
whole not a part. For Berdyaev human personality as
an integral form is no·t part of the 'i,vorld order. Man
"1 l' 63is ultimately a splrltua persona lty.
states it,
As Nucho
0&& by nature man is an individual; by
spirit he is a personality 0000 We
may say of man that he lacks personality
but we cannot deny him individuality. 64
within the Christian context personality is the image
and likeness of God in man and this is why it rises
above the natural life. 65 Personality is the true
path leading to God; it is the fruit of the struggle
of the spirit against its own alienation. The ultimate
aspiration of man is to attain to perfect personality
not to happiness, nor even the perfect society; nor the
amelioration of suffering. The capacity to bear pain is
an indissoluble part of th8 task to create personality.
A life without inner conflict is a life devoid of
spiritual growth. Because personality is creative
activity and because it presupposes the continuous con-
flict of spirit with nature, personality is constantly
in a process of change and becoming. However, with
change there is also the element of immu·tabili ty. The
paradoxical nature of personality is that; on the one
hand, it is 'potentially universal', and, on the other
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hand it is a distinct and particular being unique In
every respect. Personality is the response to the
summons of the God-man, a summons for spirit to repudiate
the realm of Caesar since Caesar has an irresistible
tendency to demand not only,
wha-t is properly his O'W!1, bu:t also wha't
is God?s. He wants the whole of man to
be subject to himself. And in this lies
the greatest tragedy of history, that of
freedom and necessity of the human fate
and historic destiny. 66
This chapter has attempted to highlight the significance
and the centrality of the idea of freedom to Berdyaev's
whole philosophy. His concern for the freedom of man
led him to consider most seriously the two main contempo-
rary philosophical quests for freedom viz. Marxism and
existentialism. It would have been obvious in the above
discussion that Berdyaev imbibes the critical concerns
and many insights from both these philosophical approaches
yet goes beyond them. His disenchantment with Marxism is
in som~> respects based on the same reasons why he could
not accept atheistic existentialism,viz their gratuitous
jettisoning of God and evil. Marxism does not take the
presence of evil seriously enough and Existentialism
without God falls prey to a vacuous actionalism in the
face of evil which it perceives as the irrationality of
existence.
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Yet it is his grappling with the irrationality of human
existence; that is, with the fate and destiny of man qua
man not Grossmensch or slave; that leads Berdyaev to
faith in God. Contrary to the traditional arguments
that questioned faith because of the presence of evil,
it was his serious grappling with the problem of
theodicy that led him to believe in God.
However, contrary to this belief being a theological
concern only, Berdyaev builds his whole philosophy
around this issue of the primordial freedom of man and
God. This is a novelty in philosophical tra~ition.
For Berdyaev, the freedom that Marxism and Existentialism
sought was not derived from one or other theory about
freedom but is ~ priori, a meotaphysical quantum, behind
any idea of God and man. Here also is the theological
novelty. Both God and man have their source in freedom
and since man is made in the image of God he realizes
his true freedom in reconciliation with God. However,
because he is free such a turning to God is entirely
his decision because before manEs freedom, even God
is impotent. Quite logically, anything less does vio-
lence to manls freedom.
One of BerdyaevVs most important contributions to
philosophical and theological discussions on freedom,
a point that both Marxism and Existentialism had failed
to fully grasp, is the important distinction he made
between necessity and freedom; a point that has been
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repeatedly maqe in this cpapter. Only in absolute
freedom can Berdyaev's high view of man be fully
understood. Alienated man enslaved in the realm of
necessity (the realm outside of God and freedom) is
essentially natural man who turns his back on full
realization of his spiritual potential.
These concerns about freedom and God are ultimately
related to Berdyaev's central concern for man. While
Marxism reduces man to a fundamental relation within
a collectivism where man is swallowed up by social
being, Existentialism attempts to restore man's
autonomy by highlighting the significance of the
individual. Berdyaev believes both have not gone far
enough. The Existentialists had quite correctly refocussed
on the individual in his thrownness; the fact of his
being there. Yet, for Berdyaev, that is still part of the
realm of necessity because it is his natural dimension.
What was needed now was his development to full persona-
lity, i.e. his development from the natural to the
spiri tual; from necessi-ty to freedom. Thus man I s whole
existence is placed in the tension between freedom and
personhood, a quest which gives philosophical underpin-
ning to a living and vital ethics~ not an object-less
ethics that leads to greater alienation from reality
where human striving is directed to some deceptive
Utopia; nor an ethics, as G.A. Rauche warns about,
'that becomes frustrating operationalism or empty
actionalism, a problem that both Marxism and Existen-
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Of course, Berdyaevis presuppositions cannot be proved
and he can be accused of gratuitous speculation also.
His philosophical imodel r may therefore also be criticised.
However, he is aware that these presuppositions cannot be
empirically sho~fm, but tha.t is precisely \'Jhy he refuses
to attempt to do so. Such an attempt would end up as
an exercise in the realm of necessity. Hence his great
appreciation for mysticism~
However, here is a.n attempt by a philosopher to bring a
new dimension to bear on philosophical discussion. His
all-encompassing concern for personality and the freedom
of man is a refreshingly different and important contri-
bution to the way out of the impasse that modern man
encounters in this age of dogmatism, intolerance and
the destruction that threatens him in the face of
raging totalitarian and absolutist powers. It is this
concern for man that forces Berdyaev to investigate
the meaning of personality, which shall be analysed in the
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'1'he J:.1eaning of Pen30naliJcy and the Abdica"tion of the Humane
The argument so far is thaJc philosophical theories have
failed to give a meaningful account of the problematic
nature of man because of their inability to come to terms
with the terrible freedom of man. It was essayed to show
tha·t the evolution of Berdyaev is thought from a Marxist to
an Idealist-existentialist and eventually personalist
position was in response to the failure of conventional
philosophy to cope with the tragic aspect of human history~
an at.tempt to defend freedom as the primary reality in
terms of which man has his being.
The first part of 'che argument (Chapters I and I1) dealt
primarily with the problem of freedom. The abdication of
freedom in both the East and West and the distortion of
the image of man was the main theme of Chapter I.
Chapter 11 discussed the realization in Berdyaev's philo-
sophy that freedom is the real ground of all being and that
the true nature of man i.e. his humane-nessfcan only be realized
in and through freedom.
The quest for the ess~ntiallY-Jlumane is t~e existential
implication of Berdyaev's philosophy. The second part of
the argument discusse~in the light of Berdyaev's idea of
Freedom.,the actualization of the humane. According to
Berdyaev humanity cannot be attained outside freedom and
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outside God. The search for humani"ty in the absence of
any higher guiding principle leads, on the one hand, to
rank individualism, and on the other~to oppressive
collectivism. The tragic irony is that in the name of
the humane, man-centredness calls into being its opposite
- the antihumane p the evidence of which is manls growing
dehumanization within totalitarian ideologies.
Proof for the above argumen"t Berdyaev finds in the cultural
Renaissance and Humanism of the West and the rise of
Socialism in the East. For him personality had been be-
trayed in its mm name. '1'he tT/Jentieth century has reaped
the unhappy fruit of the glorification of man in the West
for it gave rise to the atomic individualism of modern
western man. The anguished search for the amelioration
of the pitiful condition of man in the East by thinkers
who relied entirely on their own strength, believing in
their own power, resulted in oppressive collectivism.
Berdyaevis decision to examine cultural epochs to prove
the point about individual man rests on the fact that
human personality result::; from the creative activity of
man and is therefore always in a state of becoming. Not
until death does the personality cease to develop.
Since, hOvlever, man is rooted in history and history is
made from both the contradictory and harmonious creati-
vity of individual personalities, culture reflects the
development of the values and spirituality of man.
Berdyaev! s assessmen"t of the means of certain cultural
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phases v namely Humanism and Communism, serves to reveal
the extent of freedom or unfreedom achieved by man and
the maturity or immaturity of personality.
Indeed Berdyaev 6 s analysis of Humanism and Communism is
an attempt to Shovl that authentic humanity, that is,
personality, may only be sought in and through God, i.e.
in and through freedom.
3.1 The Meaning and Impact of Humanism
In his book The End of Our Time Berdyaev claimed that
~~_:...:..----:_-:..~---,
modern man is witnessing the end of the Renaissance v
for modern history, now coming to an end with the exhaus-
tion of both creative and spiritual sources, was conceived
at the time of the Renaissance.
The middle ages ended with the Christian mystical Renais-
sance of the fourteenth century which served as a bridge
to the Humanist phase. Robert Ergang, writing in From
the Renaissance to Waterloo, defines the Renaissance as
'the entire process of transition in western Europe from
the medieval to the modern world. il Because Renaissance v
or rebirth v suggests a 'cataclysmic conception of histori-
cal development', it means that the intensification of
the secular spirit in literature, philosophy and art of
the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which
heralded the shift from the theocentric to the secular,
revealed a sudden disclosure of the hidden talents of man.
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Erganz claims that 'the idea of man's essential sinful-
ness and guilt gave way to a new appreciation of the
dignity of human na-ture; Christian humility "'las now
2
replaced by a conscicusness of human power.' The
spirit of the Renaissance is typified in the words of
Hamlet who declared,
What a piece of work man is! How noble in
reason! How infinite in faculty! In form
and movement, how express-and admirable; in
action; how like an angel! In apprehension
how like a god! The beauty of the world!
The paragon of animals. 3
This description of man epitomizes the new found wonder
in the talents of man in the art and literature of the
Renaissance. Berdyaev openly acknowledges the artistic
achievements of the Renaissance, arguing that it sur-
passed even Greek art: in its striving for unfulfilled
spiritual perfection rather than perfection of form.
However, he claimed that it was the negative moment in
the Renaissance itself which grew over the centuries to
usher in the modern crisis. Pi-trim Sorokin in his summary
of Berdyaevls interpretation of the Renaissance and Hu-
manism wrote,
It was, therefore, the period of manls
liberation from all "superhuman" controls,
and deconcentration of his concentrated
inner forces; the period in which he spent
the creative funds accumulated in the
medieval period, and abandoned the religious
central value of the Middle Ages; the period
of secularization and external freedom.
These tasks were accomplished in the course
of some six centuries. Humanist culture
spent most of its funds accumulated in the
previous periods and exhausted its creative
power. 4
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According to Berdyaev the freeplay of the creative powers.
of man was only apparent freedom for 'the more proudly
Humanist man relied upon himself, and the more he moved
away from the Christian, Divine~ medieval foundations of
personality, the less creative, less powerful, and less
self-controlling he grew to maturity. is
Berdyaev claimed -that the Renaissance 'il'Jas based on a
humanism because it encouraged the creativity of man as
a natural not a spiritual being. But natural man has no
constant and enduring source of inspiration beyond and
above him and the 'freeplay of his human forces could
not possibly go on forever'. This is the crisis of the
nineteenth century; the drying up of the Graeco-Roman
fount of western culture. Berdyaev describes it thus,
There was within the Renaissance all that
was needed for its own annhilation. It
freed the creative forces of man and gave
his powers the highest expression in art,
and in that it operated within the realm
of truth. But it also separated man from
the spiritual fountains of life, it denied
the spiritual man, who cannot but be a
creator, and affirmed in his place the
natural man alone, the slave of necessity.
The triumph of the natural man over the
spiritual man in modern history had to lead
to sterility, to the destruction of Humanism
by i"'..:.s own self, the end of the Renaissance. 6
It is interesting to note here that Berdyaev's philosophy
implicitly denies the shift from theocentric to anthro-
pocentric worlds. He would regard the move in the Middle
Ages to be from the theocentric to the secular. His
philosophy implies that a preoccupation with the interests
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and mundane affairs of man does not mean an abiding interest.
in manu the subject, himself. Anthropocentricism is only
authentic when man remains in the image of the Divine u
that iS D the God-man. Hence, the separation that was
effected between man and his spiritual sources in later
Humanism, was the beginning of the destruction of the
image of man itself.
According to Berdyaev, the beginnings of Humanism was
still close to Christianity but the Renaissance had drawn
its inspiration from pagan sources also, and the contra~
diction between the pagan and Christian sources was bound
to set up a tension which would destroy, in the end, the
real humanity of man. Berdyaev himself wrote that,
It is an unfolding of ideas and events
wherein we see Humanism destroying
itself by its own dialectic, for the
putting up of man v.ri-thout God and
against God, the denial of the divine
image and likeness in himself, lead
to his own negation and destruction;
the affirming of paganism against
Christianity means the denial and
demolition of his sacred past. 7
Berdyaev claimed that the Reformation also had its roots
in the Renais~ance. While he admitted the eternal truths
and authentic religious elements in Luther's revolt,
Berdyaev maintains that it was the spirit of rebellion in
the Reformation which led to the evolution of modern
history towards the Enlightenment of the eighteenth
century. The reason for this is that the Reformation
asserted individual faith at the expense of the organic
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whole which Catholicism hqd managed to maintain. Conse-
quentlyu claimed Berdyaev, the Reformation together with
the cultural impact of the Renaissance and Humanism,
evolved towards modern day Rationalism, Positivism,
Socialism and Anarchism. The Enlightenment was for
Berdyaev not really the coming of age of man, as it is
understood by mos·t, but a I pale reflection of the Renais-
sance, a lingering form of humanistic self-affirmation u• 8
Berdyaev asserted in his book The Enq of Our Time that
Humanism obtained its humaneness from Christ, for man
could not have evolved a humanistic philosophy from the
culture of antiquity only. However g as Humanism developed
and human creativity was released in abundance, man became
separated from God and his destruction began there, for
man is made in the image and likeness of God.
For Berdyaev, the tragedy of modern times is Humanismus
turning against man for when man in his self-conceit became
content with the image and likeness of nature, to be the
natural man only, the spiritual centre of human personality
was los,t. When this happens, says Berdyaev, that is, when
Humanism denies the spirituality of man, that man is handed
over from the eternal to the temporal. This means that the
individual will is trapped within the temporal and is
aimless, directed towards nothing and leads man to the
'wilderness of the human soul u• 9 The upshot of all of
this is that humanism emphasized human individuality at
the expense of personality. For Berdyaev, the individual
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is still an objective category that has meaning only
against its opposite, that is, for example the Hegelian
Absolute. But the individual only becomes an authentic
subject or human personality, when it is filled wi·th
content, that is, spiritual conten·t, which provides a
source of creativity, for it is only in creativity, that
is, in the creation of values that personality is born.
According to Berdyaev when man is cut off from his spiritual
fountainhead he denies authentic creativity and becomes
instead excessively individualistic or excessively socialis-
tic. These two manifestations of the 'abstract decompo~·
sition of personalit~ and society' are represented by both
Nietzsche and Marx. Nietzsche exemplifies the destruction
of Humanism through individualism and Marx shows up its
decomposition in a collectivist form.
Neither in the individualism of Nietzsche nor in the
col1ecti~ism of Marx, does man, sufficient unto himself,
triumph. Both Marx and Nietzsche served only to unmask
the illusions of Humanism for the Renaissance is consummated
, th ' d'ff 101n em 1n 1 erent ways. Berdyaev almost bewailing the
'drying up' of the Graeco-Roman 'headwater of all European
Iculture wrote,
The nineteenth century saw the decomposition
of Humanism by itself, the end of the
Renaissance, the collapse of the fallacious
'reign of man', the final demonstration that
he could no longer be a creator after he
had set himself up against God. 11
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Individualism epitomizes the atomization of man who ends
up proud, self-conceited, lonely and shut up within him-
self,thereby, creating a condition that would destroy man's
~ssential nature. Socialism, on the other hand, is the
result of the natural aggregation of human beings who seek
to forge a common social centre when this centre has
ceased to be religious.
The latter decomposition of the spirit of the Renaissance
is nowhere seen so clearly as the nlneteenth century crisis
of Russian man.
3.2 The Russian Revolution
Berdyaev maintains that there is no cultural period in
the history of Russia which can truly be called Renaissance.
But Humanism infiltrated and lnfluenced the Russian intel-
ligentsia albeit in a negative way tor it entered Russia
'at the moment of its decay' when it was destroying both
itself and the Divine image of man. Consequently, the
'Russian soul of the nineteenth century was a suffering
soul brought to the point of self torture,.12
According to Berdyaev the Russian problem started with the
reforms of Peter the Great which, as was explained in
Chapter I, resulted in the schism between the 'upper
classes' and the peasants. Peter's attacks on the ortho-
dox church and hallowed Russian customs, virtually
destroyed the faith of the Russians in the Orthodox
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Christian empire. The i~~epiate and direct result of
this was that i while religious fervour was dimmed, the
Russian messianic idea remarried but in profound divorce
from its actual surroundings. Thus a 'schismatic and
eschatological disposition is the fundamental psycholo-
gical fact of the Russian nineteenth century; it will
express itself both in a religious way and in an anti-
13religious (an inverted religious) way.'
Berdyaev never tired of stressing the fact that the
Russi~n religious impetus had in the nineteenth century
been channelled to a secular end. He wrote in The Russian
Revoluti~~,
We have here a transposition of religious
motives and religious psychology into a
non-religious or anti-religious sphere,
into the region of social problems, so
that the spiritual energy of religion
flows into social channels, which thereby
takes on a religious character, and becomes
a.breeding ground for a perculiar form of
social idolatry. 14
That Russian socialism was a religious not a political
phenomenon, Berdyaev learnt from Dostoevsky. Russian
socialism during the nineteenth century was nihilistic
and atheistic in character and the so called love for
humanity was only love for the idea of the hQmane for it
was this type of socialism that ushered in the cOmTI\unism
of the twentieth century which mercilessly crushed the
idea of individuality and personality.




and Dobroliubo~ repudiated Orthodox Christianity on the
grounds of the scandal and injustice of the world. Hence
Russian 11,ihilism was a sort of religiou.s. polemic. Dobro-
liubov's nihilism, for example, ha.d noble and spiritual
motives. According to Berdyaev,
Early nihilism was characterized by the quest
of truth at all costs, a protest against every
conventional lie and hypocrisy; it was
especially a denudation, a throwing away of
all veils and garments, a belief that, once
that was done, the truth of life would be
revealed. The naive materialism that the
Russian nihilists professed like a religious
faith was determined chiefly by moral, one
may even say ascetic, considerations. They
held that any sort of idealistic or spiritual
metaphysics was an unla\V'ful luxury, a mental
debauch, a forsetfulness of the sufferings
of the common people. It was their duty to
live in poverty and be satisfied with bare
necessities. 15
However, despite the noble beginnings of nihilism: asceticism
wi·thout grace, that is, asceticism not in the name of God,
but in the name of the future welfare of mankind, in the
name of a perfect societY',16 was bound also, like humanism,
to destroy itself. Nihilism which became an atheistic
socialism enslaved the human person to social utility and
the interests of society, lit denies the right of personality
to lead its own spiritual and creative life; it rejects
religion, philosophy, art, morality as qualitative contents
of personal life, and throws down all values that exalt
personality. And it is obliged to do so, because it
considers human personality to be a mere product of social
surroundings; and denies its spiritual nature , . 17
That socialism could have developed such a force in Russia
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is, according to Berdyaev, the result of the failure of
Christianity in Russia. Berdyaev asserted that the
greater mass of decadent Christians of the nineteenth
century gave little proof of capacity for self-sacrifice
that the nihilists and socialists displayed. So the
denunciation of the untruth, falsehood and hypocrisy of
so-called Christian society, inspired and nourished anti-
religious psychology. The unworthiness and sinfulness of
Christians became a victorious argument against Christianity
. If 18ltse • Consequently, there was nothing to stay the tide
of Marxism in Russia which not only perverted the Russian
spirit but substituted a completely new atheism for the
atheism of the nihilists.
The atheism of Marxism is conceived chiefly with strength~
the power of organized society. Berdyaev argued that the
Marxists saw religion itself as inimical to the pursuit of
human happiness. He wrote,
Religious faith must be plucked from the heart
of man and the idea of God destroyed, in order
that human society may become powerful, human
life be defi.nitely organized and rationalised,
and that the final victory over the elemental
powers of nature and the elemental irrational
forces in human society may become possible.
The Marxian type of atheis:-ll is not moved at
all by pity~ on the contrary it is pitiless.
In order to procure power and riches for the
social collectivity, it proclaims ruthless
cruelty towards men. There is no humani-
tarian element left in it. It comes from
Feuerbach, but it goes one further than him
and rejects his religion of humanity. It was
not in the name of man that Marx raised the
standard of revolt, but in the name of the
mightiness of a new deity, the social
collectivity. 19
The paradox of Russian atheism is that it was born as.
something oppressed, which rebelled against the injustice
and evil of the world, it rejected God because the world
is evil, unjust and full of the sufferings of innocent
people. Yet when it triumphed it became a persecutor f
created a new injustice, producing evil and causing an
inuneasurable amount of suffering'. 20
Ironically, the philosophy that claimed to be a preserver
of personality ended up destroying it. It should be clear
from what was stated in part I of Chapter 11 thdt person·"
ality can only develop in freedom and in the image of the
God-man. If the spiritual fount of man is cut off, not
only will authentic creativity be arrested, but also man
will destroy his true image and live by a distorted idea
of humanity. Berdyaev claims that when,
faith in a true living God fails, and the very
idea of God is pushed out of man's consciousness,
the images of false gods arise in his soul and
religious worship is paid to them. Man has a
tendency to idolatry that cannot be uprooted, he
has a capacity for turning absolutely anything,
every kind of value into an idol. 21
Communism, says Berdyaev, has a special significance for
Christians. It is a reminder and a denouncement of an
unfulfilled duty, of the fact that the Christian ideal has
not been achieved. Christianity recognizes the inherent
value of human personality and is incapable of organizing
a society in which personality is humiliated and denied.
This gives rise, says Berdyaev, to fanaticism for it turns
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relative values into absoluue ones and the freed~ of
the personality is destroyed both socially and antclo-
gically. Personality, then, is only achieved in opposition
to false gods and idolatry, in the ability to di5Ce'..:-l"'TIl the
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Chapter IV
The Meaning of Personality~ The Quest for the Humane
According to Berdyaev the failure of Humanism and socialism
to show up the greatness of man resided in the fact that
both movements ignored the spiritual calling of man.
Humanism ended in rank individualism and Socialism in the
primacy of the collective. Man triumphed in neither of
the moYements of which he was ostensibly the centre. That
freedom ended in unfreedom and humanism in the antihuman
was the result of the refusal to acknowledge a transcendent
realm of freedom and truth which exists in dynamic tension
with man. It has already been pointed out that for
Berdyaev freedom for man is only authentic when it is
directed - Undirected freedom destroys itself and produces
its opposite. The same may be said of 'personality'.
Personality may only be achieved if the individual responds
to the higher calling of God in freedom. For Berdyaev,
the quest for the humane is a religious quest. Paradoxi-
cally, manls search for God leads in fact back to man, for
it directs him to his freedom and creativity. A glorifi-
cation of the Ego, a man-centredness that has no higher
purpose, is bound to lead in the end to either individualism
or collectivism as it was proved for Berdyaev in Humanism
and Socialism. The only way out of the impasse is to
acknowledge that man is a spiritual being and that the
full realization of man as a spiritual being can only be
achieved if he is directed away from nature, from the Ego
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ahd from social collectives. Again r according to Berdyaev r
•
this direction away from phenomena must necessarily lead
the way of the God-man. The God-incarnate is the one
example given to man, says Berdyaev, to show him that the
realization of perfect humanity is a condition of freedom
and the spirit: and not of nature and compulsion. To
. srunmarize, Berdyaev argues that the realm of freedom is
the kingdom of God and the realm of compulsion is of the
knti~Christ. Man in his abuse of freedom, which according
to Berdyaev is original sin, placed himself within the
power of the Anti-Christ. 'rhe tragic aspect of the
destiny of man is the attempt by man to overcome the power
of compulsion and assert his freedom. Personality is born
from this struggle - it is born from the revolutionary
nature of spirit which in its subjectivity and dynamism
stands in polar opposition to the realm of nature.
Personality is the spirit's victory over matter since it
acts against matter's depersonalizing determination.
Man, however, only understands himself in terms of freedom,
spirit and personality when he tries to make sense of
the God-man. Christ is the meeting point of both God and
man. He is the hermeneutical standpoint from whom,
according to Berdyaev, the world derives meaning and through
whom man understands himself and his destiny. The God-man
is God and yet perfect man. He represents the actualiza-
tion of humanity. Hence, any a-ttempt by man to search for
his own essence, that is, to try to define and realize the
humane must point to the Christ-event. Any other path,
therefore, is necessarily wrong for, according to Berdyaev,
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there is no other example of perfect hlli~anity. In his
attempt to reach the humane in order to liberate himself
from authority, his personality is born.
It may appear, however, thai: in' his at'tempts to show that
the flowering of personality is the quest for the essentially
humane, he takes the idea of man being created in the image
of God, sharing both the potential freedom and divinity of
Christ, to an ambitious conclusion. He seems to be claiming
that the nature and characteristics of God, as he manifested
himself in the world, are attainable by man. This means
that man in vanquishing evil is capable of becoming as
merciful, loving and as free as the God-incarnate. While
he does not actually say it, Berdyaev's entire discussion
on personality points to the fact that the personality of
Jesus Christ is potentially attainable by man. Berdyaev
repeatedly says that he has no other paradigm by which
to talk of man except the perfect personality of Christ.
From this; one concludes that personality results from the
extent to which spirit can overcome objectification or the
forces of compulsion of the Anti-Christ to approximate to
the image or aspect of Christ. The confusion that arises
from this notion is whether Berdyaev believes that the
perfect personality of Christ can actually be achieved or wheth-
.er it is merely a teleological principle that drives man
towards a goal. This is important to determine for it would
explain Berdyaev's 'definition' of man, that is, whether
he has a realistic apprehension of the potentialities of
man's personality or whether he (Berdyaev) is in fact not
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very different from thinke~s like Nietzsche and Marx.
T' f er urgec·l ffi"D to tran~.,cp.nd h,.imself in the name ofne arm . ,c,.. - -
--the 'Ubermensch' and the latter claimed that man could
lead a life free of crime and evil which are social pheno-
mena, if he lived in a perfect society. Berdyaev himself
\voulo. agree tha't Marx and Nietzsche v!ere completely un-
realistic. However v it remains to be seen whether he
himself does not fall into the same trap in expecting from
man a God-like aspecto
An at'temp't has been made in Chapt(:!rs III and IV 'to show
from the point of view of what constitutes personality by
Berdyaev i s standards v the breakdovm of humanism and the
eventual trirlmph of the antihuman. 'I'he discussion is now
taken a step further. The attainment of the humane itself
is discussed from the point of view of freedom and the
God-man (cf Chapter 11). It will be essayed to show that
personality can only be understood in terms of antitheses
to Dconstructsi in the realm of phenomena, and to demons-
trate that Berdyaev ultimately did maintain the duality
between God and mun.
4.1 Personality and Slavery
Berdyaev's inability to define personality and his negative
approach to the discussion on personality lies in the fact
that personality is immersed in freedom which finds subs tan-
tiation in the Christian revelation. For Berdyaev both man
and God participate of the same freedom - freedom which
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is the uncreated abyss or i to borrow Boehmeis idea,.
'cbe . Urgru~. This is why the idea of God cannot be ratio-
nalized. Manis rational faculties cannot penetrate to the
depths of freedom which is irrational. The only meaningful
talk about God is negative talk. By this Berdyaev means
that while we may decide what God is not, what God is, is
entirely beyond the Euclidean mind of man. If God cannot
be spoken of meaningfully except negatively because he is
immersed in freedom, then man whose spiritual essence has
the same beginnings defies definition also. A picture of
personality as the projected plan of God emerges from
Berdyaev1s philosophy as a whole but no definition is
attempted, not only because personality is immersed in
freedom but also because personality is constantly in a
state of becoming and there is no way of fixing a defini-
tion.
These are the reasons then for the fact that the discussion
on personality is entirely negative. The 'reconstruction i
of the image of man along the lines Berdyaev suggests
must be gleaned then in terms of its opposites, that is,
the means by· which man may be enslaved.
In his book Slavery and Freedom Berdyaev writes,
Personality realizes its existence and
its destiny in the contradictions and
combinations of the finite and the in-
finite, of the relative and the absolute,
of the one and the many, of freedom and
necessity, of the inward and the outward,
of the subjective and the objective, by
a tragic lack of correspondence and a
conflict. But unity and universality
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are attained not in infinite objectivity
but in infinite subjectivity, in I
subjectivity which transcends itself.
It ha~ been pointed out already in terms of BerdyaevUs
theology that the fallen world is the world of objectifi-
cation while the spiritual is the world of infinite
subjectivity. With the abuse of freedom by man in eternity
came division, discord, exteriorization and slavery to
space, time and causality. Hence, man by his very nature
participates in both worlds. Also, as it has already been
mentioned, the victory man achieves in freedom over
exteriorization is what constitutes personality. Persona-
lity is basically a spiritual category in constant conflict
with the inclination of man to give in to the less burden-
some weight of the realm of Caesar. Personality is
subjectivity and can only be understood in terms of its
polar opposite, objectivity. It is the end result of
the suffering that comes about from the tragic history
of man which is a dialectical movement between the two
poles of freedom on the one side/and space, time and
causality on the other.
History for Berdyaev, then, involves the issue of dynamic
spirit which at the moment of expression is bound,
defined and arrested in space and time. But spirit,
unable to be contained in the realm of objects, transcends
it in creative expression bringing about yet again
objectification.
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While this explanation may be reminiscent of Hegel it must
be pointed out that Berdyaev differs from Hegel on a number
of points. For Hegel, spirit is immanent and 'objective l ;
for Berdyaev spirit is transcendent and subjective.
Hegelis is a monistic philosophy; Berdyaev's a dualistic
one. For Hegel spirit is Absolute and culminates in the
end in its own self-identity. For Berdyaev, spirit is
not Absolute and the march of history is not toward
the self-realization of spirit. Spirit for him is
particular; it is man-who is the spiritual being and the
march of history is the result of the free creative activity
of man who strives in history (or ought to) to attain
liberation from objectification. The meaning of history
is not the self~realization of spirit but the creation of
personality; the spiritual victory over objectification
by the particular individual.
The similarities between Hegel and Berdyaev are confined
to two points,
i) Both held that history is a dialectical movement
- For Hegel the synthesis is another moment in the self-
realization of spirit; for Berdyaev the synthesis is
another moment in the realization of personality.
ii) Both see the world in terms of Spirit. For Hegel
spirit is objective, Absolute and identical with necessity.
For Berdyaev it is subjective, particular and identical
with freedom.
This brief comparison of the ideas of Hegel and Berdyaev
was an attempt to point to the fact that ?€rsonali~1
cannot be defined except in terms of necessity or of
objectification. If it is at all possible to understand
'A-the events in this world as the result of crivision -" discord.
(
and unfreedom of fallen spirit then it may be possibl.e to
understand the nature of spiritual freed~ and pers~na2it?
Since Berdyaev develops his idea of personal.ity frog ~
detailed examination of almost every possible fOrill of
enslavement, personality will be examined in this c3ap~e~
in terms of only some of the major and most sign.i£ic~t
forms of slavery, viz the forms of unfreedo~ that obt~~~
in Being, society, civilization, "Indivic.ual.ization"" ~
the State o
401.1 Being and Slavery
For Berdyaev the most dangerous form of slavery .~c~,
he craims, has bedevilled all of weste~ philosophy, is
slavery to Being. According to him, the issue to ~
decided is whether Being is primary or secon~~~, r~at
is, to what extent is Being a construction of thouqh~,
an objectivization of the subject. For 3ercyaev, Ee~-'S
is primarily a concept, an abstract concept produced by
the objectivized thought of the subject ::mc t..~erefo:::-e
enslaves man. 2
Berdyaev asserts that Being is objecti".-:'z2-:: :='5 '.::.-:e • ::::::=:c::'
and universal which ipso facto excludes :::.-e.:: sc~.=._ _ __
the singular. But existential truth lies in the fact.
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that the real thing exists singularly; the common is not
3
real.
For Berdyaev Being means 'alienation and objectivization,
a change of freedom into necessity, the individual into
the common, the personal into the impersonal. It is the
triumph of reason which has lost its link with human
existence i • 4 Being then, by virtue of it being a function
of reason and reason alone, is a form of determinism - man
is subjected to the authority of one of his "parts".
Slavery to Being consequently becomes the primary slavery
of man.
Ontology, for Berdyaev, cannot be a philosophy of freedom,
because it must in terms of its rational hierarchical
structure, arrive at an order of being with God at the
summit which explains and accounts for all 'beings'.
This hierarchy excludes personality for it abolished the
reality of good and evil. If primary reality is a rational
construction, then there is no place for evil at all.
Evil ceases to be autonomous. Everything is explicable
in terms of reason. One of the problems facing Berdyaev
is that western philosophers and theologians have been
unable to construct an acceptable theodicy. The reason
for this is that the world is conceived in terms of Being
and non-Being. Being has as its summit, God. All sub-
stantial 'things', like all creativeness, falls within
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the ambit of B~ing. The problem here is that even Satan
lies in Being and in terms of tne hierarchy is subordinated
to God. God then is directly responsible for Evil.
Berdyaev claims that this problem has dogged western
thinkers and the impossibility to reconcile the position
of God as the highest order of Being with the presence of
evil has led to such theories as, for example, the double
predestination of Calvin.
The God who emerges from such an ontology is the most
terrifying apparition for Berdyaev. In all his books
Berdyaev wages a batt~0 against the traditional idea of
God as master who expects of men servility and absolute
obedience. He insists that God is liberator not master;
God is spirit not Being.
God cannot be traced as first cause in the hierarchy of
Being. God is essentially a mystery to man's Euclidean
mind and must thereforeJsays Berdyaev p be cleansed of
I "' . " h" 5 " "serVl_e SOClomorp lsm. EVll llke good has its roots
in freedom which in Berdyaev's scheme of things lies out-
side God in a mysterious irrational abyss. Any attempt
to systematize evil is to deny the freedom of man and
hence to blur the existential centre which discovers its
personality in terms of the decisions man takes amidst
good and evil. Be~dyaev argues that,
God is always in freedom, never in
necessity, always in personality, never
in the world ... God acts, not upon the
world order as justifying the suffering
of personality but in the conflict, in
the struggle of personality, in the
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conflict of freedom against that
world order. God cr~ated concrete
beings, personalities, creative
existential centres, not the world
order which. is a mark of the fall of
these creatures and of their ejection
into the sphere of the objectivized
external. 6
World harmony claims Berdyaev is a 'false and an enslaving
idea~ It ignores the irrational and senseless!. The
problem of theodicy cannot be explained away in a harmo·-
nious system. It is solved Ion the existential plane where
God reveals Himself as freedom, Jove and sacrifice, where
He suffers for -man and strives together with man against
the falsity and wrong of the world, agains"t the intoler-
able suffering of the world. 7 There is no need to justify
the suffering and evil on earth; one cannot. Evil is as
much a mystery as freedom and lies outside the comprehen-
ding powers of man. To pretend to understand it in terms
of reason is to enslave man to a limited rationality which
obscures his own infinity and denies him as personality,
the bearer of both good and evil. It is to God we turn,
not for an understanding of evil but for the struggle on
behalf of freedom, on behalf of righteousness, on behalf
of the enlightening and bettermer:t of existence. We know
that we can turn to God to struggle against evil on behalf
of freedom for, according to Berdyaev,
While ... in personality there is an
instance of the universal in a potential
form, in the personality of Christ the
universal was actualized. Here there
is no abstraction from the existence of
personality, no objectivization. 8
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Here Berdyaev declares that in man there is an instance
of the universal but in Christ the universal is actualized.
Does this mean that to turn to God, to struggle against
evil on behalf odi'freedom, leads to the eventual actuali-
zation of the universal in man. If this is true the claim
Berdyaev makes is that it is wi>chin the power of man to
become God. But this would contradict his own theology
for, according to Berdyaev, man is in the condition of
sin, fallen and imperfect. Christ is the perfect man,
an irruption of the spiritual into temporal nature. How
is it possible then for the universal to be actualized
in man within the realm of nature? Nature is in itself
antithetical to any realization of the perfect state of
man.
4.1. 2 .Per_sonalitj, Nature and Freedom
Nature is the primary example of objectivization. 'The
slavery of man to nature', says Berdyaev, 'is slavery to
the objective world. Enslaved nature, as object, is
nature which determines from wi-thout, it is nature which
depersonalizes and oppresses inward existence , . 9
According to Berdyaev, matter 'denotes dependence, and
a state of determination from without. For this reason
t . 1 b" lana ure lS a ways 0 Ject •
This means that if nature is the antithesis of freedom,
it is the antithesis of personality and spirit.
156.
However, man is an inalienable part of nature and he does
commune with cosmic life, but this communion has been
outside objectivizatiorl. Hence the desire, at certain
times in history, to fuse with nature in the hope that
man's primal innocence and freedom may be retained. One
notable theoretician in this regard is Rousseau, who In
the attempt to escape the iniquities and sheer pressure
of modern civilization, advocated a return to nature
as the solution to man's problem of freedom. In this
regard, Berdyaev wrote,
••. in wrestling with the necessity of
nature man created rivilization, the atmos-
phere of which is stifling, the standards of
which do not give freedom of movement. In
the very longing for communion with the inner
life of the cosmos there lies much truth and
right, but this truth and right are related
to the cosmos in the existential sense, not
to the objectified cosmos, which is nature
again with its determination. 11
The cosmos held a unique fascination for man, because
fusion with it meant 'fusion with a world soul'. However,
this fusion for Berdyaev is a completely false understand-
ing of the world and cosmos. He claims that one cannot
look for the soul of the world, the inner life of the
cosmos, in objectified nature 'because it is not the real
world but the world in a fallen state, an enslaved world,
alienated and depersonalized,.12
Fusion with the cosmos had meant for man an ecstatic
emergence from the boundaries of personal existence into
the cosmic element, it is the hope of entering into cow~union
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with ,this priIt'3.ry element. All orgiastic cults have been
13founded upon this. i
Berdyaev goes on to conclude that,
••• personality is inevitably subjected
and enslaved to t}e organic and the last
resort the cosmic whole; man becomes a
mere organ, and all the freedoms of man
which are bound up with his spiritual
independence of society and nature are
abolished. 14
Hence, the slavery of man to nature must not be opposed
-to an absolute, hidden communion with nature for this
denies the existential uniqueness of the personality:
'Personality in its spiritual quality is not dependent
11;
upon society and nature.' ~
Berdyaev has shown that nature is in its essence hostile
to the spiritual. The only way the instance of the univer-
sal can be achieved is through ifusion with the cosmos'.
The 'get back to nature' idea is attractive to man trapped
by the pressures of society. In his fusion with nature/man
hopes to lose his distinctiveness which is burdensome and
painful and participate in the 'world whole'. While this
may well be achieved for example through 'orgiastic cults',
fusion with nature is the denial of personality. It is the
refusal to recognize that per~ona1ity is a spiritual category;
singular, unrepeatable and independent of both nature and
society. So while nature appears conducive to the actua-
lization of the universal, it is an actualization that
denies the real universality of spirit and denies persona-
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lity. Hence, theactualizqtion of the spiritual universal
in the Christ-event seems beyond the realization of man
who is an inalienable part of nature. If nature presses in
on the inwardness of man, setting up constantly 'obstacles'
that must be transcended, then everything points to an
actualization of the universal as in Christ. Hence, man
anticipates an eschatological culmination of the world.
The perfection of the God-man cannot be achieved by man here
on this earth. Further proof of this is Berdyaev's asser-
tion that even society which is made up of a number of
individuals is in fact inimical to personality.
4.1.3 Society and. Personality
Of all forms of slavery, the least obvious to man is slavery
to society. According to Berdyaev, man's enslavement to
society presupposes a different relation than that which
exists between man and nature and man and being. The
nature of 'society' is the abstract collection of a number
of independent "I"s,
the reality of society consists in the
personalities themselves; not in the
simple interaction of personalities, but
in the 'we' which is. not an abstraction,
and has a concrete existence. The reality
of society is not a special '1 1 , it is 'we'.
The communion of the I with the others takes
place in the 'we'. This 'we' is a qualita-
tive content of the II' it is its social
transcension. 16
The 'I' holds communion not only with the 'you', communion
as personality with personality; it also holds communion
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with the Iwe~, that is, wit~ society. Berdyaev asserts
that since the 'we' is a number of 'I's, it is not a
collective 'substance': it has existential significance
although it may have nc existential centre for the
existential centre subsists only in the individual 'I'.
Existential social reality, therefore, is the relations
that obtain between the 11', the 'you' and the 'we'. But
the condition of man disallows pure existentiality and
the 'we' becomes objectivized and society is created.
The objectivization of society is inimical to the develop-
ment of personality for it lays claims to a greater reality
assuming a primacy over man and personality. Berdyaev
wrote,
society is the objectification of the 'we'
which possesses no reality at all and no
existence outside the relation to it of the
'I' and outside the relation between the
'I' and the 'you'. The 'we' in its existen-
tiality is a community, a communion, a
fellowship, but not society. 17
Authentic communion is possible for Berdyaev only among
the community of believers. The orthodox idea of sobornost
which was first formulated by the Khomiakov, the Slavophile
thinker, is the basis for his claim. Sobornost, for
Berdyaev, is neither unity without freedom nor freedom
without unity. It is the free co~nunion among people who
are united in a higher truth. Sobornost cannot be objecti-
vized like society because it is a spiritual not a secular
'category'.
The obvious criticism raised against this idea is again
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what chances does man rea~ly have of establishing such
a community. The history of the world has almost shown
its impossibility. Furthermore, the community is exclu"~
sive for only Christians may be pa~t of it and it also
involves Berdyaev in a contradiction of terms too~ on
the one hand,all people are challenged to consider the
al·terna'tive he offers yet, on the o·ther hand, he asserts
that such acomrnunion is possible only among the already
initiated. Civilized man is unable to capture the inno-
cence which makes communion through 'primal intuition'
possible at all.
4.1.4 Civilization and Personality
Civilization is completely different from culture. While
culture is the inner development of individuals in a
society, civilization is the external ordering of society
and the refinement of social relations. Culture by'its
nature is antithetical to primitiveness if primitiveness
is defined in terms of the naive inner bond of man with
nature which has not been transfigured by the expression
of the creative development of spirit. Culture is spiritual
but civilization is not.
The relations between primitiveness and civilization are
complicated. Primitiveness continues to exist within
civilization, but without its naivete and its freshness.
The properties of technical civilization are such that the
barbarian can avail himself of it exactly in the same way
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as the man of the highest culture. This is connected with
the problem of the active irruption of the vast masses
of the people into history and culture which has always
. .... 1 18been arlstocrat1c 1n prlnc1p e.
The categories 'people' and 'masses' are different.
People may be defined qualitativelyv for example v in terms
of labour, religious beliefs and art. The masses f on the
other hand; are vast numbers of people in whom personality
is not expressed; and who are consequently predisposed
to slavery. This indicates a crisis in civilization.
The masses appropriate to themselves the technical side
of civilization and are able to equip themselves with it,
but it is with difficulty that they assimilate spiritual
culture. The masses had indeed in the past their Ovffi
spiritual culture f based upon religious belief. The masses
in the present transitional period, on the other hand, are
devoid of all spiritual culture including religion.
Civilization, therefore, is characterized by the mass and
indicates a higher degree of objectivization than sociali-
zation p whereas culture is more closely linked with
personality and spirit.
Culture is closely linked with personality because culture
and cultural values are brought into being by the creative
act of man and the natural genius of man is revealed in
them. However p the product of creativeness in Culture, is
a downward pUllo 19 The creative act is in the realm of
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subjectivity, whereas the groduct of creation is the realm
of objectivity.
4.1.5 Slavery of man to himself
Berdyaev calls this form of slavery egocentricity, which
is the dissolution of personality. Egocentricity is inten-
sified by seeing individuality as part of a whole and not
an integral whole itself. Berdyaev argues that one of the
illusions of men is their conviction that individualism
is the resistance of the individual man to the surrounding
world which is always bent on curbing his freedom. In
actual fact, individualism is Aobjectivization' and is con-
nected with the~exteriorizationtof human existence. This
fact is to a large extent not immediately evident. Since
the individual is part of a society, part of the race, part
of -the world, individualism is the isolation of the part
from the whole, or the revolt of the part against the
whole. But to be part of any kind of whole, even if it
means being in revolt against that whole, is to be
exteriorized already. Only in a world of objectivization,
that is to say a world of alienation, impersonality and
determinism, does that relation of part to whole exist
which is disclosed in individualisffi. 20
Personalism means something entirely different. Personality
contains the universe within it, but this inclusion of the
universe takes place not in the sphere of the object-world
but in the sphere of the subject-world, that is to say of
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existentiality. Personality is aware of itself rooted
•
in the realm of freedom g that iS g in the realm of the
spirit , and from that source it draws the strength for its
conflict and activity. This is the meaning of being a
d f b · f 21person an. 0- elng ree.
4.1.6 The Slavery of the State
Berdyaev proceeds to argue that ChristVs command 'render
unto Caesar the things that are CaesarBs and unto God the
"things that are God's v, has been commonly interpreted in
a sense which reconciles the kingdom of Caesar and the
kingdom of God; it is given a meaning which abolishes the
conflict between the two. But the life of Christ was
precisely this conflict carried through to the utmost limit
of intensity. The Bkingdom of Caesar' has in fact never
agreed to recognize the kingdom of God as an autonomous
region and has always demanded service from the 'kingdom
of God'; has always been bent on making a mere 'tool' of
it. The kingdom of Caesar has tolerated Christianity
only when Christianity had been adapted and adjusted to it
and has rendered it service. When there has been such
subservience the sovereignty of Caesar has conferred
every kind of privilege upon it. 22
The State has a particularist character and is often
unconscious of its boundaries since elements and functions
of the state are to be found in every expression of human
life. The will to power which always endangers personality
is built on the foundation of the State. Imperialism,
totalitarianism and fascis~ have all subjugated personality
to their ends.
The state itself is not personality; not a being. It is
not an organism nor an entity. It has no existence of
its own since its existence is always to be found in people;
existential centres are in people. Nevertheless, the state
has become a projection, an exteriorization, an objectivization
of a condition of the people themselves. Ironically, men
not only need the state and cannot do without the service
it renders, but they are reduced by it; they ore taken
captive by the state as they connect their dreams of
sovereignty with it. And there lies the chief evil and
23source of human slavery.
The human being feels oppressed by the weight of the state
and does not grow beyond it. The state is seen as some
sort of exterior force with which human beings have rela-
tions. It is not viewed as a functional aspect of society
devoid of independent character. On the contrary, the
state is the seat of power and power destroys the inte-
grality of personality.
Closely allied to the state are idea~ of war, nationalism
and economics, that is, property and money, all of which
have an enslaving ability. All three associates of the
state oppress personality and demand absolute allegiance.
The human individual in his nationalistic or patriotic
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passion, or in his pursuit of money and property, enslaves
his person to a part, to a function; and hence to an
v exteriorization! of spirit.
Only creative activity liberates man from the external
world because it is ,the irruption. of spirit into nature
and because it preserves the uniqueness of personality.
Authentic creativity sees the difference between the act
and impulse of creation and the products of it. And since
the creative activity is spurred on by dissatisfaction
with this world, wan can never become enslaved completely
to the products 01 his creation.
For Berdyaev the most important proof for the instance that
man is spirit, is his creativity. Man is a creative being
like God is a creative Being. Man as the correlative of
God shares in God's creativity. However, man in his fallen
state is subject to the limits of space and time. Unlike
God who creates from freedom and spirit, man creates from
necessity and matter. Unlike the creative act which as
ac·t belongs to the spiritual realm, the product of the human
creative act becomes constrained by the world.
So far we have seen that personality is the result of the
attempt by spirit to transcend the constraints of the
'earthly' world. However, the question still to be asked
is,what does self-transcendence mean? How is it to be
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achieved?
4.2 Personality and Creativity
The point has already been made that God in his essential
humanity neither expects servile submission from man, nor
obedience, nor fear of condemnation. If obedience to the
will of God is not the primary characteristic of the
relationship between man and God, what is? In his seminal
'JlJork The Meaning of the Creative Act. Berdyaev wro·te f
Like its creator, man's life could not
be created by God only for the purpose
that g having sinned he should atone for
his sin and should put into the work of
his redemption all his powers, through-
out the whole extent of the world process.
Such a conception of human nature would
not correspond to the idea of the creator
and would demean the God-like dignity of
man. The absolute Christian truth turns
on the one hand towards redemption from
sin and evil and on the other hand towards
the positive creative calling of man~ it
reveals a Christology of man. The New
Testament truth of the Gospel is only a
part of Christological truth, oriented
towards redemption and salvation~ in it
we cannot seek the direct justification
of man's creative purposes. The Gospels
reveal only one aspect of Christ, the
Absolute man redeeming and saving human
nature. 24
Later on Berdyaev elucidates' further,
And God awaits from man an anthro-
polOgical revelation of creativity;
in the name of man's god-like freedom
God has hidden from the ways of
creativeness and the justification of
creativeness. 25
While Berdyaev acknowledges that there is no scriptural
evidence for his claim that man;s primary vocation is to
be ico-creator with God', he bases his assertion on the
fact that 'the divine idea of man, that creative freedom,
the free power to reveal himself in creative action, is
placed within man as a seal and sign of his likeness to
.c i' V 26God, as a mark o£ the Creator s lmage
The most significant thing abou·t man's creativity is
that it is Cl. free response to the "divine call of man.
Berdyaev argues that if the revelation of creativeness
was a command by God, manus free creative deed, where he
reveals t.he image and likeness of God in him, would be
impossible. If what God expects of man is an anthropolo-
gical revelation of the creative potential of the 'divine i
creature, then that creativeness is revealed by man's own
free initiative. To deny that essential freedom is to deny
the divine in man.
Berdyaev claims further that a passive concept of human
nature is contradicted by the divine incarnation. He writes,
0.0 a passive concept of human nature makes
man a being unworthy of the incarnation.
Christ would no·t have been God-'man if human
nature is merely passive, unfree and reveals
nothing from within itself. For truly the
God-man is a revelation not only of divine
but of human greatness, and predicates faith
not only in God but in man as wello 27
Berdyaev does not deny that the meaning of the incarna-
tion lies in redemption and salvation but he argues that
manls salvation can be effected not only through obedience
and asceticism, but through creativity. In this regard
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he wrote u
Salvation from sin; from perdition! is
not the final purpose of religious life:
salvation is always from something v and
life is always for sOIT\ething ..• man's
chief end is not~o be saved but to mount
up cre~tively. ~or this ?re~tive upsurge 28
salvat~on from s~n and eVll lS necessary.
He clairns that man justifies himself before the creator
not only by redemption but by crea-tiveness as well.
Here lies Berdyaev's main criticism of traditional theology
which has concentrated u to the exclusion of all else v
on the fact that the purpose of man is to be saved. That
man has fallen and needs to be saved. Berdyaev himself
emphasizes that manls vocation and purpose is sought in
his creation. In support of this view u Berdyaev writes,
The religious acceptance of the truth that
the religious meaning of life and being is
not wholly a matter of redemption from sin
(is) that life and being have positive
creative purposes. That higher creative,
positive being though unobtainable at the
time when redemption was begun u when God was
still transcendent to manu is attainable
in another period of religious life, after 29
the redemption u when God in man is i~Tlanent.
If salvation is to be sought in creativity and if the
'creative revelation in the spirit will have no holy
scripture, but will be accomplished in man and in humanity,
that is, an unveiling of the Christology of man i ,30 then
creativity is essentially a transcendent act; it is the en-
counter between the personality of man as creature-creator
and the personality of God as supreme-creator.
1.0:7.
For Berdyaev, 'creative power is the expression of the
whole life of a man. Man crea-tes his personality and in
, , 1" 31 Wlthe act of doinq so expresses h18 persona lty • :"len
Berdyaev says that 'man is not called to creativeness as
an ac-tivity which operates in the ~"orld and is exerted
upon the world, but he is h~mself creative power and with-
out tha-t creative power his human countenance is lacking "
he binds together the essential humanity of man with
essential creativity. Berdyaev does not allow for an idea
of humanity outside creativity because for Berdyaev there
can be no personality outside of freedom.
In the discussion of Personality. and Freedom and Necessity
"
an attempt was made to show that personality is forged in
libera'cion from objectifica-tion which is by its very nature
enslaving. Tfre way pf this liberation Q claims Berdyo.ev,
is througti creativity. He maintains that 'creative activity
does not consist merely In the bestowal of a more perfect
form upon this world; it is also liberation from the burden
and bondage of this world i • 32
Berdyaev argues that there are two ways in which creativity
can express itself. The way of objectification or the way
of transcendence. In the way of objectification creativity
conforms to the circumstances of this world and does not
reach its final state, 'it is cut off short'. This means
that it is confined to phenomena. However Q by way of the
transcendental the creative act 'breaks through to noumenal
reality and sets its bearings upon the final transformation
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of the world H .33
These are, argues Berdyaev, the two extremes of creative
power. But man being a creature of both nature and spirit
is a peculiar combination of both. Partaking of both the
phenomenal and noumenal worlds, man's creativity has both
an objective moment and a spiritual moment. without the
objective moment man would be unable to endure the condi-
tions of his existence in this world or improve those
conditions. Without the spiritual moment, where creative
power itself (not its products) moves out beyond the limits
of objectification and is directed towards a new life, the
kingdom of God could not be prepared.
For Berdyaev, in the kingdom of God belong only personali-
ties. Personality born through creative liberation. To
this end Berdyaev writes,
The significance of the creative state
for the inner life of man lies in this,
that it shows he is overcoming the state
of subjection and humiliation which is
imposed by the burden of this world.
It shows that he has attained the
experience of an exalting impulse.
Creative power, therefore, proclaims
that this world is superable, that con-
gealed being can be overcome. It tells
of the possibility of setting it free
from its claims, it speaks of liberation
and transformation. 34
Obviously the birth of personality through creative and
spiritual struggle has the effect of transforming the envi-
ronment of man. Personality is not caught up in the closed
circle of subjectivity. It has its being in the natural
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world and comes into being in strife with that world ..
And it is this creative strife which is revolutionary
and transforming. Berdyaev maintains that creativeness
cannot emanate from nothing. The world supplies the
material, but the source of the creative activity is the
freedom of the other world. Creative action is not initiated
within space and time. Its product only is seen within space
and time. He writes;
This mea.ns that what is most important,
most mysterious and most creatively new, 35
comes not from the world but from spirit.
It is spirit that bears freedom and the creative philosophy
of freedom which is existential interprets creative revela-
tion as the liberation from the determinism of nature and
society. For Berdyaev, if the creative impulse comes from
the world of freedom, Spirit or noumena it may be said
Vthat the transcendent comes to birth in the creative
effort which is a union with eternal creativity v. 36
The human individual or Ego which gives birth to this trans-
cendent transforms itself into an existent, no longer
potential, creative being; for that which is 'personal is
original, connected with the primary fountainhead, authentic.
Personality must perform its self-existent, original, crea-
tive acts and this alone makes it personality and constitutes
-, 7
its unique valuesv.~
In a significant passage from Slavery and Freedom Berdyaev
elucidates this claim thus,
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The growth of personality, the realization
of personality certainly does not mean the
formation of a whole ou·t of its parts.
It means rather the creative acts of person-
ality, as a whole thing, which is not
brought of anyth~ng and not put together
from anything. The form of personality is
integral, it is present as a whole in all
the acts of personality; personality has a
unique, an unrepeatable form. 38
The meaning of creativity becomes clearer if one considers
what Berdyaev means by philosophy as a creative activity:
Philosophy for Berdyaev is essentially liberation.
Philosophy is creativeness and not adap>cation or obedience.
The liberation of philosophy as a creative act is its
liberation fronl all dependence upon science, i.e. resistance
to every sort of adaptation to necessity. In philosophy
the self liberation of the creative act of the human spirit
in its reaction to the world takes place in the conscious
resistance to necessity and to the given world; not ln
adaptation to it. Philosophy is an art rather than a
science. Philosophy is an art because it is creation.
Philosophy is the art of knowing in freedom by creating
ideas which restrict the given world and necessity, and
penetrates into the ultimate essence of the world.
Since, according to Berdyaev, the perception of the world
as value or meaning is not a scientific perception but a
creative act and not an adaptation to necessity, the philo-
sophy of values breaks with the scientific. Philosophy is
essentially not the knowledge of this world but the pene-
tration into meaning - into the noumenal world.
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An attempt has been made so. far to show that personality
realizes itself in conflict. That man has to continuously
transcend the products of his Ovln creation. The act of
transcending is manus own creativity. But the paradoxical
nature of creativity is that itls end product enslaves man.
For man's creativity to be pure spirituality must
necessarily end, for there is no immanent solution. It is
a contradiction in terms for there to be any solution to
the problem of freedom and spirit in the worldo The con-
straints of space and time are the antitheses of phenomena.
Berdyaev evidently does not see man as gaining the status
of God in a kind of moksha or nirvan~. He is very clear
about the relation of man to God and that man is the
bearer of God's image. But man is man. Man is man not
only by virtue of spirit but by virtue of nature. Nature
and spirit in dialectical tension is the basis of the nature
of man. If this were not so, man would either be God or
an object. It is for this reason that for man to regain
his pure spirituality, he has to be free of the conditioning
of the worldo And since this cannot be so, the world itself
still has to end. Hence Berdyaev's insistance on the
eschatological significance of freedom.
According to Berdyaev, the 'kingdom of God' is prepared
for by both God and man. Christ revealed himself to man
and to a society that appeared to be receptive. The
messianic consciousness of the Jews prepared them for the
reception of the Messiah, although this lapsed into an
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expec-tancy of a political ~nd national Messiah. Man has
to prepare the way for the coming of God for God and man
are co-partners in the preparation of the consummation
of the world, of his-tory and of spirit.
An examination of history and eschatology concludes the
discussion on the meaning of personality. It describes
the relation between personality and history, and the
eschatological dimension of man, history and end.
4.3 Personality and History
That man is both a spiritual and a creative being who
realizes his personalit~ is proved by the historical mani-
festation of God in the Christ-event. For Berdyaev the
incarnation of God symbolized among other things, that man
is a spiritual being like God is or God would not have had
a point of contact with man. FurthermorefChrist was the
perfect personality for in him freedom was actualized.
However, the Christ-event took place in human history.
All of man's creative efforts belong to the panorama of
history. Hence, for Berdyaev, the destiny of the human
personality is the destiny of history.39
The questions Berdyaev asks are, 'From what perspective does
one view history? Must man be seen in terms of the cosmos,
or the cosmos in terms of man? Is human history a subor-
dinate part of the cosmic process or is the cosmic process
175.
a subordinate part of human. history?,40 Berdyaev does
not see the world as cosmocentric as the Greeks saw it,
for him it is anthropocentric. If the actions of men are
caught up in space and time, the passage of which deter-
mines history, then history is anthropocentric. Human
creativity and human freedom has meaning only if history
has meaning. In his book Beginning and End Berdyaev writes,
History in time is the pathway of man
towards eternity, within it the
enrichment of human experience is
accumulated. But it is absolutely
impossible to conceive either of the
creation of the world within time or
the end of the world within time. 41
Just as for Berdyaev the personality derives its meaning
from the spiritual world, so does history find its purpose
outside time. Meaning is not immanent in history. If it
were so, as Hegel had assumed, man is doomed to necessity.
It is only because history refers to the noumenal world
that its meaning lies in its testimony to the freedom of
man.
Berdyaev claims that la meaning which is not commensurate
with the destiny of per~onality, with my personal fate,
and has no significant bearing upon it, has in fact no
meaning. Unless the universal meaning is at the same time
a personal meaning also, it has no meaning at all , . 42
Clearly then, the meaning of history must be consistent
with the meaning of personality and must therefore lie
outside time. Berdyaev did not tire of repeating that
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Vthe his-tory of the world and the history of mankind
•
possesses meaning solely upon the condition that they
43will come to an end'. It is because of this that the
philosophy of history has always been prophetic. It
contained a prophetic element that passed beyond the
bounds of scientific knowledge; beyond necessity and
causality to existentiality.
BerdyaevOs understanding of time is divided into three
aspects: cosmic time p historical time and existential
time. Cosmic time v which is calculated mathematicallyv
can be symbolized by a circle; that is, it refers to the
cyclic nature of seasons p movement around the sun, etc.
Historical time which lies in cosmic time and is also
calculated mathematically in decades, centuries and
millenia, is symbolized by a straight line; a linear
progression. Existential time is not susceptible to cal-
culation like the above two are. It depends on the inten-
sity of experience v suffering and joy and can be symbolized
by a point.
The prophetic element in the history of philosophy usually
comes from a heightened spirituality which can communicate
with existential reality and which usually gives expression
to it. It anticipates the breakthrough of the existential
into the historical, i.e. the breakthrough of the spiritual
into the natural. This is why the Christ-event is of
central importance to Berdyaev. Christianity for him lS
historical, 'it is the entrance of God into history and
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it confers a transcendent meaning upon history •.
, f h' i 44Christianity accepts a meanlng or lstory.
History is a reflection of the battle between freedom
and necessity; between spirit and nature, for historical
time and exis'cential time axe at odds with each other.
From the previous subsection one concludes 'chat while the
products of creativity remain within space and time, the
creative impulse belongs in the noumenal world. The
passage of history is the record of the objectivization of
creativity and its meaning lies in the fact that it none-
theless cowmunes with the spiritual world. If this were
no"t so, history would not be movement for "the incessant
creativity of man, which implies change and transformation,
comes about from manes freedom to create, a freedom which
he has as a spiritual being. For history to be,it has to
presuppose human freedom, yet the weight of history denies
the freedom of the unique person. Berdyaev describes this
conflict graphically in a passag"e from The Beginning and the
End:
There is a clash between human personality
and history and it is a clash which cannot
be subdued within the confines of history.
Man puts his creative strength into history
and does so with enthusiasm. But history on
the other hand takes no account of man. It
uses him as material for the creation of an
inhuman structure and it has its own inhuman
and antihuman code of morals. 45
However, although 'history treats me roughly and shows
not the slightest concern for my well being ... history
is also my history. I have indeed had a share in its
h
. g 46appeu1.ng •
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I cannot be understood apart from history,.
nor can history be understood apart from me. If, according
to Berdyaev, oman holds the cosmos within him, there is
all the more reason for ~aying that he includes history
'h' h' ,47",at ln lm.
By nature and destiny man is a historical being. His
natural dimension transforms his creative impulse into
objec,tivization and sets up a contradiction between man
and history. On the one hand, man's spiritual freedoITl
repudiates objectivization as alienatione On the other,
his natural being forces him to accept history as part
of him. However, Berdyaev is qui~k to qualify what
acceptance means when he writes, II accept it (history)
not as an obedient slave but as a free man i • 48
In his examination of history Berdyaev concludes that
history is a failure because the unresolved tension between
freedom and necessity culminated in the triumph of necessity.
The spectacle of history always evokes sadness in Berdyaev.
In Truth and Revelation he wrote with an obviously heavy
heart,
History is always disillusionment for human
personality and it always wounds it very
deeply. To a notable degree history is the
history of crime, and all the deeds of the
idealists about a better state of society
have ended in criminal deedse 49
History is a failure because in it the creative act of man
becomes objectified. For Berdyaev; history remains an
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evil force in relation to human personalityg but this.
force is within man. He wrote,
History may be brought into man and may
be recognized as his own particular
destiny. The recognition of the failure
of history by no means indicates that it
is devoid of any meaning and that man
must repudiate it, or that he can escape
from it. He must live out his destiny
in history and in so doing to bring 50
transcendent meaning and light to it.
The story of history is the story of personality. The
spiritual principle of personality realizes and actualizes
itself in history. History is the relation g therefore,
of spirit and nature. A tension which cannot be resolved
in the world of phenomena. If it has meaning in terms of
the noumenal world then it must end in a noumenal moment.
For freedom and spirit to triumph g nature must be forsaken.
4.4 Personality and Eschatology
If personality is the actualization of spirit and freedom
in creative activity in historyg the conflict of personal-
ity with nature can never be resolved in history and
therefore must aspire to some resolution or end outside
history. In a tribute to Dostoevsky1s view of personality,
Berdyaev makes this point clearly when he saysg
The existence of personality with its
infinite aspirations, with its unique
and unrepeatable destiny is a paradox
in the objectified world of nature.
It is placed face to face with a world
environment which is alien to it, and
it has tried to accept the world as a
world harmony. The conflict of human
personality with the world harmony, the
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challenge of world harmony is a funda~
mental theme in personalist philosoph~
No one has s·tated it with such power
a.nd ·t.Jte.m.tcliancya.s Dostoevsky. The world
and world harmony mus·t be brought to an
end for the very reason that the theme
of personality is insoluble within the
confines of the world and history and
because the world harmony in an aeon of
the world is a mockery of the tragic
fate of man. 51
Berdyaev also points out that the question of 'world
harmony' and personality involves history in an ends-
means problem. Personalities are not viewed individually
and singly but each generation becomes the 'manure' for
the benefit of the next. The utilitarian ethics which
prevails denies the uniqueness of the individual person,
and personality, by the very nature of uniqueness, must
necessarily clash with history. For Berdyaev, the 'tragic
conflict between personality and world ilharmony", between
person and the world process' remains fundamental. He
writes,
It is par excellence a theme of existen-
tial philosophy, for no solution of it is
to be found within the bounds of history
and it requires an end to history. 52
The idea of 'being' which has dominated western philosophy
and theology has been/in Berdyaev's words, a compromise
between two worlds and has hidden the eschatological mystery
from view. Any monistic idea denies the reality of evil
for all is resolved in a kind of 'world harmony'. The
independent existence of evil and good, and consequently
freedom, has no place in a monistic philosophy. Any attempt
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to make sense of the reality of evil and the idea of
world harmony must anticipate an end to the world; that is;
it must anticipate the Icoming of the kingdom'. It is only
in the kingdom of God that the dualism between spirit and
nature can be overcome for dualism does not indicate 'a
transcendenot breach between two worlds; it poinots to a
.. , . t' I 53confl1ct and 1S a summons to crea~lve ac lon .
It has been pointed out in the section on personality and
history that history is a failure because necessity
achieved the upper hand despite manls free impulse to
create. However, the problem of history is more primary
than the success of necessity. It obtains in the very fact
of alienation and exteriorization itself. The creative
act is connected with dissatisfaction with the world and
the desire to transform it. Therefore, even in its realiza-
tion it has an eschatological moment. But the failure of
the creative act is that it can never fully achieve its
purpose. It never overcomes objectivity. Its success can
only be limited to the preparation of this world for the
kingdom of God. The kingdom of God can never be realized
on earth because it is only spirit where matter has no part.
Clearly then, eschatology is the overcoming of objectivity
and in so far as it is a battle with necessity it is a
divine-human enterprise. Man not only awaits the end, he
prepares for it. For Berdyaev,
The end is not merely the destruction of
the world, and judgement; it is also the
illumination and transformation Qf the world,
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the continuation, as it were, of creation,
th try upon a new· apon. The creative_e en -
act of man is needed for the coming of the
kingdom of God. God is in need of and
awai·ts it. 54
Ironically, eschatology seems to point out the uselessness
of creative activity, yet it is because man's efforts are
a response to the cail of God that it cannot be abandoned
. to the exigencies of this world and must therefore culminate
in an end that confers meaning on all. According to
Berdyaev,
The human tragedy from which there is no
escape, the dialectic of freedom and
necessity, finds its solution within the
orbit of divine mystery, within the Deity,
which lies deeper than the drama between
creator and creature, deeper than the
representations of heaven and hell. 55
An eschatological interpretation of the world is the only
meaningful answer to the frustration of incessant creativity,
for it points to a consummation. Samuel Calian in his book
on the Eschatological Dimension of Berdyaev's Philosophy
also points out that,
What is underlying Berdyaev's thinking
is the fact that the creative impulse
wishes in its original outburst to see
an end to this world, it is the beginning
of a different world. In short, creative
activity is eschatological. 56
Since creativity itself becomes objectified, the moment
it finds expression/freedom is immediately limited, and
this very limitation points towards the end; to the end
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of time and space when fre~dom which finds creative expression
and lies outside objectivization is fully manifested.
Eschatology also resolves the problem of time. The idea
of time is part of our destiny because it is in history
and in time that we experience our destiny.
'the ultimate and important reason for an eschatological
interpretation of the cosmos is the self-realization of
-personality in the Christ-event. According to Calian,
The eschatological dimension is the image
and likeness of God in man and this is why
it rises about the natural life. Persona-
lity is not a part of something, a function
of the genus or of society •• 0 it is a
whole comparable to the whole of the world
... Personality is spiritual and presupposes
the existence of a spiritual world. The
value of personality is the highest hier-
archical value in the world, and of the
spiritual order. 57
In short, Berdyaev's personalism is based on meonic freedom,
which the first Adam had before the tragedy of man's fall.
He extols the fact of man's redemption in Christ who re-
stores to man the possibility of realizing personality in
dynamic creative freedom; working towards the eschatological
good of God-manhood. His personalism is pointed toward the
end. Man is created not for this world of objectification
but for God's world. 'It is for this reason that God has
given to man His revelation in Christ. It is in the God-
man, in the son of God and Son of man, that the new man
~~takes his beginnings, the man of a new and external humanity. I
Through Christ, man becomes a participant in the nature of
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the Holy Trinity; for the ~econd hypostasis of the Holy
Trinity (Christ) is the Absolute man.
Thus Berdyaev places his concept of personality in the
context of Trinity; which is a spirit-centred mystery of
life itself; while historically Berdyaev's view of man was
anthropocentric and idealistic; he favoured a pneuma-centric
spirituality, and a pneuma-centric personality which is
eschatologically orientated~ Hence Berdyaev considered
man an eschatologically directed personality.
It would be obvious by now that it was Berdyaev's deep
concern about manus freedom that underlay his whole philo-
sophy of freedom and the Spirit. His was not a logically
constructed system like Hegel's in which God or Absolute
Spirit completes 'the system'. That kind of theoretical
superstructure alienates individual man. Neither did
Berdyaev stop at the stage of merely highlighting the
individual as the existentialists had done. For him,
individualism demeans man and human freedom comes to its
full manifestation in personality. The theme of state,
labour; alienation and such like which run through Marx
are filled with a new content by BerdyaevUs personalism.
In Marx's thought the individual became enslaved by social
being. In Berdyaev, freedom and personality fills society,
state, history and time with new significance because free-
dom is not empty actionalism but human creativity is filled
with eschatological significance. His preoccupation with
the struggle of existence leads him to perceive a new and
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refreshing dimension to the Christ-event which provides.
a new terminus a quo for philosophical discourse and for
dialogue with theology, a task which may heal the present
fragmentation in the human quest for freedom and authenticity.
Having attempted to highlight some of the main tenets of
BerdyaevDs thought, which in his writings, it has been
pointed out, are not systematically presented, it behoves
us now, briefly, to attempt a critical analysis of his thought.
-This will be the task of Chapter 5.
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The aim of this dissertation u as was stated in the positio
quaestionis, has been to evaluate Berdyaev's contribution
to the understanding of man and his response to the problem
of freedom vis-~-vis the de-humanization of man in the
twentieth century. His is a thoroughly anthropocentric
philosophy that aims at restoring man to himself, to what,
Berdyaev believes, man can and ought to be.
Berdyaev's diagnosis of the modern dilemma leads him to the
view that the historical development of man has floundered
in two respects: it has not led to the realization of greater
freedom by man, nor has it promoted the flowering of man's
full humanity. Freedom and humanity are the fundamentals
in BerdyaevVs thought9 for humanity can only actualize itself
in freedom and man can only be free if he is truly humane.
In this dissertation ihumane' has been used to describe that
which is intrinsically, qualitatively and fully human. For
Berdyaev this dialectic between freedom and being fully
human is ultimately at the root of the quest for personality.
5.1 Beyond Existentialism
In many respects, Berdyaev may be regarded as a 'post
existentialist' for his philosophy of personality goes
beyond the centrality of the individual which is fundamental
to existentialist thought. He makes an attempt to 'rehouse'
man in the world after the existentialists had abandoned
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him to the fact of his solitary freedom and to his Ithrownness v •.
To handle the problem of manls humanity, Berdyaev is driven
back to first o~der questions.
accept the 'facticityi of man.
He is not content to merely
, . I
He seeks to know why man ~
in the first place; to work out \'>lhat man can potentially be,
what h.i.s task is and what direction he should take.
The terminus a quo of existentialism, without exception,
is the fact of manls 'thrownnessi in the world. That he is
already here in the world, and that he 'ek-sists' in the face
of Being (Heidegger), Nothingness (Sartre)or in his border-
situation (Jaspers). Whether theistic existentialists like
Augustine, Pascal, Marcel and Kierkegaard, or atheistic ones
like Heidegger, Camus and Sartre, they cope with man's
relationship with his fellow man, man's relationships with
God or with non-being/as the case may be, and man's respon-
sibility to himself, from the fact that he exists in the
world already. Here lies Berdyaev's problem! He claims
that the existentialists, despite their reaction to absolute
metaphysics, the tyranny of ontology, and the degradation
of culture and man's general unfreedom, did not go felT enough.
Berdyaev would still place the existentialists, especially
the atheistic ones, within the objectivized world; that is,
they speak from within the realm of necessity. For him
there is no meaning immanent in the phenomenal world.
Meaning must be sought in the realm of freedom. He, therefore,
goes beyond the 'facticity' of man to attempt an explanation
for what it means to be man in the first place. It is from
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this standpoint that he understands the meaning of freedom and
the ultimate calling of manino"t from 'below', i.e. from
the point of view of his Vfacticity!.
Of e must keep l'n ml'nd that the existentialistscourse, on
responded to a different conflict-situation which presented
its own unique problem. In the face of depersonalized
bourgeois Christianity, utilitarian ethics, the reign of
the Hegelian Absolute and later the outbreak of the first
and second world wars, the existentialists in reaction
insisted on the freedom, dignity and individual responsi~
bility of man. They defended the individual's subjective
experience against the onslaught of impersonal and objective
knowledge.
Berdyaevis historical experience was slightly different.
Although he was the contemporary of many post-war existen-
tialist philosophers and theologians, his experiences posed
to him different questions. Berdyaev was confronted with
a number of doctrines all operating with conflicting views
of man interwoven with the social, religious, political
themes of the Russian intelligettsiain the first two decades
of this century (cf. Chapter I); the influence of Ortho-
doxy which maintains the doctrine that man is created in
God's image, is essentially spiritual/and contains a divine
spark in him; and the ascendency of Marxist socialism,
which saw man primarily as the outcome of materialist forces.
Hence it was not sufficient for him just to call attention
to the freedom and dignity of the individual person. His
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aim was to challenge the fundamental assumptions in these
understandings of man so that man may be redirected on the
path of freedom and humanity. Berdyaev then supersedes the
existen"tialists by asking the first order question -'-Why is
man "thrown il in the first place? i This ques"tion is even
more fundamen"tal than the fact of his existence 0 However y
the pretentiousness of his quest exposes him to a great
many more problems than the more modest reactions of some
of the existentialists.
While the existentialists began with the freedom of the
individual y Berdyaev begins with freedom as the primal
reality.
Further, it must be remembered that his accoun"t of freedom
as primordial and unfathomable reality was an attempt to
cope with the besetting problems of theology and philosophy
and to account for the relative responsibility of man and his
tragic fate in history. He was quick to grasp that while it
was true that man did not have an adequate grasp of his own
potentialities and was far from any self-understanding,
this was in itself not the reason for his crisis but went
much deeper.
5.2 The Christian Answer
In his attempt to preserve the dignity and freedom of man
whom he claimed was essentially a creative being, Berdyaev
turned to the Christian answer. Here he saw the most
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enduring preserver of the di.gnity of man and the only
adequate basis for the claim that man 1S not merely an
individual but also personality.
According to Berdyaev the God-incarnate is only meaningful
if freedom is the primal reality. It is also the only
meaning that can be given to the Christ-event if the dignity
and freedom of man is to be maintained. Christ is the
criterian agains·t which man i S humanity is assessed and
against which he is found wanting. However, to begin with
freedom, and not with God,is a fundamental departure from
western theology and involves Berdyaev in numerous contro-
versies.
His argument starts with the observation that when Christ
came to earth he preached a message in freedom. The methods
of the realm of Caesar, of might and power, were unknown to
him. As a humble servant he called man to follow the truth"
voluntarily. His message was, for Berdyaev, essentially a
summons to spirituality and freedom. If Christ was
himself perfect personality and his message was preached
in freedom, then the kingdom of God is the kingdom of free-
dom of nature, the kingdom of compulsion and necessity. It
is on this basis that Berdyaev argues for the birth of God
from the depths of the LJrgrund. His most daring postulate
is the idea of Boehme that man is the result of the creative
self-realization of God. God creates himself out of the
depths of the Urgrund and creates man to discover his own
potential (cf. Chapter 2 and 3). This picture of God would
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be, however; from a western and strictly Biblical point of
view, highly problematic.
The idea of the vBecoming God! has no Biblical justification.
Since; as it has already been pointed out, Berdyaev!s primary
reality is freedom then he comes to the Bible with this pre-
supposition. He does not try to make sense of the world in
terms of biblical postulates only. Freedom and the Christ-
event are held in dynamic tension explaining each other.
For Berdyaev, in order for man to be created, God must suffer
a vlack i (Chapter 2). His philosophy implies that God needs
man as much as man needs God, for if God was completely
self-sufficient there would be no purpose for man. So God
created man as an act of his own self-realization, in
eternity, out of nothingness or freedom. So while God may
have absolute power over the Being of man, He is powerless
before manus freedom; the very stuff from which he created
him. Man in his freedom may choose then either to walk with
God or to explore the limits of freedom in a rebellious
assertion of self-will (hubris). This was essentially
the sin of Adam. To choose apart from God is to choose
spiritual alienation for while man may continue to create
in freedom, the product of his creative act is trapped in
space and time bringing about a sundering of the spiritual
consciousness of men for spirit becomes caught in a tension
with necessity.
One implication of this interpretation of God is that
firstly, the powers of God are limited. Berdyaev may be
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accused of limiting the power.of God to increase the powers
of man. However r if Berdyaev sees the realm of God as the
realm of freedom u then power and authority have no place in
The implication of this view for the interpretation of man is
that man, by virtue of being a spiritual being cast ln the
image of God, is potentially free. He, however, is in
constant danger of being enslaved by the 'forces of nature'.
This is the condition of his fallenness.
The fall of man is, then, man's alienation from himself and
this is a spiritual alienation. The whole of the realm of
nature, of space, time and causality, is the fallen world
of man. The problem this raises is that there is no God in
such a world. God is 'wholly other'. Also, if as Berdyaev
suggests, the Christ-event is the symbolical representation
of God suffering in eternity, then God suffers alongside
man and not in the world with man. Man's redemption then l e,- ~
only symbolically accomplished by Christ. His 'real'
redemption lies entirely in his own hands. The Christ-event
was only a summons, a beckoning to follow freedom and the
truth. 'I'he ultimate choice is up to man. Since the world
represents alienation God can have no part of it. The only
communication he has is through symbolism.
For Berdyaev, symbolism and mythology are the only overt
means of man-God communion. The Bible itself is for him
symbolical and does not tell us everything about God. It
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merely reveals God's purpose.for man. However, the fact
remains that while God has it in his power to illuminate
the dark world of man, and point man in the righ-t direction,
he can have no power over man. Man is spiritually free
even if he is bound by nature. It lies within his o"m
power to attain both freedom and humanity to the extent
that his fallenness would allow. In other words, God cannot
really save man from further sin.
-It would be a valid question to ask of Berdyaev, 'Where
then is the place for prayer?'. It is true that prayer
is a means of communicating with God, but if God has no real
part in the world except a symbolical one, then he cannot
really answer prayers or effect changes in the lives of
people who so beseech him. All he can/and wills, is to show
man the path to salvation. The rest is up to man to accom-
plish.
This symbolical explanation of the Incarnation will indeed
occasion several problems for traditional theologians, the
mos-t important being the doctrine of the divine identifica-
tion with human history in the Christ-event. How would
Berdyaev interpret, for example, John's view that 'The Word
was made flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory
full of grace and truth'? Berdyaev's idealism becomes
especially apparent when he considers the mode of communi-
cation with the realm of freedom (cf. Chapter 3). For him,
this communication is mystical intuition, creative pene-
tration into the depth of man's own being which brings him
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into touch with the mys"tery qf God since both God and man
share the same beginning. Here also, emerges Berdyaev's
Russjan heritage! In the west philosophy has been primarily
the search f?! knowledge and theJlogy, the search for ul-
timate truth (cf. Chapter 1). In the intellectual tradition
of Russia this seRaration was not made g ~nowledge and truth
were not separate concerns. Philosophy was also the search
for truth. It is for this reason that Russia almost entirely
lacks an epistemology. All its quests for meaning have
either positively or negatively a religious basis. Hence,
Berdyae~ brings to bear on his philosophy a deeply religious
~ priori. For him, authentic knowledge is based ultimately
on mystical intuition which is bo"th knowledge of God and
realization of truth.
It would appear then, that Berdyaev is idealistic to the
core yet, as it has been pointed out, he is fundamentally
existentialist also. How can this antithesis be understood?
For Berdyaev freedom and the spirit are transcendent realities
belonging to the realm outside that of nature with no possible
means of communicating with nature except symbolically. Man
is seen as a creature belonging to both the realms of free-
dom and the order of nature. So long as man is extended
in the objective world, constrained by space, time and
causality, and is a natural being, so long as he remains
free and creative, he participates in the spiritual.
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Howeve~ Berdyaev~s philosophy is existential because the quest
for the humane is an existential quest. God is an existential
reality~ he ~xists in onevs inner depths and the incarnation
is the irruption of the existential into the linear progression
of time. All aspects of spiritual reality, for example,
all acts of creativity belong in existential time. Para-
doxically, for Berdyaev the order of spirit is the order of
e·ternity and anything in the natural world participating in
eternity is existential. For Berdyaev manus being belongs
to historical and cosmic time but his spiritual essence,
his existential striving belongs to existential time. The
awakening of the spirit, the creation of values, have no
place in the natural world; it makes sense only if it
participates in eternity.
This is what gives rise to the paradox of idealism and
existentialism. Berdyaev's idea of two worlds and the
fact that this world is not ultimate reality is throughly
idealistic. His only basis for this idealism is the God-
man, the irruption of the spiritual into the phenomenal.
However, in so far as Berdyaev sees man as co-responsible
for the world and that man is God's 'projected plan' not
a completely created entity, man is in a position to forge
his own being and to be the creator of his own values. In
so far as he endures a 'terrible freedom' before which even
God is powerless, and in so far as man's image and destiny
lie in his own handsfBerdyaev could not be more existentialist.
A brief comparison with some of the main existentialist
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themes described in Chapter One elucidates this point.
As it was observed already, Berdyaev also analyses the con-
cept of 'Dread l , one of the enduring themes of the existen~
tialistso He follows Kierkegaard in distinguishing between
dread and fear. Fear is directed to an object. Dread is
objectlessi it is the condition of the human spirit on
awakening to an awareness of its vast freedom. Dread is
endemic to the development of personality and is the pre-
condition for the transcending act of spirit, i.e. for spirit
to transcend ths world of objects and be fulfilled in free-
dom. Dread is not a psychological condition but is, for
Berdyaev, as it is with other existentialists, an existential
condition. It describes the consciousness of man at his
moment of confrontation with 'reality'.
For many existentialists 'dread' is a condition of conscious-
ness. For Berdyaev it is a crisis of the spirit. Spirit
for Berdyaev is a category like reason or consciousness.
There is as much evidence for spirit as an aspect of the
human make up as there is for reason. Even in the face of
irrationality man is credited with having a rational faculty
for there is enough evidence in the history of man to support
the claim that he is capable of rational thought. Likewise,
the history of man is characterized by spiritual yearning.
This can only be the case if man has a spiritual 'faculty'.
While 'fear' is a category dealing with his psychology,
'dread' deals with his spirituality.
The second major theme of Berdyaev's philosophy is the idea
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of Being in advance of itself. Although this is a Heidegger-
~an coi.nage i·t is G1 th(~me comrnon to all the existentialists
an.d is also fundamental to Berdyaev's idea of personality.1
personality is spirit in advance of itself. It is both
personality and yet it is not yet personality for personality
is dynamic; it is constantly in the making. The conflict of
spirituality and the external world is the motor for the
creation of values and it is the creation of values that
constitutes personality. For Berdyaev a creature who
experiences no inner conflict is a creature whose spirit
h~~ not awakened to its calling; a creature with no persona-
lity. As long as man is alive Li. the vvorld his spiriJc will
be at odds with the world because there is no immanent
solution to Jche problem of man. Hence, there is no completed
state of personality and no .set;r6f final values. I'1an is
always in the making g and hence, he is always ahead of
himself - a being in-advance of itself.
However, with regard to this point there is one important
difference between Berdyaev and the existentialists. For
Heidegger and Sartre, for example, no direction is given
to the creativity of man. The idea of Being-in-advance of
itself is an attempt to explain laan from empirical data,
that is, they explain what man is idoing' and why
he must do it. The atheistic Existentialists make the
jump from the 'is' to the 'ought' without sufficiently
substantiating why the 'ought' is an imperative. It is
of no avail to tell man, like Sartre did g that he is con-
demned to be free when he is so easily enslaved or to say
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like Camus that man must reb~l on behalf of values lid thout
giving convincing enough reasons why he should. Berdyaev
not only explains man from what he observes, the vis w, he
shows why manws creation of values is imperative and why
it can be no other way. Here, then Q is one of the most
impelling philosophical arguments for faith t.hat has emerged
-in our century!
A third main theme that Berdyaev shares with existentialism
is the theme of temporality. Temporality is antithetical
to individuality. It relativizes human existence. One
moment is not any more important than Jche next. Existen-
tiality is opposed to temporality. Berdyaev gives fullest
expression to this theme (cf. Chapter 2). The moments of
victory of the spirit belong to existential time for the
moment of victory of spirit over nature belongs to eternity.
Hence personality does not have meaning in time; it has
meaning in eternity. It is in fact antithetical to time
for it is immortal.
These are some of the main themes Berdyaev shares with
the existentialists and which qualifies his philosophy as
thoroughly existential. So although he appears to have
an idealistic interpretation of the world, his philosophy
only culminates in idealism but at grass roots attempts to
explain the reality of man's existentiality. It is for
this reason that the pivot of Berdyaev's philosophy is
neither God nor man, but the God-man.
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Berdyaev~s philosophy then i~ thoroughly idealistic and
yet thoroughly existentialist. The argument against the
problematic nature of God which he advances~ he counters with the
fact that his idea of God is actually consistent with the
personality of God as he is revealed in the Bible. Proof
of this is that he absolved God of any responsibility for
evil.
conventional western theologians have often tied themselves
up in knots trying to undo the paradox of a loving and
suffering God with a God who allows the flourishing of evil
on earth. In his Divine and Human Berdyaev argues p
If Satan is entirely subordinate td God
and is the instrument of Divine providence p
if God makes use of him for his o~m good
ends, evil does not really exist. This is
an entirely optimistic theory. 2
If this is the case,. the loving and suffering nature of God
as revealed in the New Testament is incompatible with the
view of God where He appears to be the One who allows for
the wantonness of evil. God and not man in this case would
be responsible for evil. In his attempt to make the idea
of God consistent with his revelation in Christ, Berdyaev
postulated the idea that evil is rooted in uncreated freedom,
the stuff from which God created man. This makes man both
potentially good and potentially evil and places evil out-
side the ambit of God. This explanation squares with the
idea of the personality of God, with the God revealed in
Christ, but it denies the omnipotence of God in the face
of such evil.
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Western theology has been un~ble to accept a God that is
not omni.poten"t and the difficulty in theology arises from
trying to reconcile the idea of omnipotence with the idea
of the all loving, all merciful God. Berdyaev, on the
other hand, is prepared to sacrifice one of the attributes
of God (omnipotence) to emphasize the reality of God as
suffering and loving.
While Berdyaev does stray beyond the\confines of the Bible
and there is in the end very little Biblical justification
for his views, Berdyaev's statements about God's personality
begins with scripture. His speculation is only an attempt
to present an understanding of man and the world which would
be consistent with the image of God in revelation. So while
his views may be considered heretical and, narrowly inter-
preted, may imply the limitation of the powers of God and
the exaltation of man, at no point does he make statements
about the personality of God which are contradictory to
the Bible. It is the western theologians who are far more
guilty with regard to the distorting of the notion of God
since they insist on maintaining the omnipotence of God side
by side with his mercy and in the attempt to interpret
strictly, in keeping with the 'Word of God', they postulate
a very problematic picture of God and man, which contra-
dicts the image of God in the New Testament.
Berdyaev blames the narrow literal understanding of the
Bible for the distortion of the iMage of God and from his
po~nt of view it is the western theologians who are guilty
of blasphemy and heresy.
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He, on the other hand, manages.
to accomplish an incredible exaltation of God and mO.n. Man
is free even before God and God loves and suffers alongside
man who must bear his freedom with dignity. So Berdyaev
manages to assert manijs freedom an~ the loving personality
of God who cannot be held responsible for the pain and
suffering of the world.
Berdyaevis understanding of evil and freedom has important implica-
tions for the understanding of man. If God is not responsible
for evil and man is free to choose either to walk with God
or fall away from him, God is impotent in the face of man's
freedom. This may be interpreted in two ways, only one of
which has been emphasized in the West. The fact that man
fell away from God into a situation of sin and alienation
demonstrates the evil in man, the will to power of man and
the need for man to humble himself land redeem himself before
God. The fact that man is free to choos~such a choice
exalts man infinitely. It speaks of the nobility of man as
a free creature and exalts him. Berdyaev writes that,
If man is a fallen creature and if he fell in
virtue of freedom inherent in him from the first,
it shows that he is a lofty being. Awareness of
original sin both humbles and exalts man. Man 3
fell from a height and he can rise to it again.
For Berdyaev God did not create man to humiliate him. He
created him in an act of His own self-realization. Man then
is cast in God's image and is co-creator with God; that is
his calling first and foremost. That man abused his freedom
and chose against God means that he must redeem himself and
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creativity becomes a redemptive act.
Clearly Berdyaev~s interpretation of Christianity differs
completely from that of the West. His audacious idea that
man as a free being mus·t be a spiritual being for only spirit
is free,and that he has a divine spark in him because he is
God.'s image/cannot be substantiated by the biblical revela-
tion.
Berdyaev's philosophy is also an incisive counter to
Marxism. It answers the 'hidden agenda', the inner themes,
in Marxism. While his views on God, philosophy and man, as
we have already seen, may be problematic to the western mind,
they are consistent with the picture of man and God - with a
few minor changes - that the Orthodox Church of Russia
presents.
Berdyaev argued that Marxism can neither be combated by
capitalism,which is an even greater evil, nor by counter
revolutionary forces. Hence he fell out with the Mensheviks
because he believed that they did not see the truth of
Marxism, nor did they understand that revolution was not
a political or socio-economic crisis. In actual fact, the
Revolution was the result of the failure of Christianity
in the world; the reaction of suffering people against a
distorted image of God. The only answer to Marxism is a
religious revival for only a religious awakening can
extirpate the anti-Christ from the souls of men.
LUb.
Berdyaev mainta~ned that Communism essentially propagated a
dogmatic· and intolerant religion of its own: a messianic
concept of the proletariat4 and/like every extreme revolu-
tionary ideologyu an unconscious survival of dualistic
Manichean tendencies and ~a sharp distinction between the
kingdom of a good god and that of an evil god, a dualism
~larxism hopes; 'l/>Jill be overcome with the victory of the
proletariat. u5Berdyaev argued that Marx 8 s proletarian
Co~nunism was a secularised form of the ancient Jewish
chiliasm g a 'chosen class takes the place of the chosen
6people' • Berdyaev cites the experience of K. Leontyev
who lost faith in a positive religious vocation of the
Russian people and began to believe that Russia was destined
to bring forth anti~Christ. Russian remained messianic,
but in an evil sense. Such is the type of messianism,
Berdyaev argues, that emerges in Boshevism and in Communism .7
However, as Berdyaev goes on to show, Marxism which 'prefers
the most naive materialism u is an extreme idealism' ~Jbecause
'the proletariat' is not an empirical reality but an idea.
He writes,
It is impossible to understand Communism if
one sees in it only a social system. But one
can comprehend the passionate tone of anti-
religious propaganda and persecution in Soviet
Russia; if one sees Communism- as a religion
that is striving to take the place of
Christianity. Only a religion is characterised
by the claim to possess absolute truth; no
political or economic movement can claim that
.... Only a religion has a catechism which is
obligatory for everyone ..• Recognising
itself as the one true religion, it cannot
suffer other false religions alongside of it.
Besides it is a religion that aims at making
its way into life by force and coercion,
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taking no account of the freedom of the
human spirit. 8
The anti-Christ emerges in Marxism as la divinised collec-
. . t . 9t1Vl y'. Hence Marxism constitutes a great danger to
human freedom because man is reduced to !a function of
society and even~ more precisely, of a class. Man does
. 1 . i .10 Mid t' .not exist, only h18 c ass eXlsts.. arx s oc rlne 18
changed from Feuerbachus anthropocentricism to 'socio-
centricism i or °proletariocentricism i • Marxus man has
'lost the image and the likeness of God; he is the image
d · f'" 11 d t f h' . 1of an llkeness 0 soc1ety'p a pro.uc 0 lS SOC1a
surroundings s of the economics of his epoch; of his class.
It has been repeatedly stated that Berdyaev's philosophy is
not free from problems of its own. It remains a highly
rationalistic constitutive model which is based on certain
inexplicable and undemonstrable ~ priori, the Ungrund, the
primordial freedom that pre-exists God and man, the absolute free-
dom of God and Man, and manls possession of the spark of
the divine. When ultimately Berdyaev is pressed (like
Barth had done) to show the basis for these presuppositions,
he has recourse to affirming intuitive mysticism, a realm
that he cannot be drawn out from since it is ~ priori not
logical. This type of argument may well open him to the
charge of escapism.
Yet, on the other hand, he is not wary of indulging in
speculative philosophy in order to find a purpose or justi-
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fication for human existence. However, this very attempt
at explanation, as it has been discussed already, is
problematic. Furthermore, it undermines the very basis
of BerdyaevDs mysticism. The problem of how to make an
intuitive grasp of an idea or mystical understanding acces-
sible rationally still remains!
Furthermore, how can one judge when one has had a mystical
experience; that is/what criterion can be used to distinguish
true mystical truth. from hallucination? Of course, such an
objection undermines mystical postulates especially since
freedom is primordial/there can be no norm that is indepen-
dent of i-t and prior to ita Yet if there can be no norm
that guides one with regard to mystical experience then
any experience can be claimed by anyone to be mystical.
The problems Berdyaev runs into with regard to subjective
experience is no different frornthe ones the existentialists
encountered. To counter this they introduced the category
of 'authenticity', claiming that authenticity was the
ultimate means by which one can judge'good faithl. But
even this is not helpful since it is even more subjective
than mere good faith.
Another problem that Berdyaev does not seem to address is
the universal validity of his truth-perspective. In a
multi-religious world, how does Berdyaev expect to convince
the rest of the world about his philosophy if it is ultimately
based on the fact of revelation2 However significant and
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plausible his_ arguments may ~e from the idea of_the God-manu
the difficulty he faces is how to convince all the worldis
religious populations that Christ Jesus is indeed the God-
man and that God does identify with man in history. For
example v that the docetic avatar of Hinduism is inadequate
to grasp history. Berdyaev cannot very well ignore this
problem for his philosophy of history; creativity and
eschatology is the prophetic anticipation of the destiny of
all men. However p it is interesting to note; as Donald
Lowrie reports, that at a meeting in the Sorbonne it was
Cl. Hindu.scholar; . who called Berdyaev 'his mas'cer
among western thinkers i • 12 Berdyaev Illay yet have
universal appeal!
However v since he so emphatically declares that the kingdom
of God must be prepared for by man, who in his creativity
seeks redemption, Berdyaev means the creativity of all of
man. But if half the world does not accept Berdyaevis
~ priori; the God-man, they will be excluded from the
preparation of the kingdom of God. What becomes of the
eschatological consmamation of history that Berdyaev insists
must happen? This problem is especially acute since, un-
like in traditional western theology, for Berdyaev this
kingdom will be brought about by man, not God.
To briefly summarize, the problems in Berdayev's philosophy
include,
(i) His attempt to go beyond the 'facticityi of man to
account for him which leads to a speculative a priori;
(ii)
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The idea of powerlessness of God In the face of man's
. -....
freedom;
(ili) The essential divinity of man which has no real Biblica]
evidence;
(iv) His view that ultimate knowledge is only possible throus
mystical intuition. While he achieves here the import.:
task of bringing to bear the mystical on thought, this
option by its very nature remains controversial.
(v) His tru"th-perspec"tive which "takes as its fundamental
assumption the identification of God with man to be
made accessible to people of other religious faiths
who may not accept this idea,
(vi) Given the internal logic of Berdyaev's philosophy and
the 'tautological' method of writing, his philosophy
is a contribution only to believers; for none of his
ideas are universally valid from the epistemological
and rational point of view.
This last point raises a major methodological problem in
Berdyaevis thought. Everyone of his ideas is valid only
within the 'system'. The reader is left with the problem
of either accepting or rejecting Berdyaev's message as
a whole, for it is not possible to accept or reject parts
of it. He may argue in his defense that this is the nature
of truth, it cannot be bonum partem. On the positive side,
Berdyaev's cautiousness not to 'rush in where angels fear
to tread' and either like the neo-Positivists reduce every-
thing that cannot be explained to untruth and even non-sense,
or reduce human behaviour to empty actionalism as many of
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the existentialists have done, or to a type of operatiQna1ism
- -.-
as the Marxists had done. All these alternatives he quite
convincingly has shown, undermine the freedom of man.
Furthermore, Berdyaev provides for both philosophy and
theology a starting point for renewed dialogue v and a new
possibility for the healing of manus fractured world=view
since the Enlightenment. Faith and reason; theology and
philosophy; metaphysics and epistemology, morality and
economics; politics and society v and even theory and practice
have been set in incurable antithetical tension. Manu as it
were v has blown himself apart and the task facing philosophy
(and theology) is to reconstitute meaning and truth, and to
heal the terrible schism in manws mind e nay, his soul (his
being - tUE..u K.I\( ). Berdyaev V s philosophy is such cm attempt~
It affirms freedom as a non-negotiable ~ priori, man's
spiritual nature as the terminus ~ quo, the humane as the
t ' d d h t' 't Id' d' 12erm1nus a quem an uman crea 1V1 y as man s mo us vlven 1.
His thought is saved from lapsing into empty actionalism
since the object of manus striving, the model par excellence,
is the historical Christ-event, wherein
had been wonderfully manifested.
man's possibilities
Ultimatelyu one is forced to accept Berdyaev's philosophical
presuppositions on the basis of faith for there is no other
way to understand the Christ-event. The empt1'ness of th_e
nineteenth century historical quest for the historical Jesus
and the spiritless alternative of ethical monotheism of the
History of Religions School show that any other way to under-
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stand the Christ-event is an exercise in futility. Having
. - -.
accepted his presuppositions u Berdyaev argues consistently
and is not unmindful of the criticism levelled above. In
fact, he refused to attempt to prove, or attempt to demon-
strate, either the existence of God or the Ungrund; that
would be proceding in the way of Graeco-Roman logicality,
which he severely criticised (cf. Chapter 1). It would
lead to levelling off the mystery of both God and human
existence, and invariably, would lapse into quantification~
the obsession of the Brealm of Caesar'.
A severe criticism that can be made against Berdyaev is
that he makes faith and man's justification entirely a
human work. There is here no room, for example, for LuUler's
view of faith as coming Wann es in das Treffen get of or for
justification by faith, not v.lOrks. Is Berdyaev Bs optimism
perhaps not blinding him to the reality of 'sin! and the
debilitating power of 'sin' over man, which even non-Christian
philosophers have perceived as the Birrationality' of
exis-tence, its accompanying fear and dread and its unpredic-
tabilitY6 Having read Berdyaev's works carefully, one can
almost hear how he would counter the charge! He would affirm
that man must work out his own salvation with fear and
trembling, Le. through redemp-tive suffering and creativity
since he is a creature of space and time and that it was
imperative for him to do so since in the realm of the Spirit
his redemption has been already wrought, the sign of which
is the fact of the Christ-event. Manifest on earth what
is already true in 'heaven', he would say! Faith as
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poten'tiality of the Spirit mu~t be manifest in human effort.
He would explain justification by faith, by his idealism.
For him if redemption was not manls own responsibility
then man 9 s freedom was greatly endangered.
However, it could be asked whether there is in fact any
difference between Berdyaevls postulate 'freedom ' and,
for example, SartreUs postulate INothingness u • Are they really
all that different? Both are primordial and both cannot be
demonstrated. Hm",ever, Berdyaev would answer that his U free·-
dom' is an attempt to understand God and man, and to undergird
human freedom and morality. To present to man not only the
challenge of freedom but to show the existential (not
existentialist) possibility for man to be truly humane; to
give man an incentive to strive to be fully human. In so far
as Berdyaev sets this struggle for the humane in ongoing
creativity and in so far as this creativity is the correlative
of GodDs creativity, man is set coram Deo and this dynamism at
least prevents the dogmatism and intolerance of some of the
existentialists and Marxists, and we may add, the religionists.
What then is of lasting value in Berdyaev's thought? It is
clear that in spite of the points of controversy in his
thought, the two ideas of Freedom and Necessity and the
quest for the humanity of man, that is, the development of
personality cannot be separated from the rest of his thought.
The lasting legacy left in his philosophy include:
(i) The affirmation of the category of the spiritual in
describing man. There is as much evidence for calling man a
spiritual being as there is f?r calling him a rational,
irrational~ psychological or emotional being,
(ii) Given the category of the spiritual, man is essentially
free. He is not condemned to be free in the Sartrian sense.
He is both free to choose good or evil and free to remain in
the truth 0 However, he may jusJc as easily enslave himself
d de hl's human]'~y W'nl'le. as Sar-tre mav say. he doesan ny -_. L o. .1,
this of his own choosing, Freedom for Berdyaev is not the
empty freedom of actionalism but the meaningful freedom
that preserves man in his essential humanity, his personality.
(iii) Although he does not provide a satisfying answer to
why man was created in the first place, he nonetheless asks
the question. In this regard, Berdyaev asks the most funda-
mental question of all, even more fundamental than the
, '1' IeXJ.st.entla lstS. While the philosopher accepts that there
could never be a conclusive answer to this question, to ask
it would be to help clarify the purpose of man, which is an
ongoing quest.
(iv) Man's fate is entirely in his own hands. While God
may suffer on behalf of man, for that is all he can do, it
is in the end up to man himself to strive for the realiza-
tion of humanity in terms of his higher purpose.
Berdyaev's answer to what the higher calling of man is and the
end his freedom must be exercised may not satisfy all.
Nevertheless, the question must be asked again and again,
for whatever else be the purpose of philosophy, the quest
for humanity as the existential implication of Freedom
remains its enduring responsibility. This responsibility
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Berdyaev clearly grasps and, as M.M. Davy states it,.
Berdyaev speaks to all who are turned
tmvards the Light, hoping to respond to
their tragic destiny and through their
creative freedom to play their part in
-the transfiguration of the cosmos. 15
To summarize, the lasting value of Berdyaevis philosophy
firstly lies in his clear grasp of the nature of freedom
vis-~-vis necessity, a problem that has remained unresolved
in Kant, Hegel, the Existentialists and the Marxists.
Secondly, his understanding of personality vi~-a-vis
individuality. f.\LA. Vallon called Berdyaev the 'Apos-tle
of Freedom,.16 He may well be called also the evangelist
of personality! It is from the perspective of personality
that he repudiates technological, communistic, capitalistic
and all o-ther forms of besetting ideological slavery. In
our age of looming conflict between totalitarian power and
the increasing dehumanization of man by absolutist powers
(functionalism, scientism, technologism, ideological
oppression and such like), Berdyaev provides thought pro~
voking possibilities for a way out of the crisis that modern
man finds himself in.
In conclusion, it may be added that, while Berdyaev's
philosophy is a response to the exigencies of the twentieth
century as he experienced it, every human perspective is a
valid one. The implication is that, while no philosopher
can be credited with the entire truth, every attempt at
truth sheds a particular perspective on man, a perspective
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that has to be encountered ff there is a genuine desire to
understand man in the first place. Increased understanding
will necessarily lead to a dimunution of conflict, and,
while this conflict may not be entirely resolved by man
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